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ABSTRACT
Oil Pollution on the High Seas: The Establishment of an International Regime to Seal with
Public International Law and Private Law Issues, and the Role of Non-State Actors in Their
Resolution at the 1969 International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution (“Brussels
Conference”)
by
Milton D. Ottensoser
Advisor: Professor Ming Xia
On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon, an oil tanker flying the flag of Liberia and
carrying thirty million gallons of crude oil, smashed onto rocks off the coast of the United
Kingdom. The oil spill metastasized into an environmental catastrophe, and this event became
the first major environmental disaster of the electronic media age. As a direct result of the Torrey
Canyon catastrophe, two treaties were signed in November 1969, at a conference in Brussels
sponsored by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), a United
Nations Specialized Agency. The first treaty (the public law treaty) dealt with the right of a State
to intervene on the high seas in the event of potential damage from an oil spill, while the second
treaty (the private law treaty) dealt with the issue of financial liability of the owner (or charterer)
of a ship to those damaged by an oil spill.
The second treaty was and remains unique in that the participants agreed to a legally
enforceable compensation scheme in an amount of up to fourteen million dollars per incident
(subsequently raised over the years to several hundred million dollars) to damaged parties.
Moreover, the Brussels system of legal liability and mandatory compensation, despite the growth
of the environmental movement in the second half century after the Torrey Canyon incident, has
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not been replicated by other proposals or treaties (e.g., the Paris Climate Accords). Therefore, the
central question for analysis is to explain and trace the factors that produced the treaty and its
compensation scheme, and further, to explain the relevance of these processes to regime theory
and regime formation.
Accordingly, this dissertation examines the intense bargaining among States, IMCO, and
Non-State Actors in the establishment of the international regime at Brussels. Particular
emphasis is placed on the roles of the Non-State Actors, primarily shipping interests,
international insurance companies, and oil companies, in attempting to safeguard their sectoral
interests during the regime formation process. Further, individuals who held leadership positions
in some of these Non-State Actors also had professional relationships that overlapped with their
roles as members of State delegations and their official roles within IMCO. These interactions
are examined through concepts in interest group theory as developed by political scientists,
especially clientism, regulatory capture and non-decisions.
The bargaining process itself is analyzed through the neoliberal approach to regime
formation, which emphasizes negotiations and bargaining among the parties. This is in
contradistinction to a realist approach, which would center on a solution being imposed by the
strongest party. This approach also differs from the cognitivist approach, which would emphasize
that the participants were using a knowledge-based strategy, such as working to develop a
solution to marine pollution based on a common belief that the environmental integrity of the
oceans represents the highest good.
The dissertation further examines the impact on regime resilience of exogenous events,
such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, which, for all practical purposes, resulted in the
United States abandoning the multinational approach created at Brussels in favor of unilateral
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domestic legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The American unilateral approach, the
Brussels structure, and the alternate independent entities established by Non-State Actors (the
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution representing
shipping interests, and the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil
Pollution representing oil interests) all combined to form a regime complex with multiple power
centers.
Finally, on a broader theoretical basis, this study relies on a critical case study. While the
utility of critical case studies has been debated for decades among social scientists, its usefulness
as a tool in analyzing the regime complex first established a half century ago at Brussels is
crucial to understanding why and how this regime developed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
I.

The Scope of the Inquiry
This dissertation centers on the establishment of an international regime in 1969

to deal with the problem of oil spills resulting from oil tanker crashes on the seas. A crash
(in common parlance “an accident”) differs from deballasting, a routine maritime
maneuver, which is defined as the deliberate discharge of oily water from a ship and is
the subject of a different international regime.1 Accordingly, deballasting is discussed
briefly in this dissertation only in the broader context of international environmental
issues. The issue of maritime oil pollution resulting from ship crashes gained significant
traction after the Torrey Canyon episode of March 18, 1967, in which a massive oil
tanker smashed onto submerged rocks off the coast of the United Kingdom. The collision
resulted in enormous environmental damage, and concomitantly became a worldwide
news story.2
This proposed international regime was formalized by the signing of two treaties
in Brussels in November 1969 at a conference (“the Brussels Conference”) sponsored by
the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (“IMCO”), a specialized
agency of the United Nations. Each treaty dealt with a different aspect of the issue of
maritime oil spills. The first treaty, the International Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (“public law treaty” see Appendix
1) dealt with the Public International Law issue of the right of a State to intervene on the
seas against a vessel registered in another State, which vessel (typically an oil tanker) was
causing significant environmental damage to the seas, and to the coastal regions of the
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impacted State.3 As will be demonstrated below, the right of intervention against an
offending vessel overturned centuries of traditional Public International Law.
The second treaty, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (the “private law treaty” or the “civil law treaty” see Appendix 2),
dealt with the financial liability of the offending ship owner/charterer/cargo owner to
third parties for environmental damage, including cleanup costs and damages sustained
by governments and non-State entities.4
This dissertation's primary focus is on the private law treaty and its unique
provisions, which established liability against a ship owner or charterer of up to fourteen
million dollars per episode and which further incorporated the onerous strict liability
standard rather than a lesser negligence standard. Accordingly, the private law treaty
stands separate and apart from other environmental treaties, which for the most part
center on technical matters or the establishment of voluntary goals by the signatories.5
Therefore, the central question for analysis is to identify the factors that led to the
formation of this international regime at Brussels in 1969.
A prerequisite to answering this question requires a definition and understanding
of international regimes, which were defined by Stephen Krasner as “sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations...Decision making
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”6
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II.

The Research Questions

As previously stated, the major research question is: which factors led to the
formation in 1969 at Brussels of the international regime that addressed the twin issues of
intervention on the high seas against ships spilling oil as a result of a crash, and the and
financial liability of ships for damages resulting from these oil spills? Additionally, the
related question is: of which factors and interests (e.g., bargaining resulting from the
conflicting interests of coastal states versus maritime states versus the interests of
powerful Non-State Actors) led to the incorporation of specific provisions of the public
law and private law treaties? Among the possible answers are:
a.

The emergence in the period 1941 to 1966 of norms of Public

International Law based on a “polluter pays principle,” essentially opening up the
possibility under international law of a victim of oil pollution obtaining
compensation for injuries from the ship that caused the injury;
b.

The emergence of environmentalism as an issue on the public agenda,

particularly the issue of oil spills resulting from tanker crashes, which as will be
demonstrated below, became part of the public agenda through an inordinate
amount of media coverage;
c.

The inadequate remedies for compensation to victims of oil pollution

damage under existing domestic laws and institutions;
d.

The interactions among States, IMCO, and Non-State Actors (insurance,

shipping, and petroleum) who, in the case of Non-State Actors, were guided by
market forces that led to inclusion in the private law treaty of terms based on
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these market forces to the exclusion of other possible factors, such as an approach
to the issue based on environmental integrity being the highest good, irrespective
of the financial cost involved.
These interactions among States, Public International Organization, and NonState Actors will demonstrate that the neoliberal approach on international regimes7 has
much to offer in the analysis of the Brussels Conference, particularly as it shall be viewed
through the paradigm of States, Public International Organization and Non-State Actors
“as rational egoists who care for only their own (absolute) gain.”8 Conversely, it will be
argued that despite an ostensible purpose of constructing a regime based on a common
awareness of the environmental dangers posed by massive oil spills (an “only one earth”
perspective), the cognitive approach is somewhat irrelevant because many of the
participants at Brussels had other priorities, such as maintaining the status quo, which led
to a dilution of treaty provisions dealing with liability of tankers for oil spills.9
A concomitant question is, why was the regime established at Brussels not
resilient or robust, and accordingly, why did it begin to disintegrate within twenty
years?10 Why is the private law treaty as was amended sui generis, and has not been
replicated or expanded by subsequent environmental treaties? Why did the United States
not sign the private law treaty, and instead opt for a policy of unilateral action?
Among the variables to be explored to answer this question are:
a.

The input of the Non-State Actors into the private law treaty reflected the

parochial needs of Non-State Actors instead of broader environmental concerns, and
therefore was not sustainable in the long term. More to the point, the weakness of the
private law treaty's compensation scheme became apparent after the 1989 Exxon Valdez
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catastrophe, which prompted the United States to take unilateral action, which bypassed
Non-State Actors like insurance companies and relied on a tax on oil to establish a trust
fund to be used to pay for oil cleanup costs;
b.

The initial reluctance of coastal States such as Canada and Ireland to

participate based on an initial perception that the regime was inadequate to compensate
victims in the event of a major oil pollution disaster.

III.

The Use of a Critical Case Study

The analysis of the proceedings of the Brussels Conference and the significance
of its results utilizes the case study method, which is defined as “the detailed examination
of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be
generalizable to other events.”11
The threshold question is whether a single case, such as the Brussels Conference,
can be used to develop an explanation of environmentalism, international regimes, or
anything else. In their landmark book, Designing Social Inquiry, Gary King, Robert D.
Keohane and Sidney Verba12 argue, essentially, that it is not possible. Picking up on
Harry Eckstein's statement that a crucial case study based on “a single measure on any
pertinent variable,”13 they argue that a crucial case is not reliable because of the existence
of alternative explanations, errors in measurement, and simply because the world is not
deterministic – there are always unknown, omitted variables.14 Based on this approach,
one could readily argue that a study using the Brussels Conference has limited probative
value.
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There are two approaches to justifying the use of a critical case study. First, in
practical terms, the private law treaty is sui generis. The incorporation into an
international treaty of a “polluter pays” principle,15 requiring offenders to pay up to
fourteen million dollars to the victims of marine pollution is not only unprecedented, but,
as will be seen in Chapter IV, simply not replicated. None of the well known
international environmental initiatives such as the United Nations Environmental
Programme, the Stockholm Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change (to name but a few) contain enforcement provisions even remotely
comparable to the private law treaty. Accordingly, the utility of using other cases in a
discussion of the Brussels private law treaty is questionable.
Further, the criticisms of the utility of a critical case study in Designing Social
Inquiry were addressed by, among others, Bent Flyvbjerg in “Five Misunderstandings
About Case-Study Research,”16 which reviewed the King, Keohane, Verba arguments,
and proceeded to highlight flaws in their approach, and accordingly justified the use of a
critical case study.
Needless to say, a descriptive case study is not an end onto itself. Rather, a case
study is combined with process tracing, which “is a set of procedures for formulating and
testing explanations.”17 This allows the researcher “to made causal inferences about a
single case or a small number of cases,”18 which, in turn enable one to engage in theory
testing or theory development.19
All of the methodological issues raised in this introduction will be reviewed and
amplified in Chapter III of this dissertation. Before addressing these methodological
matters, however, the background of this study, including the emergence of the
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environment as a policy issue, the development of international environmental law in the
mid-twentieth century, and the actual dynamics of the Torrey Canyon catastrophe, will be
reviewed and analyzed in Chapter II.

IV.

Structure of the Dissertation

After this introductory chapter, the dissertation continues with a discussion of the
policy issue of the environment in general, and a specific inquiry into the phenomenon of
marine pollution with specific emphasis on oil pollution of the seas. Thereafter, since the
Brussels Conference formulated two treaties that were based upon and actually expanded
norms of international law, an analysis will be made of which provisions of international
law were relevant to the creation of an international regime regulating oil pollution of the
seas. Emphasis will be placed on the fact that during the twenty-five-year period
immediately prior to the Torrey Canyon (1941 to 1966), principles of international law
emerged that formed the legal basis of the two conventions signed at Brussels. The
chapter concludes with the Torrey Canyon incident itself – what happened, why the event
made such a major impact and what were the shortcomings of existing legal remedies that
led to the approach culminating in the Brussels Conference.
Chapter III discusses the existing literature on the Torrey Canyon and the Brussels
Conference, most of which is based upon interpretations of the legal implications of the
private law treaty. Since the existing literature does not view the Brussels Conference
through the paradigm of regime formation, there is a review of the literature of regime
formation and the schools of thought on regimes (realism, neoliberalism, and
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cognitivism). Further, there is a review of the literature on interest groups, especially as it
relates to regulatory capture, and overlapping memberships between the public and
private sectors, as well as a discussion of regime complexes, which are defined simply as
“a collective of partially-overlapping and non-hierarchical regimes.”20
This material is then integrated into an analysis of what the existing literature on
the Brussels Conference lacks, which, as previously indicated, is legalistic and generally
fails to analyze the Brussels Conference in regime formation terms.
Additionally, since the dissertation is based on a single critical case study, there is
a review and analysis of the existing literature on case studies, as well as a discussion of
why the critical case study is an appropriate vehicle to frame this dissertation.
Finally, since much of the material on the actual events at Brussels was obtained
from a series of interviews with elite actors who had first hand or intimate knowledge of
Brussels, there is a brief discussion of elite interviewing. (No other study of the Brussels
Conference was found that was based on elite interviews of some of the participants.)
These interviews were conducted in 1972 and the subjects included:
1. Claiborne Pell, United States Senator from Rhode Island, who sat on the United States
Committee on Foreign Relations, and chaired its subcommittee dealing with maritime
affairs;
2. Arvid Pardo, the United Nations Ambassador from Malta and known as “the father of
the law of the sea;”
3. Peter Ghee, Chief Maritime Counsel, Mobil Oil;
4. Robert Neuman, United States Department of State, and head of the American
delegation to the Brussels Conference, as well as three of his aides;
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5. Allan I. Mendelsohn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Transportation Affairs) of
the United States Department of State.
Chapter IV is a study of the Brussels Conference as regime formation. The key
questions include: who were the actors (State, Public International Organization, NonState Actors – shipping, petroleum and insurance); what were the preferences of the
actors; and which resources did they utilize in the bargaining process? In which way did
the private law treaty reflect the preferences of the participants in the bargaining process;
and which school of thought of regime formation (realism, neoliberalism, or cognitivism)
best explains the process?
Additionally, with the Exxon Valdez episode in 1989 (the American counterpart
to the Torrey Canyon), why did the United States decide to abandon entirely the
multilateral regime established at Brussels, and instead acted unilaterally by passing the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990? Concomitantly, why was the international regime that was
centered on the private law treaty not resilient or robust enough to survive an Exxon
Valdez environmental catastrophe? What does this demonstrate about regime formation?
The dissertation concludes with a final chapter which summarizes the findings of
this study, and its importance to the field of international relations. As will be seen below,
the contours of the international regime created at Brussels in 1969 were shaped by
competing forces consisting of participating States, IMCO, and most importantly NonState Actors, primarily shipping interests, marine insurers, and international oil
companies. Moreover, an unforeseen event, the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, prompted
the United States to abandon entirely the multilateral approach, and opt instead for
unilateral action through the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER I
1

Deballasting is covered by the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of

the Sea by Oil (OILPOL), which was amended in 1962 and 1969, and was succeeded in 1973 by
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL). It should be
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Chapter 2: Evolution of Environmental Issues and Legal-Political Response
I.

The Emergence of the Environment as a Policy Issue

In the late 1960s, much public attention in the United States, as well as in other
industrialized and non-industrialized states, became focused on problems of the environment.1
According to Oran Young, an early pioneer in the study of global environmental issues and
related regime formation and governance issues in international politics, “international
environmental problems sets” can be grouped into four clusters: international commons; shared
natural resources; transboundary externalities; and linked issues.2
Overpopulation, climate change, pollution of air and the seas, inadequate methods of
waste disposal, depletion of fish stock and renewable resources, biodiversity, and sustainable
development became matters of concern to private citizens and Non- State Actors, as well as to
governments of different countries and various levels. Whether or not the apocalyptic vision of a
world suffocating under its wastes, which some early proponents of ecological reform believed
would become reality unless drastic measures were promptly taken, represented an exaggerated
view of the situation, it is clear that the question of environmental degradation has become an
increasingly important component of political debate.3
The environmental challenges raised the issues of both cause and response. Although the
challenge, its cause, and its response can all be global in scale, and therefore fall into the concern
of political scientists, a subtle difference over emphasis does exist: causal explanations have
attracted more biological and natural scientists, while responses and solutions offer opportunities
to politicians and political scientists. The multiplicity of governmental environmental initiatives
has been staggering. Take the United States as an example: “Since the first Earth Day in April
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1970, federal, state and local governments have adopted dozens of major laws and hundreds of
regulations to protect natural resources and foster sustainable approaches to economic
development. New institutions, such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), have been created, and governments have assumed a wide range of new
responsibilities.”4
Needless to say, the environmental movement was not born in 1970. Naturalist and
conservationist John Muir founded the Sierra Club in 1892. In the United States during the early
twentieth century, the conservation movement bore fruit in the establishment of a vast network
of national parks. Further, almost a decade prior to the first Earth Day, Rachel Carson wrote the
best-selling book Silent Spring (1962), which described in vivid detail the far-reaching
consequences of the widespread use of chemicals, especially insecticides, on the environment.5
As Robert Gottlieb observed in Where We Live, Play, and Work (1993):
Pollution issues are not just a recent concern; people have recognized, thought about, and
struggled with these problems for more than a century in significant ways. A history that
separates resource development and its regulation from the urban and industrial
environment disguises a crucial link that connects both pollution and loss of wilderness.6
Similarly, States in other parts of the globe have likewise added provisions to their constitutions,
enacted legislation and established bureaucracies that deal with environmental matters.7 Thus, in
the nineteenth century, the River Commissions for the Rhine and the Danube started to address
environmental issues of rivers and waterways in Europe. Article 48A of the Constitution of
India, which was enacted in 1976, provides that, “The State shall endeavour to protect and
improve the environment.”8 China has undertaken numerous environmental initiatives including
a broad statute from 1995 called the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention
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and Control of Atmospheric Pollution.” The Japanese government has a Ministry of the
Environment to administer the Basic Environment Law of 1993, which provides a broad plan for
control of environmental issues. Additionally, Article 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of The
European Union encompasses a requirement that “Environmental protection requirements must
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development.” Further, Articles 191 to 193 of
this treaty amplify the general goals in environmental matters of the European Community.
In the area of international relations, there has been a proliferation over the past fifty
years of treaties, conferences, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements concerned with
environmental degradation. Starting in 1972 with the Conference on the Human Environment
held in Stockholm, the United Nations has held a series of conferences that included the
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1993, a General
Assembly Special Session on the Environment in 1997, and the Climate Change Conferences
held in Durban in 2011 and in Paris in 2015. In addition, the United Nations has created an
agency, the United Nations Environment Programme, to act in environmental matters. Further,
numerous regional and bilateral arrangements have been created to deal with environmental
matters.9
Skirting the question of the origin of the environmental movement, the threshold issue is
one of definition. The central issue is environmental degradation which is caused by a society’s
economic and/or social behavior and is simply defined as, “any reduction in the environment’s
contribution to economic well-being.”10 The degradation can be total, which is termed
“exhaustion,” or partial, which is termed “depletion.”11 Conversely, if a society engages in
economic and/or social behavior that results in the needs of the present generation being met

14

without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, such a society is
engaging in sustainable behavior.12 Therefore, “a sustainable society does not use natural
resources or produce wastes faster than they are regenerated or assimilated by the
environment.”13
Needless to say, there is a tension between development and sustainability. It is, by way
of example, difficult to reconcile two provisions of The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development. Specifically, Principle 2 provides:
States have, in accordance, with the Charter of the United Nations, and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies.14
Simultaneously, Principle 4 provides that:
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an
integral part of the development and cannot be considered an isolation from it.”15
The key point about these institutions and activities is, however, that there exists no
central international entity regulating the environment. This stands in contrast to the World Trade
Organization, which was established in 1995 and has 153 States as members, and not only
facilitates trade among its members, but also monitors compliance. Because of the complexities
of environmental issues, international environmental law has not focused on compliance and
enforcement. Instead, the three major areas of activity center on the holding of international
conferences that articulate general principles designed to guide states towards environmental
protection, the drafting of treaties to deal with specific environmental problems with an aim of
establishing technical guideline on dealing with the particular problem, and the creation of
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voluntary self-regulatory regimes by Non-State Actors for environmental impact and risk
assessment.16

II.

Sources of Marine Pollution

Since this dissertation centers on the establishment of a regime to deal with oil spills on
the high seas, sources of ocean contamination should be briefly reviewed. Oceans, which occupy
three fourths of the earth’s surface, are probably the key portion of the biosphere. Particularly
vital is their role as a medium for the growth of fish, which provide significant amounts of
protein and other nutrients for much of mankind. Fish, however, are the end result of a food
chain process that originates at the level of phytoplankton, tiny organisms that serve as nutrients
for more complicated forms of life. In the North Atlantic area, 1,000 pounds of phytoplankton
produce:
One hundred pounds of zooplankton or shellfish;
Fifty pounds of anchovies and other small fish and ten pounds of small carnivores;
One pound of carnivores harvested by man.17
Phytoplankton, however, also has the ability to attract, absorb, and retain extraneous
substances. Heavy metals such as aluminum, copper, and lead can be concentrated by the
phytoplankton at levels up to one hundred thousand times the concentration in the surrounding
environment.18 By destroying the phytoplankton, the rest of the food chain suffers
commensurately. Besides the food factor, mankind benefits from the oceans in other ways.
Oceans provide recreation for swimmers and surfers, livelihoods for fishermen and sailors on
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merchant vessels, and most precipitation originates as evaporation and condensation of ocean
waters. Many biologists maintain that life itself originated in the oceans.
Conversely, oceans have also served as humanity’s ultimate sewer. Because of a
prevailing belief that oceans can accommodate a limitless flow of man’s wastes, enormous
quantities of refuse, sewage sludge, industrial wastes, and dredging spoils are continuously being
emptied into the seas. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, at the time of the Torrey Canyon
episode, the Brussels Conference and the ocean protection regulation enacted by the United
States and Canada, the environmental degradation of the oceans was horrific. A report prepared
in 1970 by the Dillingham Environmental Corporation for the Bureau of Solid Waste
Management estimated that the yearly amount of wastes discharged from the coastal regions of
the United States totaled 48,210,710 tons.19 Impressive scientific evidence was being
accumulated that indicated that oceans’ capacity to absorb wastes was not unlimited. On a more
impressionistic basis, in 1970, Thor Heyerdahl, after crossing the Atlantic Ocean on the Ra,
noted that oil globs and manmade debris virtually carpeted the ocean.20 In 1970, governmental
officials and scientists publicized the existence of the New York Bight disposal area where
sludge had accumulated for over forty years. The conditions were so severe that it was termed a
dead sea and oxygen levels were not deemed sufficient to support various forms of aquatic life
including shellfish.21 Other detrimental results of certain pollutants include mutant forms of fish
and fish with cancerous growths.22
The problem of maritime pollution was summed up best by Barbara Ward and Rene
Dubos. “Every ounce hitherto dumped or channeled into the sea, from the very morning of time
until the modern age of general industrialization, has accumulated in one form or another inside
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the same landlocked sea, the lowest section of our biosphere and the only one with no outlet for
refuse.”23
There exist at least three major categories and/or sources of ocean pollutants. The first
two—chlorinated hydrocarbons and waste dumped from vessels—while significant, are not,
however, relevant to this study.24 Oil pollution, however, is a significant ongoing problem and
forms the core of this study. The most common ways in which oil enters the marine environment
are:
a)

Naturally, via seepage and from the decay of marine and animal life.

b)

Off shore oil exploration.

c)

Deballasting by tankers.

d)

Tanker break-up.

e)

Loading accidents in port.

f)

Wastes from land-based petroleum use and refining being dumped into the seas.

While the exact quantity of oil discharged into the seas is unknown, it has been estimated
that about one million metric tons of oil are spilled annually into the seas from oil transport, and
the total from all of man’s activities is probably ten times that figure.25 The largest single source
of oil in the sea probably comes from deballasting and other cleaning operations by tankers and
other ships.26
Yet, it should also be noted that oil seepage occurs in large quantities naturally. Oil was
observed in the Santa Barbara Channel off California as early as 1793, years before oil was used
in significant quantities.27 Nonetheless, with the increase in size and number of tankers, and the
acceleration of the development of offshore petroleum exploration, it is these sources of
pollution by oil that are becoming increasingly significant. Thus, in the late 1960s the average
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tanker weighed 12 thousand to 13 thousand tons. By 1972, there were four tankers in operation
of 325 thousand tons, and plans were being developed for 800 thousand-ton tankers.28 If but one
of these super tankers were to spill its cargo, the total pollution from tankers would increase by
twenty-five percent.29
When the Torrey Canyon became grounded off the English coast in 1967, thirty million
gallons of oil were spilled. The 1969 Ocean Eagle disaster near Puerto Rico resulted in a spill of
three million gallons.30 In addition, with the increase in offshore oil drilling, more accidents
became inevitable. The Santa Barbara disaster of January 1969, resulted in a spill estimated at
one to three million gallons.31 The 1989 Exxon Valdez grounding and the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil rig explosion dwarfed the magnitude of these events. To sum up, at the time of the
Torrey Canyon disaster, there occurred worldwide about ten thousand oil spills per year, two
thirds of which occurred in port and harbor areas, and the short-range prospect was for
proliferation of these discharges.32

III.

Environmental Degradation and International Law

If oil pollution of the seas is a significant international environmental issue, the point of
departure in acting in concert to devise a solution is to determine whether Public International
Law offers any agreed upon principles and guidelines upon which to craft an appropriate
response. As it turns out, the years from 1941 to 1966 (immediately prior to the Torrey Canyon
episode) marked a particularly fruitful time period in which Public International Law developed
to meet the challenge of environmental degradation.
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The threshold question, simply put, is whether the mere act of an oil tanker polluting the
seas through discharges of oil contravenes any principle of international law. Further, if such a
principle exists, is the ship- (or cargo-) owner financially liable to the entities or parties injured
by the oil spill? While a response might simply be that it is just plain wrong for a State or NonState Actor to degrade the biosphere, the answer is far more complex.
The more precise question is whether there exists a duty under the norms of Public
International Law not to degrade the biosphere, and if so, what are the consequences of
breaching this duty? Would such a breach of duty rise to the level of delictum iuris gentium,
"wrong against the law of nations"? To clarify, it is a fundamental principle of western
jurisprudence that liability accrues to a tortfeasor if a duty to others has been breached.33
Conversely, as general rule, no liability accrues in the absence of a breach of duty.34 The
counterpart principle in Public International Law is State Responsibility. Article 3 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility provides:
Article 3
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
There is an intentionally wrongful act of a State when:
(a) conduct consisting of an act of omission is attributable to the state under international
law; and (b) that conduct constitutes a breach of international obligation of the State.35

While rules and laws enjoining environmental damage by polluters in the domestic law
context can be traced to antiquity,36 there historically have been no counterpart prohibiting
pollution causing activities in Public International Law. The only exception is a generic
principle that a State has a duty not to cause harm or permit activities from its territory that
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cause harm to another State. (Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.)37 It has been observed that
the classical writers and commentators on Public International Law essentially had little, if
anything, to say on pollution-causing activities.38 The paucity of international norms is best
summed up as follows:
The classical references to pollution are few, and even then, in a context which makes
them to appear to be little more than footnotes to rules on warfare. Neither Grotius nor
any of the other classical writers appear to express any concern for the non-intentional
pollution of the environment. Their frame of reference was purposeful pollution as a
possible tactic of warfare, not pollution as the by-product of an industrial world.39
During the twenty-five-year period from 1941 to 1966, however, this absence of Public
International Law norms governing the pollution of transnational resources began to change
when three significant contributions were made to the body of international law governing the
pollution of transnational resources. The first resulted from a case of arbitration – the Trail
Smelter Arbitration – between the United States and Canada (1941). The second was a
multinational treaty – the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil (1954). The third resulted from the promulgation of the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the
Waters of International River by the International Law Association (1966). While each of these
three, especially in its own time, may not have been viewed as groundbreaking, their combined
effect was the establishment of a norm of Public International Law restricting the freedom of a
State and of Non-State Actors to pollute transnational resources at will and with impunity.
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A.

The Trail Smelter Arbitration – March 11, 194140

The Trail Smelter Arbitration arose out of the following circumstances. The
Consolidated Mining and Smelter Company owned a smelter located in Trail, British Columbia
(at that time still called the Dominion of Canada). The smelter, which was used to process zinc,
lead, and other metals, discharged fumes that caused damage to crops and forests in the State of
Washington. To resolve the issue of liability and the extent of damages, it was decided, pursuant
to a 1935 Special Agreement between the two counties, which established a three-person
arbitration panel to resolve all issues.
Article III of the Agreement empowered the Tribunal to decide four questions:41
1.

Whether damage caused by the Trail Smelter to the State of Washington has

occurred since the first day of January 1932, and, if so, what indemnity should be paid
therefor?
2.

In the event of the answer to the first part of the preceding Question being in the

affirmative, whether the Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from causing damage
in the State of Washington in the future, and, if so, to what extent?
3.

In the light of the answer to the preceding Question, what measures or regime, if

any, should be adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter?
4.

What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be paid on account of any

decision or decisions rendered by the Tribunal pursuant to the next two preceding
Questions?
The tribunal was authorized to answer the questions based on the law of the United
States as well as international law and practice. Further, each country was authorized to use
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scientists and technical experts to come to its conclusion, and, in fact, the Decision of Tribunal
incorporated expert testimony based on the data amassed by the scientists and technical
experts.42
The uniqueness of the task given to the tribunal was expressed in its final decision when
the Tribunal concluded, "No case of air pollution dealt with by an international tribunal has been
brought to the attention of the Tribunal nor does the Tribunal know of any such case. The
nearest analogy is that of water pollution. But, here, also, no decision of an international tribunal
has been cited or has been found."43
Since no precedent was available, the Tribunal used the reasoning of Professor Eagleton,
who wrote in Responsibility of States in International Law, "A State owes at all times a duty to
protect other States against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction." Further,
the Tribunal incorporated decisions of the United States Supreme Court in cases like State of
Missouri v. State of Illinois (200 U.S. 496,521), Kansas v. Colorado (185 U.S. 125), the State of
New York v. the State of New Jersey (256 US. 296, 309), the State of Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Company and Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Limited (206 U.S. 230),
which dealt with diversion of rivers, pollution of New York Bay, and air pollution crossing from
a one state to a second state.44
Therefore, the Tribunal held that "under the principles of international law, as well as the
law of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence."45
Within this legal framework, the Tribunal answered the four questions as follows:
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1.

Sulfur dioxide from the Trail Smelter had drifted into Washington State. The

scientific experts concluded that the sulfur dioxide impacted negatively on crop
development and forests. The American standard for computation of damages was
utilized by the Tribunal and was based on the reduction of the value of the land
(diminished crops, and diminished lower rentals for properties). No damages, however,
were awarded to the United States for violations of its sovereignty.46
2.

Initially, no decision was made on Question 2, and its resolution by the Tribunal

was deferred until October 1, 1940. Thereafter, the Tribunal decided that the damages
due from Canada to the United States amounted to $78,000. Ultimately, after protracted
negotiations between the United States and Canada, a government payment in the amount
of $350,000 was made.47
3.

The Arbitration Tribunal decided that permanent scientific instruments should be

strategically placed in border areas so that meteorological and other conditions could be
monitored, thereby ensuring compliance with the arbitration decision. Further, the
instruments would be monitored by two technical consultants who had been appointed by
their respective governments to assist the Tribunal experts in the fields of meteorology
and agriculture.48
4.

The Tribunal noted that the international regime established by it would prevent

further damage in the future. Moreover, as to any damages which, nonetheless, could
occur in the future, the Tribunal held, "an indemnity shall be paid for such damage, but
only when and if the two Governments shall make arrangements for the disposition of all
claims for indemnity under Article XI of the Convention."49
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While the Trail Smelter decision explicitly decided that a State would be financially
liable for serious damages to another State, the decision was limited to the facts of that
particular case, and there is no evidence that it was seen at the time as having any broader
implication for the international system.50
Yet, while it can be easily argued that while the participants in the Trail Smelter
Arbitration did not see the results as particularly groundbreaking,51 it is clear that the
Arbitrators’ decision had long-term significance in the rise of an environmental awareness,
which in turn would form the legal and intellectual basis of the development of international
regimes in the forthcoming decades.52
Specifically, the principle that emerged from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, namely that
the polluter is liable to his victims for harm caused by pollution activities (“polluter pays”) was
loosely incorporated thirty-one years later into Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment, which declared:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.53

It has been pointed out that this language does not replicate the Trail Smelter Arbitration
principle in that the Stockholm Declaration omits the qualifying adjective "serious" (serious
damage) in terms of what constitutes a breach of Public International Law.54 Fifty-one years
after the Trail Smelter Arbitration, at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992), the Rio
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Declaration on Environment and Development was adopted, and while it did not use the
adjective "serious," it clearly incorporated the principle of "polluter pays" as a principle of
international environmental law. Specifically, Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development states:
National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental
costs and the use of economic instruments taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.55
Finally, when the International Law Commission promulgated the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, the Trail Smelter Arbitration was mentioned several times in the Commentary as
a precedent for the incorporation of the principle of State responsibility for transboundary
environmental damages.56

B.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil

On May 12, 1954, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil was signed at a conference held in London.57 The Convention entered into force on July
26, 1958, and was modified by Amendments in 1962. These Amendments entered into force on
May 18 and June 28, 1967.
The problem addressed by the Convention was the deliberate discharge of oil (a process
known as deballasting) by ships in areas of the seas that were near coastal States but not part of
the territorial seas.
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Article III of the Convention addressed the issue of discharge of oil by ships in the
following manner:58
a)

the discharge from a ship to which the present Convention applies, other than a
tanker, of oil or oily mixture shall be prohibited except when the following
conditions are all satisfied:

(i)

the ship is proceeding en route;

(ii)

the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content does not exceed 60 litres per
mile;

(iii)

the oil content of the discharge is less than 100 parts per 1,000,000 parts of the
mixture;

(iv)

the discharge is made as far as practicable from land;

b)

the discharge from a tanker to which the present Convention applies of oil or oily
mixture shall be prohibited except when the following conventions are all
satisfied:

(i)

the tanker is proceeding en route;

(ii)

the instantaneous rate of discharge of oil content does not exceed 60 litres per
mile;

(iii)

the total quantity of oil discharged on a ballast voyage does not exceed 1/15,000
of the total cargo-carrying capacity;

(iv)

the tanker is more than 50 miles from the nearest land

The Treaty established neither any criteria for liability, nor did it establish an international
mechanism to punish offenders. It did not even incorporate the principle of "polluter pays"
within its terms. Rather, it merely contained a provision that a violation of its provisions:
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Shall be an offence punishable under the law of the relevant territory in respect of the
ship in accordance with paragraph (1) of Article 11.59
Appended to the Treaty were several Annexes that amplified its terms. Annex I set up the
territorial locations where a discharge of oil would be a violation of the Terms of the Treaty. As
a general rule, this area was within fifty miles off the coast of a contracting state. Further, the
captain of each ship was required to keep a log of discharges of oil during each voyage. In
addition, there was an Annex that contained specifications for the future construction of new
ships and tankers so that oil discharges would be less likely in the future.
While the Treaty did not establish negligence (as opposed to strict liability) as the
standard for liability, it did contain an important escape clause in Article IV which provides in
part: b) the source of oil or oily mixture resulting from damage to a ship or unavoidable leakage,
if all reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of
the leakage for the purpose or minimizing the escape.60
In other words, no liability would accrue in a scenario where a significant oil discharge
had occurred, which damaged extensively fishing or recreational facilities, as long as the owners
of the ship or tanker could argue that they had used reasonable measures to contain the discharge
of oil.
Another issue which the Convention dealt with was the all-important question of a ship’s
nationality. The Convention provides "The present Convention shall apply to sea-going ships
registered in any of the territories of a contracting government."61
Needless to say, different governments have radically different standards to regulate
shipping. Specifically, because of issues involving taxation (resulting in corporate inversions),
labor standards (wages and hours) and safety standards, significant numbers of ships are
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registered in countries that have a lax approach to these matters, which are generally termed
"flags of convenience." The Marshall Islands, Honduras, Liberia, and Panama are among States
that have lax standards. While the Geneva Convention on the High Seas62 provides that there
should be a genuine link between a ship and the State of its registration, this provision is
frequently ignored and certainly not enforced.63
Further, it should be noted that the Convention is essentially impossible to police and
enforce. A ship can deballast in a protected zone, and days or weeks may elapse before the
resulting oil slick is detected, thereby allowing the offender to continue its voyage undetected.
While the Convention was somewhat strengthened by the 1962 and 1969 amendments,
and further strengthened by a successor treaty, the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution of Ships and its 1978 protocol (MARPOL), it is questionable nonetheless whether it
has substantially alleviated the oil spill/discharge problem. Still, it should be viewed in the
context of an era when comparatively few perceived that oil spills posed a significant problem,
and even fewer believed that concerted international action was necessary to deal with the issue.
Accordingly, it would be fair to characterize the Convention as an affirmative statement
that certain transnational resources are protected from pollution damage. Nonetheless, the fact
that enforcement provisions were in the hands of individual states, the exception to liability and
the significant exception contained in Article III (b) makes the Treaty a relatively modest step.
The 1954 treaty as it was subsequently amended, was the subject of a scholarly analysis
by Professor Ronald B. Mitchell (International Oil Pollution at Sea), who described the
amendments as effective multinational efforts to increase compliance, and, in general, improve
the marine environment. He described compliance as, “an actor’s behavior that conforms to a
treaty’s explicit rules.”64 What Mitchell glosses over, however, are the facts that the specific
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“polluter pays” principle for damages (as promulgated in the Trail Smelter Arbitration), as well
as sanctions for noncompliance, are omitted in the treaty and in its amendments. In other words,
since there are no “explicit rules” providing for penalties and sanctions, there is no issue of
noncompliance which, of course, is what differentiates the 1969 Brussels private law treaty from
the 1954 convention, as well as from the 1996 London Protocol to the Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. The latter treaty
incorporated Article 15, which merely recommended that the parties to the treaty meet and work
out issues of liability. It is therefore submitted that the question of whether there is or is not
compliance with a treaty’s terms is secondary to the issue of why certain terms are incorporated
in a treaty and others are omitted.
Therefore, the question arises as to why sanctions were omitted in the 1954 treaty as
amended, in contradistinction to the 1969 private law treaty agreed to at Brussels, in which
sanctions were incorporated. The solution to understanding the difference might lie in politicaleconomic analysis such as overlaps in decisionmakers among participating states and in IMCO,
and whether IMCO was or was not a genuinely neutral agency.
Finally, it is worth noting the notorious 1986 case of the Khian Sea, a ship which carried
fourteen thousand tons of incinerated ash from Philadelphia, and traversed the seas for almost
two years, searching for a place to dump its cargo. The ash was ultimately dumped on a beach in
Haiti and in the Indian Ocean. Despite the existence of various conventions, no one was held
legally accountable for any damages in this matter.
Approximately four years after the Oil Pollution Convention was signed, the 1958
Convention of the High Seas, which was perhaps the landmark treaty of that era governing the
law of the sea, was agreed to in Geneva.65
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Article 24 provides:
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of
oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the
seabed and its subsoil, taking into account of existing treaty provisions on the subject.66
Article 25 dealt with an agreement by the covenanting parties, "to prevent pollution of the
seas from the dumping of radio-active waste, taking into account any standards and regulations
which may be formulated by the competent international organizations.”67
In addition, States pledged to "co-operate with the competent international organizations
in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from
any radio-active activities materials or other harmful agents."68
In sum, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, at best, contained precatory language
requesting States to draft regulations to prevent oil pollution of the seas, and to take measures to
prevent the discharge of radio-active materials. Conversely, the Convention contained no
provisions forbidding pollution of the seas or sanctions for violating its provisions.69

C.

The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers

The International Law Association (ILA), which was founded in Brussels, Belgium, in
1873, is a private (non-governmental) group of international lawyers. Among its activities is the
drafting of proposed rules of international law and conventions.70 Its objectives, as defined in its
Constitution, are the "study, clarification and development of international law, both, public and
private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect for international law." It
has consultative status as an international non-governmental organization with a number of the
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United Nations specialized agencies. The ILA holds biennial Conferences where the ideas
promulgated at its committees provide a forum for discussion. To date, seventy-five of these
conferences have been held.71
At its fifty-second conference held in Helsinki, Finland, in 1966, its Committee on the
Uses of Water of International Rivers offered a draft set of rules, The Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers. The Helsinki Rules covered the uses of international
drainage basins. Article II defined an international drainage basin as a "geographical area
extending over two or more States determined by the system of waters, including surface and
underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."72
Article III defined a basin state as, "a State, the territory of which includes a portion of
an international drainage basin."73
The governing principle of the Helsinki Rules was contained in the title of Chapter 2,
"Equitable Utilization of the Waters of an International Drainage Basin." This principle was
amplified in Article IV, which stated, "Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the drainage basin."74
Article V sets forth the criteria for determining the equitable share of an international
drainage basin. Among these, Article X dealt with pollution and provided:
1.

Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an

international drainage basin, a State:
(a)

Must prevent any new form of new water pollution or any increase in the degree

of existing water pollution which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a cobasin State.
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(b)

Should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in an

international drainage basin substantially caused in the territory.75
2.

The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to water pollution

originating:
(a)

Within the territory of a state, or

(b)

Outside the territory of the State’s conduct.

Article XI discussed compensation to the injured State:
1.

In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph 1 (a) of this chapter, the

State responsible shall cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the injured co-basin
State for the injury that has been caused to it;
2.

In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph I (b) of article X, if a State fails

to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter into negotiations with
the injured State with a view towards reaching a settlement equitable under the
circumstances. 76
Therefore, the Helsinki Rules incorporated the essence of the decision (“polluter pays”)
in the Trail Smelter Arbitration – polluters are liable for damage caused to other States because
of pollution-causing activities within its territorial boundaries.77
Accordingly, by 1966, it was clear that there existed principles of international law
governing the pollution of transnational resources. Specifically, responsibility under Public
International Law attached to the State that permitted pollution-causing activities within its
boundaries.
Nonetheless, it is also clear that the establishment of this principle of international law
did not have any institutional mechanisms attached to it that have provided for administrative
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sanctions to deter and/or punish the polluters of transnational resources. Rather, the principle of
"polluter pays" required voluntary adherence to a set of abstract principles without any operating
guidelines.
Specifically, while "polluter pays" became an accepted principle, it remains only an
abstraction unless and until guiding principles were agreed upon and established. Among these
principles are who is ultimately liable – the owner of a ship, the charterer of a ship, the owner of
the cargo, or are they jointly and severally liable? Which standards should be used – negligence,
gross negligence, willful acts, or strict liability? Who should be compensated – only States or
private groups and individuals such as fishermen, beach property owners, or other private
interests? Should there be limits to liability (such as found in the Warsaw Convention on
liability to international airline passengers) or should liability be unlimited?
In the absence of answers to these questions, the principle of "polluter pays" remains an
abstract notion, in effect, an empty shell. Moreover, it should be noted that the development of
these principles established in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, etc. must be placed in their proper
historical context. Specifically, they occurred alongside many treaties, both bilateral and
multinational, which governed many aspects of transnational resources, such as the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, the International Convention for the Safety of Life
on the Sea. the Standards for Training Certification and Watchkeeping, the International
Convention on Bills of Lading, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
and the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Convention. Additionally,
regional arrangements, such as the Rhine River Convention and the Treaty on Lake Constance,
were all products of the early to mid-twentieth century. Most of these agreements were at that
time seen as far more significant than the Trail Smelter Arbitration or the 1954 International
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Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. (See Table II-1 for a summary and
comparison of The Development of Principles of Public International Law Governing the
Pollution of Transnational Resources.)
All of this changed forever on March 18, 1967, the day that the oil tanker, Torrey
Canyon, smashed onto rocks off the coast of England, thereby causing a massive oil spill that led
to an environmental catastrophe.
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TABLE II-1
The Development of Principles of Public International Law Governing the Pollution of
Transnational Resources
State Duty Not To
Pollute Biosphere

Incorporates Polluter
Pays Principle

Trail Smelter Arbitration
(1941)

YES

YES

International Convention

YES

NO

YES

YES

For The Prevention Of
Pollution Of The Sea
By Oil (1954)

The Helsinki Rules On
The Uses Of Waters
Of International
Rivers (1966)
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IV.

The Torrey Canyon Episode

On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon, a supertanker of 120,890 deadweight tons,
smashed onto the Seven Stones reef while it was traveling at full speed on a voyage from Kuwait
to Milford Haven in Wales. The Seven Stones reef is a series of submerged rocks in international
waters off the southwest coast of England between the Scilly Islands and Land’s End. The
accident ruptured the Torrey Canyon’s tanks, and thousands of tons of oil escaped into the sea.
Salvage operations were abandoned when the ship broke into three pieces, thereby becoming the
largest shipwreck in history at the time.
While the Torrey Canyon was only one of several major oil spill disasters in the 1960s,
its impact transcended the physical damages it wrought.78 Although environmentalism had not
yet become an important issue in the popular mind (the first Earth Day in the United States was
not to occur for over three years), the Torrey Canyon disaster serves as a watershed incident in
the development of an awareness of environmental degradation in general, and more specifically,
in the problem of oil spills and the codification of sea law79 as applicable to environmental
disasters.
The shipwreck became an international news story, with intensive coverage from print
and electronic media. It received frontpage coverage in the New York Times (March 25, March
28 and March 29, 1967), including a dramatic frontpage picture of the burning ship being
bombed by the Royal Air Force in a vain attempt to halt the environmental catastrophe.80
Decades later, Richard Hobbie, the president of the Water Quality Insurance Syndicate in New
York, speaking at a seminar in New York sponsored by the American Institute of Marine
Underwriters summed up the impact of the Torrey Canyon incident:
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The graphic pictures that came out of the Torrey Canyon incident with the Royal Air
Force attempting to bomb the vessel, and the oil washing onto the beach are still with us
today. That event more than any other ushered in the modern era of pollution legislation
and public awareness of the issue.81
It is revealing to note that as a general rule, oil spills from ships tended to be more highly
publicized in the media than those emanating from other sources (with the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil rig catastrophe being a notable exception).
While oil spills from vessels represented only about forty percent of the total amount
discharged in recent years, they attracted disproportionate media scrutiny and public
attention because they were more likely to be dramatic events in sensitive coastal waters
affecting America’s shorelines. For example, while the COSCO BUSCAN spilled only
about 54,000 (gallons) of oil in San Francisco Bay, it captured extensive media attention,
prompted congressional hearings, and resulted in criminal convictions for both the vesseloperating company and the pilot. By comparison, oil spills from non vessel sources,
which have typically been more localized, have attracted less national media attention.
For example the discharge of over 800,000 gallons of crude oil into the Kalamazoo River
in Michigan on July 26, 2010 garnered little national attention,
More recently, the July 6, 2011 discharge of approximately 42,000 (gallons) of
crude oil from Exxon Mobil’s Silvertip pipeline into the Yellowstone River in Montana
attracted only modest media attention. It appeared to be handled as a routine incident by
both the responsible party and government officials.”82
In retrospect, the Torrey Canyon episode was the first of numerous environmental
disasters that received worldwide coverage. The Torrey Canyon itself, however, was a
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nondescript oil tanker, one of thousands that traverse the oceans daily and are an integral part of
the international petroleum industry. It was constructed in the United States by the Newport
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in 1959. Originally, the ship had a deadweight
tonnage of 65,920. In 1965, the ship was enlarged, or jumboized, in Japan by the Sasebo Heavy
Industries Co. The vessel was cut in half and a new center section was added, increasing its
deadweight to over 120,000 tons, thereby widening and lengthening her. At the time of the
accident, the ship was only fifty-seven feet shorter than the Queen Elizabeth, the iconic ocean
liner, which at that time was the largest passenger vessel in the world.83
The facts of the Torrey Canyon’s ownership and registration are indicative of the
complexity of establishing liability in contemporary maritime litigation. Despite the fact that the
ship had no physical connection whatsoever with Liberia, the Torrey Canyon was registered in
Monrovia, Liberia, and flew that country’s flag. She was owned by the Barracuda Tanker
Company of Bermuda, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Union Oil Company of California. On
her last voyage, she was on charter to British Petroleum Ltd., and carried a Greek crew and an
Italian captain. The crude oil cargo was loaded at Mena Al Ahmadi on the Persian Gulf.
Although the disaster occurred in international waters, the resulting oil spill damaged beaches
and property in France and Britain, as well as impacting negatively on the coastal fishing
industry.84
The Liberian registry of the Torrey Canyon was not accidental. By registering the ship in
Liberia, the owners were able to create a favorable climate for the business of transporting large
quantities of crude oil.
Traditionally, a ship is obligated to follow the law of its flag state; coastal and port states
cannot impose their laws on a foreign vessel. The principle of flag state supremacy over
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port or coastal states gives ships of a state with less stringent maritime laws some
competitive advantage over ships from states with stricter laws.85
The environment consequences of the Torrey Canyon incident were monumental. Huge
numbers of fish and seabirds were killed or injured. Livelihoods of fishermen and resort owners
were upended. The cleanup cost for oil removal in the Channel Islands and Brittany was three
million English Pounds. Beyond the specter of ecological disaster, important legal questions
arose as thousands of tons of crude oil began polluting the seas and beaches:
1.

Did the British Government have a legal right to destroy the vessel in order to

protect its coast and territorial seas?
2.

If the ship were to be destroyed as a result of British governmental action, were

the British obligated to compensate the owners of the ship and/or its cargo for loss of
vessel and cargo?
3.

What were the obligations of the owners and/or charterers of the Torrey Canyon?

If they were found liable, to whom were they liable and for what amount? Where would
the venue of the litigation be?
The answer to question number one appeared to be "no." At that time, no convention
existed which permitted a State to intervene on the high seas against a vessel of another
nationality in such a situation. While an "abatement theory" (the right, akin to self-defense, to
intervene unilaterally to abate an imminent danger) might be utilized as a justification for such
an action, this theory has generally not been accepted by international lawyers as a valid
rationale for such actions.
In reference to questions two and three above, while these were highly technical
questions involving domestic, as well as international law, it was evident that contemporary
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practice absolved the shipping interests from assuming total liability in such a situation.
More specifically, the answer to the second question seemed to be no. The initial British
position was that if such drastic action were undertaken, the government could be sued by a
Dutch salvage company, which had contracted for salvage rights by British Petroleum, for loss of
the cargo, and by Union Oil and its subsidiary, the Barracuda Tanker Corporation, for loss of the
vessel. British Defense Minister Denis Healey stated, "We are not in a position to be able to set
fire to the ship until they (the owners) give their agreement that this can be done."86 Instead, it
afforded the Dutch salvagers several opportunities to refloat the vessel and also consulted with
the owners. John Nott, a Conservative MP noted, "Can anyone believe, if a British tanker had
gone aground outside New York harbor, President Johnson would still have been negotiating
with the British owners ten days later?"87
Finally, after high winds had caused the ship to break into several sections and most of
the cargo of oil had been discharged, the British government elected to bomb the vessel. The task
was substantially more difficult than had been originally anticipated. Ultimately, 161 thousandpound bombs, eleven thousand gallons of kerosene, three thousand gallons of napalm, and
sixteen rockets were utilized to destroy the wreck and the oil.88
Most troublesome was the question of liability for damages inflicted by the Torrey
Canyon on the French and British coasts. Great Britain was a signatory to the International
Convention Relating to the Liability of Owners of Sea Going Ships (Brussels, October 10, 1957).
Under the terms of this treaty, 1,000 gold francs (about $67) was available per net ton of ship for
all liability claims provided that there was no loss of life. If fatalities did actually occur, an
additional 2,000 gold francs per net ton was to be made available to compensate for injury or
death. The Torrey Canyon had a net tonnage of 48,427 tons. The treaty required that the weight
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of the engine room be added to the figure, yielding a liability limit of about 4.2 million dollars,
far short of the British cleanup costs, let alone compensation for claims for damages incurred as
a result of the shipwreck.89 Further, because the United States had not ratified the 1957 Brussels
Convention, and because an American corporation (Union Oil) was a party to the controversy,
the role of American law was also relevant. In 1967, the American legislation that covered a
contingency such as the Torrey Canyon was over a century old.
Specifically, in 1851, Congress passed a law stipulating that, in the absence of personal
injury or death, an owner’s liability be limited to the value of the vessel.90 The American courts
interpreted the law to mean the value of a ship after the disaster, Norwich Co v. Wright, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 104 (1871). Since the only salvageable portion of the Torrey Canyon was one lifeboat,
the owner’s liability would be limited to fifty dollars.91Shortly after the disaster, Union Oil and
the Barracuda Tanker Corporation filed a petition in a United States District Court to limit their
liability to fifty dollars.92
The French and British governments, fearing that the oil and shipping interests might
evade financial responsibility for their portion of the damages, commenced an intricate series of
legal maneuvers. The Lake Pelourde, a sister ship of the Torrey Canyon, was seized first by the
British and thereafter by French authorities in Singapore and Rotterdam, respectively, and was
not released until a surety bond was posted in each case, which partially covered cleanup costs.
Ultimately an out-of-court settlement was reached, and the owners and charterers indemnified
the British and French governments with a total payment of seven million dollars, which
probably did not cover half the costs of the cleanup, let alone losses sustained by fishermen,
resort owners and other coastal economic interests.93
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The environmental devastation caused by the Torrey Canyon demonstrated that a norm of
Public International Law requiring a State to compensate another State was essentially
meaningless in the face of an actual massive disaster. The need for the establishment of an
international regime to confront the issue of oil spills on the seas was obvious, but two broad
categories of issues had to be confronted and resolved prior to the establishment of such a
regime.
The first issue was a Public International Law issue. Could a State raise a response to the
next level and proactively intervene against an offending ship that is threatening or actually
causing severe environmental harm under the doctrine of self-defense, as promulgated in the
Caroline Case?94
The second issues were private law issues: Who was the responsible party to pay for
damages – the ship owner, cargo owner, or another party? Who should be compensated for
economic losses – governments, non-state interests, or both? Further, should there be a cap on
compensation or should compensation be unlimited?
These issues were addressed at the 1969 Brussels Conference, which was ostensibly
designed to create an international regime to deal with the legal aspects of marine oil spills.
Prior to examining the substantive results of Brussels, however, methodological issues such as
approaches to regime formation and disintegration, and the use of a critical case study should be
reviewed. These concerns form the basis of Chapter III.
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abate any transboundary environmental interference or a significant risk thereof which causes substantial
harm, i.e. harm which is not minor or insignificant,’" page 43.
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War II, there were two unsuccessful multilateral attempts to regulate oil spills on the high seas. On July 1,
1922, the United States Congress passed a Joint Resolution requesting the President to convene a
conference of the major maritime States to discuss the problem of oil spills in navigable waters. In June,
1925, the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters met in Washington, D.C., and
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proposed a treaty which would have banned oil discharged by vessels within fifty to one hundred miles
from coastal regions. While the treaty was never adopted, it is doubtful that its adoption would have been
successful in resolving any problems. One incisive observer noted, “oil patches move and to trace the
culprit who discharged the oil, perhaps months ago and miles away, will be in most cases impossible."
A second attempt was undertaken by the League of Nations in 1934. Great Britain initiated a discussion
of the issue of oil pollution in July 1934 in the League of Nations; subsequently the Assembly of the
League proposed that the Communication and Transit Organization of the League investigate the
problem. A conference of Experts from Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom was held
in Geneva in November 1934, and concluded that oil pollution of the seas, was, in fact, a significant
problem. A second meeting of the Committee of Experts was held in October 1935, and a new draft
convention, based largely on the 1926 Washington recommendations, was proposed. The League’s
Advisory and Technical Committee favored holding a conference on the matter, and the League Council
announced plans to convene a conference to consider the treaty. The conference was not held because
Germany and Italy "…whose participation was considered necessary from a technical point of view, were
not in a position to attend a conference convened under the auspices of the League of Nations." Finally,
on account of the outbreak of World War II, the matter was not pursued further.
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Other oil spills of the 1960s include (bbl = 42-gallon barrel):

Argea Prima

07/17/62

28,000 bbl.

R.C. Stone

09/07/67

143,000 bbl.

Keo

11/05/69

210,000 bbl.

Because of larger oil tankers and more efficient methods of oil drilling, as well as the 1990 Gulf War, the
size of oil spills grew significantly over the ensuing decades. By 2014, the largest oil spills included:
The Sea Star Oil Spill

(1972)

35.3 million gallons

Amoco Cadiz

(1978)

69 million gallons

Atlantic Empress Oil Spill

(1979)

90 million gallons

Nowuz Oil Field Spill

(1979)

80 million gallons

Kolva River Oil Spill

(1983)

88 million gallons

Castillo de Bolivar Oil Spill

(1983)

79 million gallons

Odyssey Oil Spill

(1988)

40.7 million gallons

Persian Gulf War

(1991)

380-520 million gallons

ABT Summer Oil Spill

(1991)

51-81 million gallons

M/T Haven Tanker Oil Spill

(1991)

45 million gallons
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Deep Horizon Oil Spill

(2010)

200 million gallons

Interestingly enough, the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska, while so widely publicized and
subsequently litigated, does not even rank among the worst thirty-five oil spills of all time. It was a spill
of 11 million gallons, which could have been far worse given the fact that the Exxon Valdez was carrying
55 million gallons of oil.
Probably the largest oil spill catastrophe of all time was the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling
platform, which was owned by British Petroleum (BP) and which on April 20, 2010, exploded and sank
off the coast of Louisiana. By the time the oil spill was contained, an estimated 200 million gallons of
crude oil were discharged into the Gulf of Mexico, thereby creating an ecological catastrophe. The extent
of the disaster was manifested in a press release by BP on July 27, 2010, in which BP announced that it
had taken a charge of $32.7 billion dollars, including direct costs of $2.9 billion, as well as an escrow of
$29.3 billion for future costs.
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The Barracuda Tanker Corporation was what might be termed a “shell” aka “dummy” corporation, and
consisted of a Bermuda mail drop. The Torrey Canyon (which was named after one of the Union Oil’s
first fields) was in reality associated with the Union Oil Co. Photographs of the vessel show the
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The concept of imminent danger was articulated in the Caroline Case which occurred in 1837. Briefly,

during an insurrection in Canada, British forces crossed into the territory of the States and destroyed a
vessel "The Caroline," which was being used by the Canadian rebels. There were American casualties in
the British assault into American territory. This, in turn, led to an exchange of diplomatic notes between
American Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and Lord Ashburton, a member of the British Parliament,
who had negotiated with Webster to conclude the Webster-Ashburn Treaty, which resolved outstanding
border issues between the United States and Canada.
The Note dated April 24, 1841, sent by Webster to Ashburn articulated the doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense. Specifically, Webster wrote to Ashburn:
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…and it will be for Her Majesty’s Government to show up what state of fact, and what rules of
national law, the destruction of-the "Caroline" is to be defended. It will be for that Government to
show a necessity for self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice, no moment for
deliberation.
The Caroline Case and the Webster - Ashburton exchange of notes is found in "British American
Diplomacy, The Caroline Case" New Haven: Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library.
This right of self-defense is incorporated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, but this
portion of the Charter deals only with armed attacked, not an impending environmental crisis.
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Chapter 3: Issues of Methodology
I.

Previous Studies of the Brussels Conference

While the literature on the Torrey Canyon shipwreck itself is generally either journalistic
or descriptive,1 much of the existing literature on the Brussels Conference and the treaties it
produced consists of legal analysis of their provisions – i.e. what each treaty article provides and
how the treaties mark advances in Public International Law.
Therefore, not surprisingly, much of the initial analysis of the issues of oil spills on the
seas and of the Brussels Conference, especially in the years immediately after 1969, appeared in
law reviews and similar publications. Among the representative examples of this approach are
scholarly law review articles by Dennis M. O’Connell,2 Nicholas J. Healey,3 and Allan I.
Mendelsohn,4 as well as a lengthy unattributed forty-four-page long Comment in the Harvard
International Law Journal.5
All were written by attorneys (with the possible exception of the Comment in the
Harvard International Law Journal, which was probably written by law students) and, not
surprisingly, primarily addressed the legal ramifications of the private law treaty. Conversely,
there is very little in these pieces about interactions of Non-State Actors with IMCO and State
participants at Brussels. By way of example, in Healy’s articles about Brussels, there is mention
of the conference, the key participants who chaired the proceedings (Dr. Albert Lilar and Dr.
Walter Muller), but there is no connection made to their professional affiliations as international
lawyers representing shipping interests.6 These different roles raise issues of regulatory capture
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as well as regime complexes, and likewise will be examined in this dissertation.
Even in more recent years, much of the literature on the private law treaty tends to be
legalistic in orientation and not framed in broader theoretical context.7
A partial exception to the legalistic approach in the analysis of the private law treaty is
the literature about the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability in Oil
Pollution (TOVALOP) and the contract regarding a supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil
Pollution (“CRISTAL”), which were organizations established by shipowners and petroleum
companies respectively, to provide compensation beyond that provided by the private law treaty
to victims of oil spill damage.8 In the later years of TOVALOP’s and CRISTAL’s existences,
numerous articles appeared that described not only the legal impact of these institutions, but also
discussed in broad terms the interplay between shipping interests and international petroleum
companies in the establishment and maintenance of the compensation scheme established by the
private law treaty.
The question therefore arises as to what is missing in these previous studies of the private
law treaty? And further, what can this dissertation add to the existing body of scholarly
literature?
It is therefore argued that to date, there has been no study of the private law treaty and its
effects in the broader methodological framework of international regimes. This inquiry will
examine the results of Brussels in terms of regime formation. Further, the multiplicity of actors
and their interactions in the Brussels process – States, IMCO, and Non-State Actors (shipping,
oil, and insurance), will be analyzed through the paradigm of regime complexes.9 Moreover, the
American refusal to participate in international regimes established by the private law treaty, and
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the subsequent American election to proceed unilaterally by the enactment of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 raise questions about the impact of exogenous events and their impact upon regime
resilience and robustness.10
Finally, this dissertation contains materials, based on interviews with governmental
officials who had both firsthand and secondhand knowledge as to what actually transpired at
Brussels. To date, there apparently has been no study of Brussels based on the use of such
interview data.
Accordingly, this dissertation, while incorporating a legal approach to understanding the
content of the treaties under examination, seeks to move beyond a law review type analysis and
instead place them in the realm of regime formation and regime complexes. In order to move in
that direction, a brief review of the intellectual underpinnings of the study of international
relations of the past seventy years follows.

II.

Paradigms in the Study of International Relations

A.

The State-Centric Model

Traditionally, the study of international relations has been oriented towards the nation
state (“the State” or “State”), which has been the dominant entity in the international system
since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.11
In a very real sense, the study of international relations, as was undertaken in the middle
and later years of the twentieth century, developed almost exclusively around the nation state, to
59

the almost total exclusion of all other actors in the international arena.
The state centric model was incorporated and expanded upon by many theorists of
international relations in the mid- to late-twentieth century, and it formed the basis of the realist
world view of the international system. Hans Morgenthau, in his classic work, Politics Among
Nations, stressed the role of the nation state and the national interest in the international system
with virtually no mention, let alone analysis, of the role of Non-State Actors except for Public
International Organizations.12
Similarly, Raymond Aron,13 Stanley Hoffman,14 and Henry Kissinger (at least in his
earlier writings) wrote about a system of world order which relied, “on a system of independent
states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and checking each other’s
ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”15
Nonetheless, there is virtually no rule in the realm of social science that is absolute
without any exceptions whatsoever. Thus, even the most traditionalist theorist of international
relations always allowed that there exist entities in international relations other than States.
Among the obvious examples are Public International Organizations, as well as religious
movements, the Vatican, international terrorism, state-run corporations, and the International
Red Cross.
Further, while Public International Organizations have been accorded the standing of an
international person,16 most realist studies of these entities during this time period were
predicated upon an instrumental interpretation of any particular situation, and the Public
International Organization being studied, was viewed as being composed of sovereign States that
utilized the Public International Organization as an instrument to attain the State’s specific goals.
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Thus, the prevalent view of Public International Organization reduced it to an arena in which the
clashing agendas of States were carried out.17 As two critics to this realist approach noted:
Realists believe states would never cede to supranational institutions the strong
enforcement capabilities necessary to overcome international anarchy. Consequently IOs
(International Organizations) and similar institutions are of little interest; they merely
reflect national interests and power and do not constrain the powerful states.18

B.

The Transnational Model of the International System

An alternative to the State-Centric model, which, as described herein, largely ignores the
presence and roles of Non-State Actors, is the pluralist or the transnational model. The origin of
the word transnational, as used in this context, is attributed to Phillip C. Jessup, who wrote his
influential treatise, Transnational Law, in 1956,19 which was based on his belief that the StateCentric model was inadequate to define the international order. Similarly, in 1964, Professor
Wolfgang Friedmann of Columbia University wrote and lectured extensively about the diversity
of the actors in the international system.20 This pluralist view was further developed by, among
others, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye.21 Fundamental to their analysis is their view that
the actors in the international system are not limited to States. Rather, they all argued that NonState Actors such as for-profit corporations and religious organizations, to name but two, are an
integral part of the international system.22 They termed the pluralist system a “transnational”
system. Keohane and Nye maintained that Non-State Actors’ roles are not confined to operating
through their State of domicile, or the location from where they transact their business, or
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maintain their activities. Rather, they can and do act independently of their host States, and
interact directly with Public International Organization, or other States, or other NonGovernmental Actors.23
This model stands in sharp contrast to the State-Centric model. It should be noted, for the
sake of clarity, that the Keohane-Nye model uses a specific terminology that identifies and
describes the interaction of the components of the transnational system. Thus, the term
Intergovernmental Organization refers to a Public International Organization while Society refers
to a privately (Non-State) organized interest group. Of course, it goes without saying that the
Non-State Actors have their own policy agendas, which may or may not be congruent with the
abstract notions of “the people” or “the public interest.” (For a diagram illustrating the
components and interactions in the Keohane-Nye model, refer to Figure III-1 on the next page.)
Probably the greatest deficiency in the Keohane transnational model is the underlying
assumption of a sharply defined compartmentalization of its components. Even a cursory glance
at their transnational model shows that on its face, its components are distinct: States,
International Organizations, and Societies. Further, this assumption of compartmentalization is
implicit in the writings of other political scientists.24
This compartmentalization assumption apparently precludes the possibility that
representatives of Non-State Actors may actually be embedded in the ranks of the ostensibly
neutral state delegations and Public International Organizations. The validity of this assumption
shall be tested in the analysis of the Brussels Conference.
A second flaw in the Nye-Keohane model results from the fact that its major actors (S1,
G1, S2, G2) are not differentiated or ranked. Thus, from their model alone, one cannot ascertain
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whether or not Keohane and Nye believe that Non-State Actors and International Organizations
are inferior to, exceed, or are equal to States in power. Specific indicia of what constitutes power
in the transnational system remain largely undiscussed. 25
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Figure III - 1

A State-Centric Interaction Pattern

Interstate politics
Domestic politics
G = Government
S = Society
IGO = Intergovernmental organization

Transnational interactions and interstate politics

Classic interstate politics
Domestic politics
Transnational interactions
G = Government
S = Society
IGO = Intergovernmental organization
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A third flaw in the Keohane-Nye model was pointed out by Din Eshanov, who observed,
“…The authors did not provide a clear cut analytic framework which would explain exactly how
Non-State Actors interact with states and other subjects of IL (International Law).”26 Further,
Eshanov continued, “it is not clear from their propositions what concrete mechanisms are
available to Non-State Actors through which they could exert influence on the dynamics of
global affairs.”27

C.

International Regimes

The simple transnational approach evolved into regime theory, which attempts to
establish a theoretical, as well as a pragmatic, understanding of the cooperative interactions
among States, International Organizations, and Non-State Actors. Keohane and Nye defined a
regime as “sets of governing arrangements” whose components include “networks of rules,
norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects.”28
In 1983, Stephen D. Krasner edited a volume on international regimes29 which he later
described as, “…A term that was just coming into wider usage in the field of international
relations, and which has some currency in international law.”30
In his seminal 1982 essay, Professor Krasner amplified this concept and defined an
international regime as, “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.
Decision making procedures are prevailing for making and implementing collective choice.”31
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This definition of a regime was refined as follows:
Regimes are deliberately constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or
global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue areas of international politics
from the sphere of self-help behaviour. By creating shared expectations about appropriate
behaviour and upgrading the level of transparency in the issue area, regimes help states
(and other actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional
welfare or security.32
Interestingly, in a fascinating self-reflective essay written eighteen years after his original
theory was propounded, Professor Krasner modified significantly (if not actually walked back)
his original definition and its underlying assumptions. Referring to his celebrated 1982 essay, he
wrote, about his original definition of an international regime, (“principles, norms, rules and
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area”),
In fact this definition reflected what would now be termed a constructivist perspective
which emphasizes the importance of intersubjective shared ideas or identities. Most of
the writers in the volume would not have accepted the definition had they fully
appreciated its implications. Realists, for instance, would have defined regimes as
principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures that reflect the preferences of
the most powerful states in the international system, and liberals would have been happier
with a definition that read something like principles, norms, rules and decision making
procedures that contribute to the solution of market failure problems. But these
distinctions were not as clear in 1981 as they are now.33
Moreover, in a candid evaluation of the shortcomings of social scientists, Krasner
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conceded that he had participated in a 1980s conference on regimes, and it was the lawyers,
rather than the political scientists and the economists, who had clarity about the specific
character and nature of international regimes.34

1.

Regime Formation
Regime formation “is the process by which a regime comes about in an issue area where

hitherto none has existed. It includes both the initiation of the regime, for example, through
international negotiations ending up in an international agreement, and its implementation
through norm- and rule guided action by the participating states.”35
The process of regime formation has been the subject of considerable discussion among
international relations theorists for over three decades. Relevant issues include (but are not
limited to) typologies of regime formation, the role of bargaining in regime formation, the actors
who participate in regime formation, and regime complexes, which often are a product of regime
formation. A brief discussion of regime formation issues relevant to this dissertation now
follows.
According to Oran Young, there are three tracks or channels through which regimes
form.36
a. The contractian track in which actors interested in some sort of activity meet “for the
explicit purpose of negotiating a ‘constitutional’ contract laying out a regime to govern the
activities in question;”
b. The evolutionary track, which is the result of social institutions “arising either from
widespread practice over time, or as a consequence of dramatic unilateral actions that are
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subsequently accepted by others on a de facto basis;”
c. The piecemeal track in which actors, “can reach agreements on one or more
components of a regime without entering into a comprehensive social contract regarding the
activity.”
Another approach to regime formation is the analysis of a phenomenon through the
paradigm of “the assumptions that are made” about the underlying motivations of actors.37
Accordingly, there exist three general schools of thought about the actors and their
motivations in the establishment of international regimes.
The first is an outgrowth of realism. This approach is the logical outcome of the StateCentric theorists, previously described in this chapter, who view international regimes through
the prism of power.
As such, according to this school of thought, international cooperation is most likely to
occur when it is imposed by a dominant State or hegemon that has a dominant position over
economic resources and the ability to impose its will over competing States.38
In sharp contrast, the neoliberal approach emphasizes interests as opposed to power, and
centers on a bargaining situation where each party seeks absolute gains but does not have the
ability to impose its will on other members of an international regime. It is suggested at this point
that the neoliberal approach is an appropriate model to analyze the dynamics of regime formation
and will serve as part of the methodological framework of this study.
Cognitivism, the third school of thought, emphasizes the role of knowledge in the
establishment of stable regimes. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger maintain that state identities
and the objects that they pursue in foreign relations, “are shaped by normative and causal beliefs
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that decision makers hold and that, consequently, changes in belief systems can trigger changes
in policies.” Therefore, focus must be placed on “the distribution of knowledge.”39 Implicit in
cognitivism is the assumption that decision-makers arrive at a consensus based on their shared
values, which in the instant case would be a belief that oceans must be preserved from
environmental degradation. The case study of the Brussels Conference analyzes the validity of
these assumptions.
Another approach to a broad view of regime formation is to differentiate between
reactionary regimes and anticipatory regimes. The former addresses an existing problem (e.g.
marine oil spills), and each actor participates in attempts to negotiate a solution based on its
perceived interest.40
Accordingly, in a reactionary regime, any individual actor is satisfied if its needs are met.
The downside of this regime is that, “the resulting institutions will be limited in its ability to
address changing environmental conditions…”41 It can therefore be argued that reactionary
regimes are by definition weak because decision-making will always remain with the individual
state components who seek to maximize their own advantage at the expense of the regime’s
interest.
In contrast, an anticipatory regime can be forward looking and flexible enough to meet
changing conditions. “It prescribes the processes for resolving problems that have not been
identified yet. Decision-making in such a regime focuses on achieving a common long-term goal
for all the members, not on maximizing the benefits of individual members.”42
To sum up, the international regime established at Brussels will be analyzed as a
contractian regime (per Oran Young) in that the relevant actors gathered for the explicit purpose
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of addressing a particular problem and establishing rules to deal with it. Further, the regime was
reactionary (per Hagen) as opposed to anticipatory, resulting in a regime that might not be
resilient to the challenges of exogenous events. Finally, the neoliberal approach (based on the
dynamics of bargaining) will be the relevant paradigm. Conversely, the realist approach (based
on a dominant power dictating to the wealth power) and cognitivist approach (shared values
based on knowledge) will be tested to determine their relevance to the outcome of the Brussels
Conference.

2.

Regime Complexes
The introduction of the concept of regime complexes marked an advance in the analyses

of regimes. Regime complexes result from, “the rising density of international institutions –
making it increasingly difficult to isolate and ‘decompose’ individual organizations for study.”43
Further, a regime complex is characterized as, “loosely coupled sets of specific
arrangements.”44 An outgrowth of regime complexes is what has been termed “forum shopping”
since there are multiple, overlapping institutions in any regime complex, actors can choose the
venue where they hope to obtain the most favorable outcome.45 This allows States to, “bypass
legal commitments which tend to undermine the goals of cooperation.”46
The essence of a regime complex approach is that it broadens the analysis of regime
formation from a relatively simple paradigm of interaction among States to a more detailed
examination of all of the participants in the regime’s formation and ongoing activities. Thus, by
way of example only, there are twelve different sets of components identified in Keohane and
Victor’s model for the regime complex for climate change.47 They range from United Nations
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legal regimes (UNFCCC), to bilateral initiatives, to financial market regulating agencies.

3.

Role of Non-State Actors in Regime Complexes
If regime complexes consist of a variety of actors, both State as well as Non-State, the

question arises as to the nature of the configuration in which these interactions occur.
First, as a general proposition, the role of ideas cannot be underestimated. As Thomas
Risse-Kappen observed, the end of the Cold War cannot be analyzed separate and apart from the
role of ideas, knowledge, values, and strategic concepts. He argued that the transmission of ideas
from natural scientists, think tanks, scholars at academic institutions and public interest groups to
their counterparts in the Soviet Union led to a mentality that was instrumental in ending the cold
war.48
Second, the institutional presence, identity, and roles of Non-State Actors in a regime are
crucial. In this dissertation, the core issue is to identify the Non-State Actors at Brussels, and the
methods used by them to shape the contours of the regime. Chapter IV details six of the major
Non-State Actors in the regime complex, as well as issues of overlapping identities among the
State and Non-State Actors.
In recent years, the role of Non-State Actors in regime formation has been analyzed
extensively. In Sell and Prakash’s study centering on a 1994 agreement on intellectual property
(Trade-Related Intellectual Property or TRIPS) and the subsequent distribution of certain
HIV/AIDS medications, they note the role of ideas in the bargaining process but ask the obvious
question of whose ideas matter. Moreover, they observed that business interests and nongovernmental organizations, despite obvious differences are, nonetheless, similar enough in that
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they have instrumental goals and principled beliefs, and thus they can be studied together.
Further, they observed that both business interests and nongovernmental organizations use
interest group tactics such as agenda-setting and mobilization of public opinion.49
Similarly, Raustiala, and Victor’s study of plant genetic resources revealed a
sophisticated system of actors, institutions, and other components interacting with each other.50
This approach was taken a step further by Elizabeth A. Bloodgood who actually
advocated the use of domestic interest group activity to analyze Non-State Actors.51 Specifically,
she observed that American interest groups have three mechanisms for influence: campaign
contributions and electoral pressure; strategic information transmission or expertise; and
grassroots representation and mobilization.52 Bloodgood found that these mechanisms were
useful in constructing a State-Centric theory of the international system, while simultaneously
not underestimating the importance of advocacy INGOs or overestimating the decline of the
State.53
In short, the study of international regimes based on an approach that the networks of
arrangements among different types of actors, in which there exist significant overlaps among
the State and Non-State components, all operating in a market economy, is a relevant paradigm
for analysis of these regimes.

4.

The American Interest Group Analogy
If a regime complex incorporates a multiplicity of groups, both State and Non-State, and

if business interests do in fact exhibit behavior substantially similar to that of non-governmental
organizations per Sell and Prakash, and if domestic interest activity might provide a useful
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paradigm per Bloodgood, then a brief discussion of some of the other observations about
domestic interest group activity can be useful in analyzing the results of the Brussels Conference.
Specifically, students of American interest groups understood decades ago that the role of
interest groups in the United States went far beyond the three mechanisms for influence
suggested by Bloodgood. Among the most crucial mechanisms are strategies used by domestic
interest groups that allow for participation in the decision-making process through the use of
organs of administrative pluralism, clientism leading to regulatory capture, and self-regulation. A
brief discussion of each of the strategies reveals the following.

i.

The Existence and Roles of Organs of Administrative Pluralism
The term “organs of administrative pluralism” refers to entities established by a particular

government to bring specific private (non-governmental) entities into the decision-making
process. The importance of these entities is that they provide a platform by which interest groups
are embedded into an official governmental institution. At the very least, this results in an
interest group having an officially sanctioned link to governmental decision-makers.
A student of the administrative process noted the diversity of interest group/bureaucratic
relationships in the following terms:
The influence exercised by groups on the administrative process can probably be
considered on a continuum. On the one hand, there exist in many countries officially
sanctioned institutions described sometimes as organs of administrative pluralism i.e.
boards and committees which are merely supposed to provide expert advice to the
administration especially in economic and social matters. On the other hand we find
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situations where public and private ‘managers’, the civil servants, and the staff of interest
groups are working so closely together that to speak of ‘pressures from the outside’ is no
longer an adequate description. Here the administrative process may have been
‘colonized’ by the representatives of interest groups to an extent that the dividing line
between state and society has all but disappeared.54
The establishment of “organs of administrative pluralism” has been a fairly common
phenomenon in industrialized nations. In the mid-nineteen-fifties, for example, over five
thousand advisory committees, many of them having corporate representation, existed within the
framework of the federal executive departments in the United States. During the Korean War,
five hundred and fifty industry advisory committees were attached to the National Production
Authority, an agency of the Department of Commerce.55
In 1972, the United States Congress passed the Federal Advisory Committee Act,56
whose purpose was to reduce significantly the number of these entities, as well as to diversify the
nongovernmental participants, in order to achieve a balance of opinions. Accordingly, their role
in the policy-making process has probably diminished since that time. This statutory change,
however, occurred three years after the Brussels Conference in 1969. As will be discussed below
(Chapter IV), the Shipping Coordinating Committee, an organ of administrative pluralism
attached to the United States Department of State, was particularly influential in formulating a
policy position for the American delegation at the Brussels Conference.
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ii.

Clientism Leading to Regulatory Capture
The clientele of an agency are, “...those groups whose interests are strongly affected by

an agency’s activities, and provided the principal sources of political support and opposition.”57
Clientism has been studied for decades as a phenomenon in domestic politics, but far less at the
level of the international system. Among the conclusions drawn by political scientists studying
domestic politics are that agencies often become dominated and are, in fact, captured by the
groups that they are supposed to regulate. This phenomenon is known as regulatory capture. In
the realm of international environmental regimes, there is some discussion of regulatory capture
because of the existence of domestic entities, as well as multinational corporations, acting as
stakeholders in the regime formation and ongoing regulation processes.58
David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff however, conclude:
We expected to find that policy systems open to participation by target groups would be
prone to regulatory capture leading to public policy decisions that mirror the interests of
regulated target groups, not the public good. The studies confirm that while regulatory
capture is a risk, the capturing influence of target groups has been offset through
informed participation by countervailing groups.59
Other studies of international regimes established to deal with environmental issues
have failed to incorporate even the possibility of regulatory capture in their research or
conclusions. Thus, in their collection of research studies titled The International Politics of
the Environment, Actors, Interests, and Institutions, Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury
et. al discuss environmental issues such as deforestation, marine dumping, ozone depletion,
and climate change, to name but a few, and limit their analysis of the role of Non-State
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Actors to international environmental groups.60
Conversely, despite the word “actors” in the subtitle, there is no mention of the role
played by multinational corporations in formulating the terms of any particular
environmental agreement, which certainly represents a failure to view the formulation of an
international regime through the prism of regulatory capture of veto groups.61 As will be
demonstrated in Chapter IV, the key to understanding the private law treaty was the
regulatory capture of IMCO by Non-State Actors.
Further, administrative agencies often actively seek support from interest groups, and the
sources from which agency personnel are recruited have a direct bearing on policy outcomes.62
Perhaps the ultimate manifestation of clientism is the veto group: it, by definition, has the power
to oppose successfully any change in the status quo that the group perceives to be a threat to its
position.63 This definition differs from the approach of George Tsebelis, who writes extensively
about “veto players,” which he defines as follows, “in order to change policies – or, as we will
say henceforth, to change the (legislative) status quo – a certain number of collective actors have
to agree to the proposed change. I call such actors veto players.” Tsebelis, however, limits his
definition of veto players to constitutionally-mandated players (e.g. Congress or the President),
or those created by the political system (e.g. political parties).64 As previously stated, however,
the term veto group as used in this study is a nongovernmental entity (Non-State Actor), which
has the ability to block change unless its demands are accepted by all players. The concept of
clientism will be utilized to examine the relationship between the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization and the Comite’ Maritime Internationale, a Belgian-based
organization of maritime lawyers, which historically has actually drafted treaties in the area of
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international shipping.
The concept of clientism will also be used to analyze the composition of the American
delegation to the Brussels conference. Clientism explains the presence of shipping, oil and
insurance interests, and the absence of environmentalists; it also sheds light on the political clout
of the fishing and coastal interests who would be directly involved in any lawsuit for damages
arising from an oil spill. In addition, the role of the British marine insurers at the Brussels
conference will be examined by the use of the veto group concept.

iii.

Self-Regulation as a Manifestation of Non-Decisions
Another concept developed in the study of domestic groups is that of the non-decision. In

Power and Poverty, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz discuss the decision-making process.
Among their key theoretical concepts is what they termed the non-decision. They note:
A non-decision, as we define it, is a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a
latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision maker. To be more
explicit, non-decision making is a means by which demands for change in the existing
allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are
even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decisionmaking arena; or failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decisionimplementing stage of the policy process.65

Essentially, the term non-decision-making encompasses a variety of strategies that seek
to prevent a certain set of options from reaching the public agenda.
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Among the strategies of non-decision employed by business interests is self-regulation.
As Grant McConnell noted:
The claim to autonomy is the typical demand in business. In its most traditional form –
that government not interfere in business affairs that a policy of laissez faire should be
followed – it is usually not seen as a business demand at all. Indeed, differing policies are
often very simply condemned as “political”, although it should be fairly obvious that a
policy of non-intervention is as political as any other.66
This has been a common tactic in the context of the American political system. It has
been noted that:
Much of this self-policing and self-regulation is backed by state and federal law...and its
voice carries tremendous influence regarding any changes to laws regarding the
profession under its jurisdiction. Associations usually do this to head off governmental
regulation and protect their profession’s independence. For example, physicians formed
the American Medical Association in 1846 to prove that they were more than just bloodletters, but also to stay independent of both hospitals and government.67
Non-decision and autonomy serve as a conceptual framework to understand the strategy
of oil tanker owners and petroleum companies in 1967 and 1968. Essentially, these two groups
realized that with the growing consciousness of environmental degradation (which was partially
sparked by Torrey Canyon – see Chapter IV below), some sort of international action was
inevitable. Consequently, they reasoned that if they devised their own self-policing entities to
deal with the oil spill problem, certain obvious benefits would accrue. Specifically, they correctly
believed that the international community might either be deterred from undertaking any liability
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compensation scheme in the first place, or procrastinate the implementation of any plan of
action, or, at the very least, adopt a plan that would incorporate their own proposals as a basis of
action. Therefore, beginning in 1967, the shipping and oil industries proposed the voluntary
liability plans, TOVALOP and CRISTAL, either to head off or dilute proposed regulation of oil
spills on the high seas by the international community.68
By undertaking this course of action, the maritime and petroleum interests would, in
effect, make these entities (TOVALP and CRISTAL) the arbiters of their own liability, and
would have the further benefit of making themselves judge and jury vis-a-vis any potential
liability for harm caused by them.

D.

The Use of a Case Study

1.

Critical Case Study
The basis of this dissertation is a single case study on the Brussels Conference. Needless

to say, the utility of a single case (“critical case,” “single case,” or “crucial case”) as opposed to
multiple cases, is subject to a significant debate among methodologists.
As indicated in Chapter I, Gary King, Robert D. Keohane, and Sidney Verba in
Designing Social Inquiry are highly skeptical about crucial case studies. “In general, we
conclude, the single observation is not a useful technique for testing hypotheses or theories.”69
Moreover, they vehemently disagree with Harry Eckstein, who in the 1970s had argued that a
crucial case not only can be used for explanatory purposes, but can also score a clean knockout
over a theory.”70
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In sharp contrast to the Designing Social Inquiry argument, George and Bennett have a
point-by-point critical analysis and rebuttal of Designing Social Inquiry, and come to very
different conclusions on social research in general and case studies in particular. They maintain
that, “Cases usually fall somewhere in between being most likely and least likely for particular
theories and so pose tests for intermediate degrees of difficulty.”71
The most articulate defense of the single case study was made by Bent Flyvbjerg who
explicitly rejected the idea that, “One cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case;
therefore the case study cannot contribute to scientific development.”72 After relating his own
experience in finding “black swans” in a research project, he concluded that, “one can often
generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific
development via generalization as a supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal
generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas, the ‘force of
example, is underestimated.”73 This dissertation proceeds on the assumption that in general,
critical case studies can be very useful in the development of theories in political science
research.

2.

Process Tracing and Case Studies
Process tracing is defined as, “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected

and analyzed in light of research questions and hypothesis posed by the investigator.74 It is “an
analytical tool for drawing descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidences
often misunderstood as part of temporal sequence of events or phenomena.”75 Process tracing is
a method to identify cause and effect by attempting, “to identify the intervening causal process –
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the causal chain and the causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and
the outcome of the dependent variable.76
Alternatively, causal process tracing is described as a way of, “formulating and testing
explanations with case studies” Specifically, “if we are able to trace the processes, we will be
able to identify the causal mechanism as it is operating in a particular.”77
A body of political science literature has developed on the theoretical aspects of process
tracing. Moreover, there is scholarship that incorporates process tracing into actual case studies
on international relations. Thus, by way of example, Nina Tannenwald used process tracing to
determine why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945.78 She posited the existence of a
taboo against the use of nuclear weapons and deterrence theory as two possible causes of the
non-use of nuclear weapons, and by the use of process tracing, eliminated deterrence and thereby
confirmed that it was the nuclear taboo that was the better explanation.
Similarly, Kenneth Schultz in Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy79 uses process tracing
to analyze the 1898 Fashooda Incident between Great Britain and France which resulted in the
ascendancy of British interests and the concomitant decline of French interests in East Africa. It
further represented the last time (except for the extraordinary situation in 1940 after the Nazi
conquest of France) in which Great Britain and France actually threatened war against each
other.
Schultz uses process tracing to determine which factors were relevant to the crisis’
outcome. Among the factors considered were domestic considerations, economic issues, and
military strength to come to a conclusion on how the crisis between Great Britain and France was
resolved.
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In Chapter I, several factors were suggested, such as the development of norms of
international law based on the “polluter pays” principle, the emergence of environmentalism as
an issue on the public agenda, and the inadequate remedies for victim compensation, among
others, as explaining the results of the Brussels Conference. Through process tracing, this
dissertation attempts to determine which variables can be used to explain the outcome of the
conference.

E.

Methodological Issues as Applicable to the Case Study of the Brussels Conference
Based on the foregoing, this dissertation attempts to analyze the Brussels Conference and

the regime it established as follows. First, it is not at its core a legal analysis of the treaties signed
at Brussels, although it is probable that an understanding of the legal concepts incorporated in the
private law treaty’s provisions, such as strict liability versus negligence, and limits of liability
versus unlimited liability, are a sine qua non to understanding what was accomplished at
Brussels.
Nonetheless, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, law review articles have done a
more than adequate job in detailing who is liable for marine oil spills and the extent of their
liability under the treaties signed at Brussels.
Instead, this dissertation is a critical case study of the events from the Torrey Canyon
disaster in March 1967, through the signing of the two treaties at Brussels on November 29,
1969.
More specifically, it is a crucial case study of the establishment of a reactionary
international regime (as the term is used by Hugen – see endnote 40 to this chapter), and the
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roles of diverse actors in its establishment. These actors include States, a Public International
Organization (IMCO), and Non-State Actors, particularly shipping, oil and insurance interests.
Further, the neoliberal approach, which emphasizes bargaining in contradistinction to realism or
cognitivism, will be the paradigm by which the results will be evaluated. The uneven results of
the bargaining process, by which certain actors achieved their goals and other did not, will be
analyzed through the paradigm of interest group theory, where concepts such as clientism will be
incorporated not only to describe the results of Brussels, but also to understand the broader
implications for the study of international relations.
Accordingly, this dissertation proceeds on the assumption that, in general, crucial case
studies can be very useful in the development of theories in political science, and in the case of
the 1969 Brussels Conference in particular, it is an indispensable tool of analysis because of its
unique feature in its imposition of significant sanctions for violations of the terms of the private
law treaty.
Additionally, the United States’ refusal to participate in the regime established at
Brussels and choice to opt instead for unilateral action through the passage of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 will be analyzed as an example of the establishment of a regime complex with
competing institutions and centers of powers.
Finally, the variables, such as the development of norms of Public International Law
based on the “polluter pays” principle, the emergence of environmentalism, the inadequacy of
compensation remedies for oil pollution damage, and the existence of market forces
(compensation by insurance companies) to explain the formation of the international regime will

83

be analyzed by process tracing, in order to eliminate the causes that are irrelevant to what
actually occurred at Brussels and afterwards.
I do not believe that this regime theory approach has been used to date in any other
analysis of Brussels. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the validity of this methodological
approach, the next step is to discover what actually occurred in the leadup to Brussels and at
Brussels itself, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: The Formation of a Regime – The Brussels Conference of November 1969

Chapter II concluded with a description of the Torrey Canyon episode and the resulting
oil spill, which ultimately cost millions of dollars to clean up and further resulted in enormous
financial damage to fishermen, boat owners, proprietors of resorts, and those whose livelihoods
depended on the seas. Thereafter, preparations began for what ultimately evolved into the
establishment of an international regime to deal with the problem of marine oil pollution, in
particular the legal questions of intervention of the high seas against the ship leaking oil, and on
the issue of compensation to be paid to the victims of oil spills for damages sustained by them.
At the outset, it is crucial to emphasize that the Brussels Conference was not
contemplated as an academic discussion of environmental issues, nor was it likely that it would
result in general technical guidelines on ship operation and safety. Rather, it would codify and
effectuate a new body of international law that would mandate compensation in the millions of
dollars to parties injured by marine oil spills.
Further, the regime would be based on the economics of the world oil trade, a highly
profitable business, and accordingly, liability would accrue to shipowners and their insurers,
cargo (oil) interests, or some combination thereof. The countervailing idea that since the benefits
of the oil trade accrue to society as a whole (gasoline for transport, oil to fuel industry and
thereby provide employment, and oil for heating purposes), and therefore society as a whole
should bear some or all of the losses, did not seem likely to carry the day.1
In order to obtain the full picture of the nature of the international regime established at
Brussels, the participants (“stakeholders in the process”) should be identified along with their
positions.
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I.

Preparations for the Brussels Conference – International Stakeholders Regarding Oil
Pollution at Sea

A.

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization

The gaps in international law, which allowed neither for intervention against an offending
ship, nor for realistic compensation for injured parties that were evinced after the Torrey Canyon
episode, prompted the British government in April 1967, to request a special session of the InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which has been known as the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) since 1982. IMCO is a United Nations specialized
agency that was established in 1948 at a conference convened at Geneva, Switzerland. Its
purposes are defined in Article 1 (a) of the Convention:
To provide machinery for cooperation among Governments in the field of governmental
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping
engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the general adoption of the
highest practical standards in matters concerning maritime safety, efficiency and
prevention and control of marine pollution from ships.2
Essentially a backwater among United Nations Specialized Agencies, it began to function
on January 6, 1959, and by 1967, it had fifty-nine members (by contrast, in 2018 it has one
hundred fifty-three members, and three associate members). Operating on a minuscule annual
budget of only one million dollars, IMCO had dealt exclusively with various technical matters in
the maritime field and had aroused little general interest outside of the maritime community.
Within the maritime community, there was resistance to the very idea of an agency like IMCO as
a central body since it was viewed as representing the injection of “political distractions” into an
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area perceived as technical.3 Matters such as navigation, radio communications, methods of
tonnage measurement, and protection of ships against fire hazards were the types of activities
generally undertaken by IMCO. Nonetheless, given its budgetary constraints, IMCO did not have
a large staff, and it was questionable whether it was up to the task at hand after the Torrey
Canyon disaster. Accordingly, Non-State Actors such as the Comité Maritime International
(CMI—see below) were available to become highly involved in the inevitable adoption of rules
and regulations to be promulgated regarding oil spills on the seas. At the time of the Torrey
Canyon disaster, a number of Non-Governmental Organizations had been granted official
consultative status, which tended to overrepresent international shipping interests.
Parenthetically, by 2016, sixty-eight Non-Governmental Organizations had been granted
consultative status by the IMO. They constitute a diverse group whose interests range from
environmentalism (Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International) to industry
groups (International Bulk Terminals Association, International Associations of Independent
Tankers Owners).
It should be emphasized that IMCO, like other Public International Organizations, then as
well as now, is an integral part of an ongoing political-economic process. It does not exist in a
rarified world of ideas, where organizational, economic, political and even personal motives are
irrelevant to its work and mission. As Susan Strange noted:
But it should be enough at least to pose the in-whose-interest question, in the hope that
subsequent research may pursue it further. Note that this is a fundamentally different
question than the regime one that has dominated the literature of international
organization – and its eponymous journal, IO – for almost a quarter of a century. The
regime question has been about when, and how, governments could be got to cooperate;
about what generated regimes and what caused them to change. Only occasionally and as
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an afterthought, did the cui bono question crop up. A notable exception was an edited
volume in the late 1960’s The Anatomy of Influence, comparing the decision making
processes in a half-dozen UN specialized agencies (Cox and Jacobson, 1973). They did at
least ask the questions when and if these processes were influenced by “private regarding
motivated” – in less polite language, by the self-serving interests of international
officials. Otherwise, it has generally been an implicit assumption of regime research that
any increase in international organisation is a triumph of idealism over realism, that more
is always better, and that cooperation is ipso facto better than conflict – no matter what
the purpose of the cooperation, and whatever the outcome of that cooperation. And the
outspoken assumption, of course, is that international officials are selfless dedicated
missionaries, with only the best interests of the world community at heart.4
Similarly, John M. Bunzel’s observation about the international system in general, is
likewise applicable to international organizations, “The present predominant set of shared values
and worldviews – what we might call superstructure also remain a good deal less than global.
Since we don’t yet think globally and systematically, it’s hardly surprising that we’re having
trouble solving global problems.”5 At the time of the Brussels Conference, IMCO did have
preferences and biases, it saw its mission as being consistent with the maritime industry’s goals,
and was not inclined towards harming this industry to promote environmental interests.

B.

The Comité Maritime International

By definition, decisions undertaken by IMCO on the development of technical and legal
measures to mitigate the problem of oil spills would directly affect three Non-State Actors that
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were part of the maritime industry – shipping interests, marine insurers, and petroleum
companies. The European shipping interests then as well as now are organized in a
nongovernmental organization called the Comité Maritime International (CMI). The CMI has
probably been far more important than IMCO in the drafting of international law on marine
matters. Based in Antwerp, it has served as an important agency in the development of
international maritime law.
The CMI’s Constitution defines its purpose:
It is a non-governmental not-for-profit international organization established in Antwerp
in 1897, the object of which is to contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the
unification of maritime law in all its aspects. To this end it shall promote the
establishment of national associations of maritime law and shall co-operate with other
international organizations.6
Since the time of CMI’s founding, whenever the need for a new set of laws, treaties, or
regulations affecting the shipping industry arose, the CMI provided expertise. The CMI
convened and drafted an appropriate convention, which was then transmitted to the Belgian
government. In turn, that government held an international conference for the purpose of
obtaining approval from those states that chose to participate. Among the CMI conventions
adopted by the international community have been those dealing with matters such as collisions
at sea, maritime mortgages and liens, arrests of ships, and salvage and assistance.
The CMI historically has maintained close ties with governmental officials in various
European shipping ministries. This is particularly true in Great Britain, Belgium, Norway,
Sweden, and Denmark. The pattern of interaction closely resembles a client-patron relationship
that has been studied and observed in many bureaucracies where an agency and an interest group
formulate policies that accrue to their mutual benefit.7 Accordingly, it would be fair to assess that
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the CMI, both as an organization and also as some prominent individuals associated with it,
provides information and occasional political support to governmental officials.8
In turn, the CMI is given crucial input in decision-making regarding marine affairs in the
abovementioned States. As I was told in an interview with a high official of a major international
petroleum company, “The CMI can virtually dictate to certain governments which rules and
regulations it will and will not accept.”9
The American affiliate of the Comité Maritime International is the Maritime Law
Association, which is composed of lawyers who represent the maritime industry. Like their
American counterparts in the marine insurance field, the Maritime Law Association is relatively
uninfluential in policy formulation in the international area. “CMI is dominated largely by
British and Scandinavian interests with Belgium directly behind and everyone else, including the
United States, a very poor third.”10
Further, as shall be described in the next section, the shipowners have a very close
relationship with the insurance industry either through self insurance via the Prevention and
Indemnity Clubs, or through the purchase of policies through marine insurers. Accordingly, high
limits of liability, coupled with the strict liability standard from marine oil pollution damage,
would prove financially disruptive to the shipping industry.

C.

Marine Insurance Interests

In the event of a significant oil spill, the major costs of the disaster would ultimately be
paid by the insurance industry through third party coverage. Susan Strange was perfectly on
target when she wrote about the insurance industry:
The business of insurance plays a growing and important part in the world market
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economy. Those who supply it are not seeking power over outcomes–but they exercise it
nonetheless. And increasingly so. Yet it is hardly mentioned in texts on world politics;
(emphasis by writer of this dissertation) and in economics the study of insurance is
dominated by a few informed specialists, most of who are ideologically committed to the
value judgments of economic liberalism, putting the pursuit of free trade and
untrammeled competition above all other policy objectives.11

Professor Strange expanded on this thought when she wrote:
But it is still generally true that the most widely read academic journals in social science,
whether in economics or politics, pay little or no attention to the political economy of the
insurance business as it is conducted in the real world. This is surprising because
structural forces in the market, in technology, in the authority of political regulators, in
the nature and fortunes of the players, make this one of the most dynamic of the world
system.12

Similarly, political economist Virginia Haufler wrote about reactions of political scientist
colleagues when she discussed her proposed research dealing with insurance. The following
excerpt is from the introduction to her book, Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and the
Management of International Commerce, about risk management in the international system:
When I started this project, the reaction among my colleagues could not be called
universally enthusiastic. Their concerns centered on whether the insurance industry made
a suitable project for a political scientist to explore; some declared insurance dreadfully
dull. Certainly few had bothered to explore this area previously. When I began my
interviews, I discovered many insurers who honestly did not see any political significance
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in what they did. The challenge to me was to demonstrate to readers in both the scholarly
and business communities that the historical development of insurance reveals something
broader about political-economic development and the changing relationship between the
public and private sectors.13
While maritime insurance underwriters are available in many parts of the world, the
industry has historically been centered in Great Britain. Some historians trace modern marine
insurance to the Lombards, who were thirteenth century Italian traders, but most agree that the
modern concept of insurance originated after 1691 at Lloyd’s Coffee House (on Lombard Street)
in London where shipowners used to distribute lists of cargos they needed insured. Any
interested party would sign his name (from this practice came the term underwriter) under the
item he would be willing to insure. Lloyds, despite its venerable age, is still a powerful insurer.
The modern Lloyd’s, together with a number of specialist “London Market” insurance
companies, still writes about 15% of all marine business, 27% of world aviation
insurance, and nearly 58% of all offshore energy business (including oil rigs and similar
marine structures). Lloyd’s is not an insurance company; rather, it is a society of
underwriters and a marketplace where risks are insured by around eighty syndicates of
Underwriting Members (“Names”) which are controlled in turn by managing agents or
underwriting firms (51 at present)...Marine business (and nearly all other business) is
brought to Lloyd’s by 180 or so accredited Lloyd’s brokers.14
The roots of the political-economic power of the insurance industry are described in the
following terms:
The development and evolution of an international risks insurance regime over the course
of the twentieth century depended on the initiative and authority of the private sector
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participants. The insurance underwriters in London and elsewhere made crucial decisions
about what would be insured, how it would be insured, and by whom. The public
authorities, concerned with national security and economic well-being, looked on the
management of political risks as an important factor facilitating foreign commerce, but
proved reluctant to become participants themselves; they eventually joined the regime as
junior partners. The commercial underwriters and government agencies carefully separate
their business from each other, viewing their operations as complementary not
competitive. Both adhered to standard industry norms in designing their insurance
contract, and both believed that many international risks could not be insured.15
In modern times, two types of maritime insurance developed. The first form insures a
quantifiable insurance risk such as the cost of the ship and is referred to as hull and machinery
insurance. It is issued by large marine insurance companies, who cover risks. The second form of
insurance covers, among other losses, damage caused by a ship or its cargo, which by definition
is not a quantifiable number that can be determined in advance. This form of insurance is not
issued by marine insurance companies. Rather, it is issued by the shipowners themselves, who
band together in what are termed Prevention and Indemnity Associations (“P&I Clubs”).
Accordingly, the costs of a disaster like the Torrey Canyon are ultimately paid for by the
shipowners themselves. Therefore, the stakes for the shipowners are enormous in a situation of
massive damage to third parties, including government cleanup costs caused by cargo carried on
their vessels. In a very real sense, the P&I Clubs are the alter egos of the shipowners, and any
compensation paid by them are ultimately borne by the shipowners themselves.
Lloyd’s, the London-based insurer, is composed of over six thousand separate
underwriters who join together to form several dozen syndicates. When a ship is to be insured for
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a particular voyage, each of the brokers (through the syndicate) can purchase a portion of the
insured value of the vessel and/or its cargo (but generally not for damage caused by the cargo).
Often, these individual policies issued by insurance brokers represent a tiny portion of the ship’s
value. In the case of the Torrey Canyon, over four thousand brokers had insured the hull, and the
losses in many cases were as little as one thousand dollars. Although the Torrey Canyon’s hull
was insured at sixteen and a half million dollars (the greatest loss in maritime history), the loss of
the portion insured by the British underwriters was easily absorbed by the British insurers.16
In 1969, British underwriters insured the bulk of the world’s shipping tonnage. Their
position was that high limits of liability, combined with a strict liability standard (as opposed to
the traditional maritime concept of fault), would result in uninsurable liabilities, which implied
that the system in place for the transoceanic transport of oil would simply break down.17
The United States marine insurance industry at that time was smaller and far less
influential than its British counterpart. Nonetheless, the amount paid out by it for the Torrey
Canyon loss amounted to almost twenty-five percent of its total annual premium intake.18 In
1971, the American Hull Insurance syndicate reported that the percent of the income paid out to
indemnify casualties was at a record high, and indicated that new policies were required to meet
contemporary challenges to the industry.19 Therefore, it urged lower limits of liability and lower
standards of liability, specifically, liability based on negligence, with carved out exceptions
diluting that standard, as opposed to the higher standard of strict liability. In addition, shipowners
were interested in the idea of an international fund that would obligate the cargo interests (i.e.
oil) to participate in any compensation scheme. This would distribute the costs to the entire oil
transport industry and lessen their own financial burden. Thus, their interests did not necessarily
coincide with those of the insurers or oil industry.
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D.

The Petroleum Interests

The power and size of the major international oil firms have been well documented.20
The relationship between the oil and shipping industries is complex. Petroleum companies
operate their own tankers, yet independently owned tankers have always been an important
factor in the transoceanic transport of oil.21 The American Merchant Marine Institute (AMMI),
which was the major merchant marine lobby in the United States until 1968 when it merged into
a new association known as the American Institute of Merchant Shipping, listed in 1972 among
its forty three members, eight oil companies including Standard Oil Company of California,
Atlantic Refining Company, and the Sun Oil Company.22 As previously noted, however, a
divergence of interests was manifested between these two industries at the 1969 Brussels
conference over liability for oil spills. The States where shipping interests were powerful argued
that cargo interests, rather than vessel owners, should bear the responsibility for liability for
damages. While oil interests were not averse to some forms of compensation, this could be
accomplished only if the shipowners and the P&I Club agreed to participate in offering some of
the compensation to damaged parties. Further, the terms of liability could neither be made
unlimited, nor based on strict liability, rather than on fault.23 Of the three involved major
industries (shipping, insurance, and oil), the oil companies offered the least resistance to a
compensation plan. The reasons for this attitude were:
a)

Their financial resources were far greater than those of the shippers or the

insurers. (It should be remembered that these events occurred in the late l960s, a time
when the oil interests were far more independent and far less under the control of the
States in which they drilled for oil than they are today.)
b)

Unlike the shippers or insurers, the cargo interests were bearing the brunt of
104

criticism for oil spills (which is still true today). By participating in a compensatory
scheme, a more positive public image might be developed.
c)

Finally, by participating in the establishment of any international fund, the oil

industry would have an effective voice in its founding and in its ensuring policies.24

E.

Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP)

As was discussed in Chapter III, self-regulation is a tactic used by Non-State Actors in
domestic systems whereby a group threatened by government regulation takes a position that
while regulation is needed in any particular situation, the regulation should come from within the
industry rather than from within the government. One of the purposes of this tactic is to cause a
non-decision from the government – i.e. not to proceed with governmental regulation and
instead, let industry police itself.
This tactic was used by the tanker owners and the petroleum companies shortly after the
Torrey Canyon episode in the establishment of two industry entities, The Tanker Owners
Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) by the shipowners,
and the Contract Regarding and Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
(CRISTAL) by the oil companies.
TOVALOP was an agreement reached by owners of oil tankers whose ostensible purpose
was to reimburse governments for cleanup costs that ensued after an oil spill.25 It originated in
London in June 1967, shortly after the Torrey Canyon episode, in a meeting of several corporate
lawyers representing shipping entities affiliated with seven major oil companies (British
Petroleum, ESSO, Gulf Oil, Mobil Oil, Shell, Standard Oil and TEXACO) who gathered to
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assess what international action might occur in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon episode.
These seven oil companies were the leaders in world oil production and known informally as the
“Seven Sisters.” Their specific intention was to avert entirely or delay any reaction, either
unilateral or international, that these lawyers perceived would run counter to the interests of their
clients in the shipping industry. Consequently, after a series of meetings, TOVALOP was
formally registered as a Bermuda based self-insurance corporation in December l967.
The TOVALOP Agreement provided that the member Tanker Owners would undertake
certain obligations in the event of an oil spill caused by one of its members. Specifically, if a
Participating Owner’s oil tanker caused an oil spill through an error or omission, then, in such
event, the Participating Owner would either remove the oil and/or reimburse the government
which had cleaned up the spill for cost of removal up to certain limits – ten million dollars. This
compensation would be made available only after all other means and avenues of compensation
were exhausted.
In short, TOVALOP would provide payment if a Participating Owner acted negligently
(as opposed to a strict liability standard), and only to reimburse governments for cleanup costs,
(as opposed to third parties, e.g. property owners, fishermen, and persons similarly situated, for
damage to person and property).
Moreover, as the name clearly states, it was a voluntary Non-State organization, and
therefore was not subject to governmental oversight, review, appeal, or any of the procedural
safeguards in place when a government is the decision-maker regarding the imposition of
liability. Ultimately, it was sole judge and jury in the matter for governmental compensation for
cleanup costs resulting from oil spills.
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F.

The Contract Regarding and Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
(CRISTAL)

CRISTAL was not financed by insurance companies. Rather, the participants, the major
international oil companies, pledged to compensate affected parties on a pro rata basis. The
upper limit of CRISTAL compensation was established at thirty million dollars.26 The same,
notwithstanding, CRISTAL would become activated in any particular situation only after other
criteria had been met. First, the shipowner’s maximum liability under TOVALOP would have to
be established. Added to this figure would be the expenditures incurred by the shipowner to
clean up the oil. Finally, two other computations would be necessary: the maximum liability of
the owner with respect to such damage under applicable law, statutes, regulations, and
conventions; and the maximum amount to which persons sustaining pollution damage were
entitled from any other person or other ship under existing law, statutes, regulations, and
conventions for compensation for the damage. CRISTAL would pay the difference between that
final figure and a maximum of thirty million dollars.27 Thus, unless a monumental oil spill
disaster occurred, and the total cleanup costs exceeded fourteen million dollars, CRISTAL would
not be activated. The CRISTAL agreement among the oil companies was formally agreed to by
its component members on January 14, 1971.
After the details of CRISTAL had been worked out, an entity called the Oil Companies
Institute for Marine Compensation Ltd (“the Institute”) was established by the oil companies.
Unlike TOVALOP, which imposed liability on the shipowner, CRISTAL’s method was to
impose liability on the cargo owner (oil companies) and claims would then be paid by the
Institute.
107

Again, like TOVALOP, the Institute was not a governmental entity, and any payments by
it were essentially voluntary in nature with the Institute establishing all procedural and
substantive rules and regulations.

II.

The Regime Formation Process Begins – April 196728
As previously noted in this chapter, shortly after the Torrey Canyon episode, the British

government in April 1967, sent an official communication to IMCO requesting an urgent
meeting to discuss changes in international law regarding liability for pollution-caused oil spills
and possibly other pollutants.
Almost simultaneously, the Bureau Permanent of the CMI voted to establish an
International Torrey Canyon Subcommittee, which was charged with studying the disaster and
making the appropriate recommendations as to any changes in international law regarding
liability for marine oil pollution damage. The Chairman of the Subcommittee was Lord Devlin
who was the President of the British Maritime Law Association, which like other Maritime Law
Associations was the official national affiliate of the CMI (see official CMI website for listing of
all national Maritime Law Associations). The Subcommittee selected from its membership a
Working Group of nine, which included prominent members of the French, British, Italian,
Dutch, Norwegian, and Swedish Maritime Law Associations, as well as the Manager of the
German Shipowners’ Association.
The IMCO and CMI subcommittees worked separately in the formation of the emerging
regime complex to deal with maritime oil pollution. IMCO consisted of an organization that had
diverse international membership, although it was highly inclined to promote shipping interests
while the CMI Subcommittee by its Working Group consisted of maritime lawyers, whose
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clients were the shipowners and therefore clearly represented the shipping interests and their
alter egos, the P&I Clubs.
IMCO through its Legal Committee studied both the Public International Law question of
intervention on the seas against an offending vessel (Legal Working Group I), as well as the
private law issue of financial liability of the shipowners (Legal Working Group II). The CMI
dealt only with the private law issue and was not concerned with the issue of intervention on the
seas. It is important to note, however, that IMCO and the CMI did have an official channel of
communication through the IMCO Legal Working Group II.
It soon became clear that most important private law issue was the standard of liability,
which would be incorporated in any private law treaty. Maritime law had traditionally used a
negligence standard, which is far less rigorous than the strict liability standard. The latter
standard, in practical terms, meant that liability would accrue to the shipowner, whether or not
the crew of the ship had acted negligently. There were many in IMCO who wanted a strict
liability standard, while the CMI, as an organization representing shipowners, was adamant that
the traditional negligence standard would remain in effect.
The second issue was who would be liable for oil pollution damage. In the broadest
sense, the question under consideration was one of economics – should liability be borne by the
shipowners and their insurance companies, or should liability be borne by the petroleum
companies who, at the end of the day, were profiting from a lucrative trade in oil, or some
combination of shipowners, insurance companies, and oil companies? As will be seen below, this
question was not resolved at the Brussels Conference, and in a very real sense still remains an
open issue today.
The CMI spent the period between the establishment of its Working Group in 1967 and
the Brussels Conference attempting to establish a credible alternative to an anticipated IMCO
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regime based on strict liability, as well as high limits of liability.
Accordingly, the CMI met in Rome in October 1967, and requested that its members
respond to a membership poll on the issues in order to establish a unified position.
Eighteen members responded to the poll, and in September 1968, the CMI held a meeting
in Brussels to establish its position. The meeting was chaired by Albert Lilar, President of the
Belgian Maritime Law Association, who, as will be seen in the discussion of the Brussels
Conference, served as an official chair on behalf of IMCO. The net result of this meeting at
Brussels was (not unexpectedly), the drafting of a proposed treaty based on a consensus to
minimize the liability of shipowners.
Several months later, in January 1969, IMCO met in London and considered the
September 1968 CMI draft treaty, and while there was an agreement on certain relatively minor
issues such as compulsory insurance for shipowners, the key issue of liability remained open.
Also in January 1969, the CMI met in Tokyo and in an effort to shift the terms of
liability, the Irish and Swedish delegations proposed that the strict liability standard be applied
to cargo owners rather than shipowners. This proposal was rejected, and further, no consensus
was reached on all of the terms of a draft treaty. Following the Tokyo meeting, the CMI
submitted its latest draft to IMCO, but the terms and limits of liability remained open issues to be
resolved at Brussels.

III.

The IMCO Meeting of May 1967

The special session of IMCO to discuss the problems raised by the Torrey Canyon
episode convened in London on May 4 and 5, 1967. Because of the significant decisions made at
this meeting, an in-depth analysis of the decisions will be discussed at this point. There existed a
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broad consensus that if another Torrey Canyon disaster were to be avoided, certain corrective
steps would have to be taken. Three categories of potential IMCO activities were considered.
The first dealt with technical and preventive measures to avoid repetition of a Torrey Canyon
disaster. Discussed were methods of training seamen, tanker construction technology, and
establishment of sea lanes for tankers. Next on the agenda was a discussion of remedial
measures, such as how to alleviate the physical problems caused by oil pollution. These
functions were well within the usual scope of IMCO activities and could be best described by
noting that, though desirable, they were nonetheless technical and generally non-controversial.
The third category of question, however, marked a notable departure from previous
IMCO endeavors. For the first time at any IMCO meeting, proposals dealing with legal remedies
were placed upon the agenda. Among the items under consideration were: the legal rights of a
coastal state to intervene on the high seas in case of an oil tanker breakup that threatened its
shores; the terms and extent of civil liability in accident situations; and the question of
compulsory insurance for oil tankers.
The legal questions, which previously would have been discussed exclusively at a CMI
session, were now being considered by IMCO. At least some of the motives for this new
approach were suggested by a team of observers from the United States House of
Representatives, who in their report to the House’s Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries noted that:
First, the CMI, as a non-governmental body does not have the official status to make
authoritative determinations on behalf of member nations. An intergovernmental panel
such as a new subcommittee of IMCO would be able to give the prompt and official
attention required for the pressing legal problems.
The second reason was that the entire three-part program would best be handled and
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coordinated within one organization.
A further reason in the mind of the delegates, not discussed by the council but learned in
private conversations, was that the CMI is not highly regarded for its efficiency or
dispatch in handling problems. Many delegates felt that assigning urgent and complicated
legal questions to the CMI would not bring prompt results.29

This last reason is problematical because the CMI over the past seventy years had dealt
with precisely the type of situation, which it was now claimed the CMI did, “not have the official
status to make authoritative determinations on behalf of member nations.”
Instead, one must examine the latter two reasons given by the report of the United States
House of Representatives and the fact that IMCO was attempting to gain recognition (and
possibly enhance its image and obtain a larger budget) by drafting a convention on a matter
guaranteed to win some publicity for itself.30 Further, it is reasonable to assume that since CMI
represented shipping interests, it was probably felt by many within IMCO (such as the nonmaritime States) that a more “neutral” agency should participate in the forthcoming conventions.
Thus, it appeared as if there occurred, a dichotomy between, on the one hand, IMCO, a
Public International organization, and the CMI, a Non-State Actor that heretofore had drafted
maritime treaties and conventions. This divorce, however, was not destined to be permanent or
even contemplated to be permanent, for it was emphasized at the London Conference that, “The
IMCO body could draw upon the experience and expertise of the CMI, on a consultative
basis.”31 Thus no real separation between the shipping interests and IMCO was in the offing. As
was demonstrated repeatedly at the 1969 Brussels Conference, the term “consultative basis” was
interpreted rather broadly by the CMI and by IMCO.
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IV.

The Competing CMI and IMCO Treaty Drafts – Post-London 1969

As previously indicated, as the Brussels Conference approached, the CMI and IMCO
draft treaties still diverged in significant ways.
The CMI draft stipulated that liability be based on the traditional maritime standard of
fault (negligence) and not on the principle of strict liability.32 Again, the CMI worked closely
with the P&I Clubs and accordingly, since liability would be ultimately borne by the shipping
companies (who self-insured through the P&I Clubs), their mutual interests dictated that liability
be based on fault (i.e. negligence as opposed to strict liability) and, further, be limited rather than
open-ended. The IMCO Working Committee split between those sympathetic to the CMI
position and those opting for strict liability. The strict liability clause of the IMCO Working
Committee made the vessel owner fully liable for damages, unless the oil spill was caused by “an
act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character.” Because of the split in the IMCO Working Committee, the proposed IMCO draft
treaty contained both versions (Alternative A and Alternative B), and it remained for the
delegates to the Brussels Conference to make the final decision.
Besides the major issue of liability based on fault versus strict liability, there were other
significant differences between the CMI and the IMCO draft treaties.
First, the CMI draft applied to seagoing vessels carrying bulk quantities of oil. The IMCO
convention defined ship (except war ships and government vessels used for noncommercial
service) as any sea going vessel, and included in its provisions, damage caused by empty
tankers.33
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Second, the CMI draft defined damage as “contamination” – the damage actually caused
by oil.34 The IMCO draft could be interpreted to include damage caused by fire and explosion, as
well as by oil.35
Third, the CMI draft provided a limit of one thousand Franc Poincaré (sixty-seven
dollars) per net ton if the owner was innocent of “actual fault or privity.” IMCO’s decision was
to allow the matter of a ceiling for financial liability be decided at Brussels. Consequently, the
treaty clause that stipulated the exact amount of liability was left blank.36
While there existed other discrepancies between the two drafts on other related matters,
such as compulsory insurance and appropriate jurisdictions for adjudicating any claims,37 there
also were wide differences of opinion within the IMCO Working Group. Several of these
relevant issues could not be resolved in the pre-conference negotiations. (Table IV-I: Competing
IMCO and CMI Draft Treaty Provisions outlines these issues on the next page.) Among the
major points of contention were:
a)

Which pollutants should be encompassed within the scope of the treaty. The

United States position was that all pollutants should be included. Others took the position
that only pollution by oil should be regulated.
b)

The territorial scope of the proposed treaty. Some states wanted to include the

territorial seas, as well as the high seas. Others opposed the inclusion of the territorial
seas in the treaty, since the right of States to act within their territorial seas had been
codified in international law and, “application (of the treaty) in the territorial sea might
subject coastal states to liabilities by arbitral tribunals on the basis of law other than that
of the coastal state.”38
c)

The matter of strict liability vs. liability based on fault. The United States favored

the strict liability position. Again, this position appeared to be consistent with the
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structure of the shipping and marine insurance industries, which were located largely
outside of the United States.
d)

The limit on liability. This was a subject of vigorous debate. The proposed figures

ranged from sixty-seven dollars to four hundred and fifty dollars per ton per vessel per
incident. The United States, “favored a limit which would be sufficient in most cases to
compensate fully governments and coastal victims for pollution damage keeping in mind
the amount of insurance available on the world market.”39
e)

Whether a vessel should be required to demonstrate through some form of

insurance that it was able to compensate both government and victims. Again, the United
States maintained that, “such a provision (was) essential to insure compensation.”40 41

TABLE IV-1: COMPETING IMCO and CMI DRAFT TREATY PROVISIONS
IMCO

CMI

STRICT LIABILITY

Yes

No

LIMITS TO LIABILITY

Yes (higher)

Yes (lower)

CARGO CAUSING
DAMAGE
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE

Only Bulk Oil

Other Cargoes

Only Caused by Oil

Broader – fire, etc.
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V.

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE

A.

The Organization of the Conference
The IMCO conference met in Brussels from November 10 to 29, 1969. The attendees

included forty-eight nations as participants, six nations as observers, three specialized agencies
of the United Nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and six non-governmental
organizations.42 The majority of the participants were either shipping States or coastal States
from the Western powers, or from the Communist bloc. Conversely, there was little
representation from developing States, with the notable exception of Liberia, where so many
seagoing ships were registered. (A full list of the participating nations and organizations, as well
as the composition of the leadership, is presented in the following pages in Table IV-2
Participants at the Brussels Conference.)
The first item on the agenda was the election of a President and Vice President for the
Conference. Elected as President of the Conference was Dr. Albert Lilar, Chairman of the
Belgian delegation. Dr. Lilar was also the President of the CMI and, as indicated, a member of
the Belgian delegation. From the perspective of interest group theory, especially on the broad
issue of regulatory capture, this overlapping of public and private roles by the President of the
Conference was highly significant.43
The Conference was divided into three working committees. The Committee on the
Whole I studied the draft articles on the public law treaty, which served as the basis of the
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case Of Oil Pollution
Casualties. Chairman of this committee was Mr. George A. Maslov (USSR) with Mr. G. E.
Nasamento de Silva (Brazil) and Mr. E. Lysgaard (Denmark) as vice chairmen. The Committee
on the Whole II studied the draft articles, which eventually were incorporated into the
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International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. Chairman of this
committee was Dr. Walter Muller, a prominent Swiss attorney, member of the Swiss delegation
and President of the Swiss Maritime Law Association. Vice chairmen were Mr. C. Borchsenius
of Norway and Mr. S. Matysik of Poland.
Finally, a committee on the Whole or Final Clauses was established. The chairman was
Mr. H. E. Shefer (Netherlands), and the Vice-Chairman was Mr. R. Economou (Romania).
Again, one cannot underestimate the significance of the appointments of Dr. Albert Lilar
and Dr. Walter Muller to leadership roles at the Brussels Conference. These two appointments
are illustrative of the role of interest groups in general, and the concept of regulatory capture in
particular. This phenomenon could exist only in an international system that is transnational and
characterized by overlapping relationships among its State, Non-State Actors, and Public
International Organization components. What is somewhat surprising is that those who have
previously written about Brussels have failed to identify these dual roles and their significance to
both interest group and international relations theory.44
There were those at the Conference who opposed the approach of drafting two separate
conventions. Canada articulated these sentiments when early in the Conference its delegate, Mr.
Jamieson, noted that, “The Canadian government believed that there should be only a single
convention – if necessary, in two parts: one part dealing with civil liability, the other with the
right of intervention – so that the states would not be able to approve or reject one or other of the
proposed conventions as it suited their interests.”45 In other words, the Canadian government
took an approach requiring mutually acceptable cross-provisions for the private law and public
law treaties.
To reinforce its position, Canada offered an amendment to the public law convention that
would have enabled States to disavow the financial obligations implicit within the convention
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vis-a-vis vessels of those States that did not accept the financial obligations in the private law
convention. Canada’s position was that it was absurd to require a coastal State to pay for cleanup
costs in relation to States that did not accept the corresponding financial obligation of the private
law convention. The amendment, which reflected an emerging environmentalist approach to the
issue of pollution of transnational resources, was rejected by the Conference.
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TABLE IV-2
PARTICIPANTS AT THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE (NOVEMBER, 1969)
III.

Participation
As previously indicated, fifty-three countries were represented at the Conference, forty-

seven by official delegations and six as observers. In addition, three Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations, two intergovernmental organizations, and six non-governmental organizations
were represented by observers at the invitation of the IMCO Assembly.
The following countries were represented by official delegations with the number of
representatives from each indicated:
Australia (3)
Belgium (14)
Brazil (6)
Bulgaria (3)
Cameroon (1)
Canada (9)
China, Republic of (4)
Denmark (7)
Finland (4)
France (9)
Germany, Federal Republic of (8)
Ghana (3)
Greece (5)
Guatemala (1)
Iceland (2)
India (4)
Indonesia (8)
Ireland (2)
Israel (1)
Italy (8)
Ivory Coast (2)
Japan (13)
Korea, Republic of (4)
Liberia (9)

Libya (1)
Malagasy Republic (5)
Monaco (1)
Netherlands (7)
New Zealand (1)
Norway (12)
Peru (1)
Philippines (1)
Poland (6)
Portugal (2)
Romania (3)
Singapore (1)
Spain (9)
Sweden (16)
Switzerland (4)
Syria (3)
Thailand (2)
Ukrainian S.S.R. (2)
U.S.S.R. (6)
United Arab Republic (2)
United States (8)
Venezuela (3)
Yugoslavia (4)
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The following countries attended as observers with the number of representatives from
each indicated:
Algeria (2)
Argentina (1)
Hong Kong (1)

South Africa (1)
Sudan (1)
Turkey (1)

The following Specialized Agencies of the United Nations were represented as observers
with the number of representatives from each indicated:
International Labour Organization (1)
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2)
International Atomic Energy Agency (2)
The following intergovernmental organizations attended as observers with the number of
representatives from each indicated:
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1)
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (2)
The following non-governmental organizations attended as observers with the number of
representatives from each indicated:
Comité Maritime International (2)
International Chamber of Shipping (1)
International Chamber of Commerce (3)
Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses (1)
International Law Association (3)
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (1)
IV. United States Delegation
The United States delegation consisted of:
Representatives:
Robert H. Neuman
Assistant Legal Advisor
Department of State
Chairman of Delegation
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Rear Admiral William L. Morrison United States Coast Guard
Department of Transportation
Alternate
Charles I. Bevans
Assistant Legal Adviser
Department of State
K. E. Biglane
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
Department of Interior
W.J. Ford
Shipping Attache
U.S. Embassy, London
Louis P. Georgantas
Office of the Legal Adviser
Department of State
Advisers:
Ralph E. Casey, Vice President
American Institute of Merchant Shipping
James J. Higgins, President
Maritime Law Association of the United States
(Source: United State Department of State, Robert E. Neuman et. al., Report of the United States
Delegation to the International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution Damage, p. 3-5.)
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B.

The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties (Public Law Treaty)

The public law treaty establishes the rights of a State to intervene on the high seas against
a ship causing oil pollution by providing that:
Parties to the convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to
prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related
interests from pollution of the seas by oil, following upon a marine casualty or acts
related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful
consequences.46
Two further relevant points should be noted:
a)

The convention applies only to the high seas, not the territorial seas.

b)

Not only coastlines are protected, but related interests, which are defined as,

“...fisheries activities...tourist attractions...the health of the coastal population...and living
marine resources and wildlife.”47
This right to intervene against an offending vessel is tempered by the requirement that the
intervening State must undertake consultations with other States affected by the casualty,
particularly the flag State; consult with independent experts on the advisability of the impending
action against the vessel; and notify any person (physical or corporate) in the coastal State whose
interests could be affected by the decision.48
Nonetheless, if the situation allows no time for consultation or notification, the threatened
coastal State was authorized to act unilaterally.49
Thus, a new right under Public International Law was created. Specifically, a State had
the unilateral right to intervene proactively against a threat resulting from oil pollution to it or its
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interests. Accordingly, this provision resolved the uncertainty faced by the British government
when confronted with a decision whether or not to destroy the Torrey Canyon.
The treaty further provided that each state should “...use its best endeavors to avoid any
risk to human life, and to afford persons in distress any assistance of which they may stand in
need, and in appropriate cases to facilitate the repatriation of ship’s crews, and to have no
obstacles thereto.”50 On the last point, the Soviet Union had proposed an amendment which
would have obligated the coastal State to repatriate the crew to the State of the ship’s registry or
their home port without delay.51 The compromise term “to facilitate the repatriation” was
ultimately incorporated into the treaty.
Further, the financial liability issues resulting from a State’s intervention against an
offending vessel were also resolved as follows:
First, if any State takes measures in contravention of the provisions of the treaty and
causes unnecessary damage, then compensation must be paid, “to the extent of the damage
caused by measures which exceed those reasonably necessary to achieve the end mentioned in
Article I.”52
Second, Article VIII provides that if there is a dispute between the involved parties
whether or not the measures taken, “were in contravention of the provisions of the proposed
convention,” (and compensation must therefore be paid under the provisions of Article VI), then
the parties can submit the dispute to conciliation or arbitration as provided in the annex of the
convention.
Third, the annex to the convention details the procedures for conciliation and arbitration.
The Soviet Union, the Soviet Bloc, and some of the Third World States opposed the principle of
compulsory arbitration. The United States and Western Europe favored the idea.
Generally speaking, the public law treaty aroused little controversy. First, it legitimized a
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practice that had been used previously (for example in the Torrey Canyon episode). The treaty,
in a very real sense, only legitimized State action against privately-owned ships, which in any
event was a course of action likely to have been undertaken by coastal States faced with an
environmental catastrophe.
Second, it was perceived as a reasonable move to save the seas.
Third, the treaty was “conservative,” and rather limited in that:
a)

It only dealt with oil, not all contaminants.

b)

It provided for consultation with other powers and international experts.

c)

It provided for compensation in cases of overreaction.

In essence, the Caroline Case53 described in Chapter 2 serves as a relevant precedent or,
at the very least, a rationale for this treaty. Action is sanctioned in situations where monumental
disaster is inevitable. The State’s action can readily be justified on the grounds of defense;
consequently, the treaty reiterates an accepted principle of customary international law.
Professor I. F. E. Goldie noted that there are those who suggested that the treaty be
rejected because it reaffirms “creeping jurisdiction...that whenever a state enjoys exclusive
offshore rights for some purposes, it tends to acquire further exclusive rights for other and
perhaps all purposes, jeopardizing regional, international, and community interest in the freedom
of the seas.”54 Goldie maintained that such fears are groundless and, “creeping jurisdiction can
only occur by a failure of the international community’s will.”55 It is difficult to perceive how the
public law convention could represent a threat to the international community.
Additionally, the protective theory is analogous to self-defense. The great principle of
territorial integrity is vulnerable before the experience of such a fundamental right. Certainly,
“the freedom of the seas” concept is of no greater dignity and must be temporarily abridged in
the pursuit of self-protection.56
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A second approach to rationalize the right of States to intervene on the high seas is based
on the broad doctrine of “abuse of right” and its specific application in the Trail Smelter
Arbitration.57 It should be pointed out that abuse of right is a doctrine of Public International
Law, which may be applied by the International Court of Justice per Article 38 of the Statue of
the Court. Both approaches have a common basis of affording an environmentally endangered
State the opportunity of intervening against an offending vessel on the seas.

C.

The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Private Law
Treaty/Civil Law Treaty)

The private law treaty was far more complicated and controversial than was the public
law treaty because of radically different views on the resolution of outstanding issues that were
encompassed within the former draft text.58
The private law treaty, as signed, provides that the convention applies to oil pollution
damage occurring on the territory or the territorial sea of a contracting State.59 At that time, there
did not exist a universally accepted standard as to the width of the territorial sea. Accordingly, a
State that recognized a width of six miles had a greater coverage under the treaty than a State that
recognized a three-mile limit.
Article III discusses the scope of liability, which was probably the most controversial
issue discussed and decided upon at the conference. The issue was simply who was liable for
damages. The terms of the private law treaty provide that the owner of the vessel (as opposed to
the cargo owner) was made liable for any damages.60 Clearly, this represented a victory for the
international oil interests who had far deeper pockets than the shipping interests.
The resolution of this issue occurred only after many days of debate and the addition of a
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provision to the treaty to establish a fund to compensate victims. The Canadian delegation,
among others, had argued that since marine oil pollution was caused by the oil interests, as well
as the shipping industry, both should share in the cleanup costs. Consequently, Canada offered
an amendment that would have made the shipping interests liable up to a certain amount, with
the cargo owner (oil interests) paying the remainder.61
Similarly, the Irish delegation offered another amendment, which was supported by
States that had strong shipping interests, such as Belgium, Greece, Liberia, and the Scandinavian
countries. This amendment placed primary responsibility on the cargo owner. Further, the
liability would have been absolute, rather than capped at a specific dollar or franc amount. This
was modified by a savings clause, which provided that if the oil discharge occurred because of
the vessel’s negligence, then, in such event, the cargo owner (oil interests) would have had a
right of recovery over the shipowner.
After lengthy discussion, an agreement was reached that provided that the shipowner
would be held liable for oil pollution damage up to the amount of one hundred thirty-four dollars
per net ton of the ship, or fourteen million dollars whichever was less. Further, strict liability,
rather than negligence, was the standard used in the determination of the ship owner’s liability.
The effects of these seemingly onerous provisions were, however, diluted as follows:
a.

An international compensation fund would be established to relieve shipowners
from the burden of liability. Specifically, Sweden and Denmark offered a resolution
that called upon IMCO to convene a conference by 1971 to establish such a fund. The
fund would be based on two principles: “that victims would be fully compensated
under a system of strict liability (and) that the fund should relieve in principle the ship
owner of the additional final burden imposed by the convention.”

b.

A ship owner would be relieved of responsibility if the discharge:
126

“resulted from an act of war or hostilities;”
“was wholly caused by an act of omission done with intent to cause damage by a
third party;”
“was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful acts of any government
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational
aides in the exercise of that function.”62
The ceiling for liability was global in that it incorporated all potential suits ranging from
cleanup costs to damages to coastal installations. No priority was granted to government cleanup
costs over any other person’s or other entity’s cleanup costs or damages. These limits of liability
were enhanced by the commitment of TOVALOP and CRISTAL to provide additional coverage
in the event that damages exceeded fourteen million dollars. Needless to say, any payments by
TOVALOP or CRISTAL would be made at their sole discretion, rather than by the independent
authority having the power to compel payment.
Other salient provisions of the treaty dealt with the physical location of damages to an
injured party. Specifically, as previously noted, the treaty’s liability provisions apply solely to
damage in territorial waters, or the actual territory of a contracting State. Also covered are costs
resulting from preventive measures taken by a coastal State.63 Excluded, however, by
implication, are damages that occur on the high seas, which would be highly relevant to coastal
fishing interests, whose boats, equipment, and cargo were excluded from coverage by the terms
of the treaty.
Further, the treaty provided that each ship carrying over two thousand tons of oil must,
“maintain insurance or other financial security...in the sums fixed by applying the limits of
liability...to cover his liability for pollution damage under the convention.”64 This certificate
specified the name of the vessel and its port of registration, the name and principal place of
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business of the owner; the type of security (e.g. surely bunds), name, and place of business of the
insurer.65
Two significant exceptions, however, were incorporated into the article outlining the role
of the insurer or financial guarantor.
In an instance where an insurer is being sued for damage, the defendant (insurer), “may,
irrespective of the actual fault or privity of the owner, avail himself of the limits of liability,
prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1.66 The owner, however, cannot limit his liability in cases of
“actual fault or privity.”67
In addition, the insurer was given the right to plead a defense, “that the pollution damage
resulted for the willful misconduct of the owner himself,” and thereby not be liable for the
damage.68
These limitations on liability provided to the insurer are highly significant. As will be
demonstrated further, they are indicative of the role played by the insurers at the Brussels
conference.
Further, on the matter of jurisdiction for litigation, the convention provides that if
pollution damage has occurred in the territorial seas of two or more of the contracting States, or
preventive measures have been taken in these areas, “...actions for compensation may only be
brought in the courts of any such contracting state or states.”69 Thus the venue for litigation is in
the court system of the State(s) damaged, irrespective of the State of origin of the ship’s owner or
charterer.
Finally, other articles dealt with “boiler plate” issues of ratification and signature,70
denunciation,71 and the amendment process.72
While the private law treaty established an orderly process for compensation of pollution
victims, it, nonetheless, disappointed those who had anticipated an international convention that
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would provide substantial compensation for those entities and persons who were damaged by oil
spills and their aftermath. Even Robert H. Neuman, the Chairman of the American delegation to
the Brussels meeting wrote, “...the fact remains that the 1969 conventions are likely neither to
reduce substantially the number of accidental oil spills or dramatically mitigate the damage
resulting from them, nor will they fully compensate in all cases the coastal victims of such
incidents.”73
While the first two goals mentioned by Neuman (the reduction on the number of oil spills
and the mitigation of oil spill damage) were not directly under discussion at Brussels,
compensation of victims was a primary topic of concern. Consequently, the question must be
raised as to why a seemingly inadequate system of compensation was established at Brussels.
The answer lies in the interests of Non-State Actors, both national and transnational, who
perceived an economic threat if certain terms and limits on liability were established at the
Brussels Conference. The next step then in this analysis is to examine the methods by which
Non-State Actors were able to influence the terms of the Convention on Civil Liability (the
private law treaty).

VI.

Decision-Making at Brussels Using the Paradigm of Regime Formation

A.

The Regime Formation Process

As demonstrated in this chapter, the regime formation process during the period
beginning in April 1967 through November 1969 occurred in the context of a transnational
system characterized by interactions among State- and Non-State Actors and a public
international organization. The participants in this regime complex included the CMI and IMCO
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as competing power centers, as well as powerful insurance and oil interests. All interacted in a
bargaining process that culminated in the private law treaty, as well as the far less controversial
public law treaty. A closer examination of the institutional framework in which Non-State Actors
operated clarifies their specific roles in the competitive regime formation process. It has been
observed that, “competition among the elemental institutions constitutes a core characteristic of
regime complex.”74 A closer examination of the institutional framework in which Non-State
Actors operated clarifies their role in the competitive regime formation process in Brussels.

1.

The Institutional Presence of the CMI and Other Non-State Actors at the Brussels
Conference
The pivotal role of Non-State Actors at the Brussels conference can be observed by a

reading of the records and the rules of the conference.75 Most of the States who sent
representatives to the meeting divided their delegations into three levels: the delegates;
alternates; and advisors. While the delegates and alternates were, in virtually all cases,
individuals who held official governmental positions, the advisors represented, to a certain
extent, various segments of the industries that would be most affected by any resulting new
treaties. Thus, sprinkled throughout the ranks of certain delegations were representatives of
shipowner associations, maritime law associations, and the insurance industry.76 The Provisional
Rules of the meeting provided that alternates or advisors could act as a representative if they
were so designated by the head of the delegation.77 An examination of the records of the
Committee of the Whole II (which drafted the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution)
indicates that the Non-State Actors often availed themselves of the opportunity to inform
publicly the Committee of their views on certain of the vital issues under discussion, not the least
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of which was the controversy over whether or not to incorporate strict liability provisions into
the private law treaty.
Allan I. Mendelsohn, a former United States Department of State negotiator who
participated in several IMCO conferences, has been highly critical of the mingling of private
interests in national delegations at IMCO meetings. Mendelsohn has stated:
The individual participants who appear at conferences on behalf of states are mostly
drawn from ship owning and marine insurance interests. Though highly competent in
their respective fields, these individuals are usually more prone to protect, and
experienced in protecting, their own parochial interests rather than the interests of the
environment.78
While Canada, and to a lesser extent, the United States represented “the interests of the
environment” at Brussels, the shipping, petroleum, and insurance interests were probably far
more effectively represented by delegates such as Dr. Walter Muller and Dr. Albert Lilar, who as
previously indicated represented shipping interests on a professional level, but served as
members of their national delegations (Switzerland and Belgium respectively), and were part of
the formal IMCO leadership that ran the Brussels Conference.
The bias of certain key Brussels Conference delegations, such as Belgian, Swiss, and
Irish, towards the shipping and insurance industries and not to the potential victims of an oil spill
again underlines a major premise of this study: that in the bargaining process to create a
transnational regime, there is competition but not all actors are created equal.
Instead, the critical role of Non-State Actors (especially in the crucial area of terms of
liability), and their methods of cooption can undermine the efficacy of the institutional
machinery established to deal with the pollution of transnational resources.
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2.

The American Delegation at Brussels: The Politics of Access

As previously noted, Non-State Actors such as the CMI were crucial in drafting the terms
of the private law treaty. In addition, certain Non-State Actors were able to influence their host
country’s votes and position at Brussels (also referred to as advisory committees). The American
delegation to the Brussels conference provides a prototype of the latter type of influence.
Writing on the roles played by interest groups, Harmon Zeigler noted on domestic
systems:
In those cases of almost total harmony of interest between the government organization
and the interest group, the regulated clientele actually acquires a beachhead within the
institutions of government. Groups enjoying this relationship have a distinct advantage
over groups which face the obstacle of lack of access.79
As previously observed in Chapter III, among the methods that an interest group can
utilize to obtain access to bureaucratic decision-makers is by the use of what are termed organs
of administrative pluralism (also referred to as advisory committees). The Shipping Coordinating
Committee, an organ of administrative pluralism, played an outside role in the American
delegation at Brussels.
At the time of the Brussels Conference, the Shipping Coordinating Committee had thirty
members. The committee’s members were drawn from the Departments of State and
Transportation, and from the shipping, oil, and insurance industries. The Committee’s purpose
was to provide an input for the private interests who would be affected by a State Department
decision on shipping matters. A second purpose of the Shipping Coordinating Committee was to
coordinate State Department policy on maritime policy with other involved governmental
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agencies, such as the United States Coast Guard.80
An examination of the Shipping Coordinating Committee’s membership at the time of the
1969 Brussels Conference makes it clear that access was provided only to representatives of the
maritime, insurance, and petroleum industries. Conversely, there was no access to the Shipping
Coordinating Committee by representatives of environmental interests.81 (For a detailed list of
the committee’s membership, see Table IV-3 Shipping Coordinating Committee on p. 138.)
At a hearing held before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
April 1973, Richard Frank, a spokesman for the Center for Law as Social Policy, a group
representing environmental interest, charged that the lack of environmentalist membership on the
Shipping Coordinating Committee resulted from a deliberate State Department policy, “to inhibit
the participation of certain elements of the public in the decision-making process.82 Frank added
that the economic bureaus of the State Department, which formulated international
environmental policy, “have a constituency which is more oriented toward economic (sic) than
the environment.”83
Democratic Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell, who had a strong environmentalist
orientation, agreed with Frank’s evaluation of the State Department’s pro-industry orientation,
and indicated that he would attempt to ensure that organized environmentalists would be granted
access to the deliberations of the Shipping Coordinating Committee.84
In my research, I conducted interviews in Washington, D.C., in March and June of
1972.The late Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island provided background information, but this
information was somewhat general in that he was an active member of the United States Senate,
and obviously was not in a position to reveal matters that might be detrimental to his career.
Another interviewee was Allan I. Mendelsohn, a former State Department negotiator currently in
the private practice of law, as well as an adjunct professor at the Georgetown University Law
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Center. He was the individual deploring the lack of public participation in the decision-making
process. The other former negotiator wished to remain unidentified. It should be noted, however,
that there was a feeling in certain business circles at the time of the Brussels meeting that the
United States had adopted a position that was inconsistent with the best interest of the shipping
and insurance industry and was over-concerned with ecology.85
Thus, decision-making in the State Department on the American stance at the Brussels
Conference was not based on an amorphous concept known as “the public interest,” but on the
fact that representatives of key industry groups had direct access to members of the bureaucracy.
This again illustrates a major point of this study: that in the making of policy to formulate a
regime to regulate pollution, the role of Non-State Actors with a vested financial interest in the
outcome can be crucial, and their resistance to the development of an effective international legal
regime to regulate oil spills can override or countervail the desire of some States or
environmental interests to establish such a regime.
When discussing the policy formulation process, it is, of course, difficult to define
precisely which course of action is congruent with the public interest.86 It is not, of course, being
suggested that the policy demands of the oil, marine, or insurance interests cannot coincide with
“the public interest,” nor that the demands of environmentalists, such as the Sierra Club, always
represent ‘‘the public interest.” Rather what is being suggested is that a policy formulation
process that does not give a multiplicity of competing interests access to the decision-makers
cannot, by definition, be considered to be representative of the “public interest.” Accordingly, it
is suggested that if either IMCO or the State Department had given access only to organized
environmental groups, and not to the shipping interests, the resultant policy would likewise not
have been considered as conforming to the “public interest.”
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TABLE IV-3
SHIPPING COORDINATING COMMITTEE
August 8, 1969
NAME _

ORGANIZATION

Mr. Philip H. Trezise
Mr. John Rhinelander
Mr. John F. Buckle
Mr. Richard A. Frank
Mr. M. C. Pfutz
Mr. A. H. McComb, Jr.
Mr. James J. Higgins
Mr. Gordon W. Paulsen
Mr. John Prokes
Mr. Nicholas J. Healy
Mr. James J. Reynolds
Mr. Richard W. Palmer
Mr. Robert P. Nash

Department of State - E
Department of State - L
Department of State - E/MA
Department of State - L/E
American Petroleum Institute
American Petroleum Institute
President, Maritime Law Association
Maritime Law Association
America Inst. of Merchant Shipping
American Inst. of Merchant Shipping
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In my interview research in 1972, when two former State Department negotiators were
asked about the role of the Shipping Coordinating Committee, both replied that before the United
States participates in any international conference relating to maritime affairs, the members of
the Shipping Coordinating Committee assemble to inform the Department of State of their
positions. When I observed that there were no groups representing the public interest on the
Shipping Coordinating Committee, two different answers were offered. One former negotiator
replied, “We (the State Department) and other governmental units represent the public interest.”
The other conceded that, in fact, the public interest was not represented at all, and the Shipping
Coordinating Committee excluded public interest-oriented groups such as environmentalists or
those who are involved in what might be referred to as consumerism and thus are opposed, for
example, to oil or insurance industry policies.87
Another relevant aspect of the Shipping Coordinating Committee is the interchange of
personnel (a so called “revolving door.”) between its Non-State Actor members and the United
States government. This clearly enhances their role in the decision-making process. Three cases
serve to illustrate this concept:
a)

James J. Reynolds: President of the American Institute of Merchant Shipping

since 1969. From 1946 to 1951, he served on the National Labor Relations Board. In
1961, President Kennedy named him Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor Management
Relations. In that position, he served the government as the governmental official most
directly concerned with maritime labor disputes. After the Nixon administration came to
power, he became the congressional lobbyist for the American Institute of Merchant
Shipping.
b)

Ralph E. Casey: From 1939 to 1955 he served with the General Accounting

Office as an associate general counsel in charge of contracts, litigation and maritime
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activities (1948 to 1955). From 1955 to 56, he was chief counsel to the House Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Committee. Resigning that post in 1956, he became president of the
American Merchant Marine Institute from 1956 to 1968. When the American Institute of
Merchant Shipping succeeded the AMMI in 1969, he became that group’s Executive
Vice-President. In 1971, he became chief counsel to the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee.
c)

Earl W. Clark: In 1969, he was involved in the Maritime industry’s Labor-

Management Maritime Committee. From 1951 to 1954, he was a former United States
government deputy maritime administrator.88
Beyond the fact that the Shipping Coordinating Committee’s membership was limited to
government and maritime industry representatives, formal access was not granted to interests
affected by any potential oil spill disaster. Thus, those whose livelihoods depend on the sea, such
as fishermen, and resort and hotel operators, and those who would be adversely affected by a
marine oil spill were not present when questions of the amount and extent of liability were
raised. It is fairly certain that lobster fishermen in Maine or hotel owners in Florida would have
demanded greater amounts of compensation to be included in the treaty, as opposed to a
representative of the American Petroleum Institute or the American Institute of Merchant
Shipping.

3.

The Regime is Formed: The Brussels Conference’s Decision on the Issue of Liability

The most significant decision made at the 1969 Brussels Conference was related to the
terms of liability. As previously observed, the delegates from Canada, Ireland, and Belgium (as
well as from Greece, Liberia, and Scandinavia), among others, diverged on whether shipowners
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or cargo owners would be financially responsible for oil pollution damage, and on the terms of
liability.
The final decision on the terms and extent of liability resulted from rounds of
negotiations involving the P&I Clubs, who were the major insurers of European and American
owned tankers, and the Belgian, British, Irish, and Scandinavian delegations.89 The P&I Clubs
interacted directly with the British delegation, and insisted that liability be based on the
traditional maritime standard of negligence (in contradistinction to strict liability) and that a low
ceiling be imposed on the maximum amount of compensation that a shipowner be required to
pay for any single oil spill incident.90 At various stages of the conference, different maximum
liability figures were suggested by the P&I Clubs, but they never exceeded ten million dollars
per incident. The P&I Clubs argued that the adoption of strict liability and unlimited liability
standards would make it economically unfeasible to provide insurance for oil tankers.
In sharp contrast, the Canadian delegation, which represented a state with a coastal and
environmentalist orientation, argued that the economic loss resulting from an oil spill should be
borne entirely from those who profited from the carriage of oil.91 The Canadians maintained that
to establish negligence rather than strict liability as the criteria for recovery of damages, or to
impose a ceiling on the compensation that a victim of an oil spill could receive, would inevitably
shift part of the cleanup and reconstruction burdens from the polluter to its victim.92
At Brussels, a compromise was reached on the problem of the terms of liability. It was
agreed that the draft convention would be based on the principle of strict liability, and a one
hundred thirty-four dollars per ton or fourteen million dollar limit (whichever figure was less)
would be imposed on the shipowner for an oil spill disaster. It was also agreed in principle that
the cargo owners (petroleum companies) would be responsible financially for claims in excess of
fourteen million dollars. The exact terms of liability of the cargo owners, which were not
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incorporated into the terms of the treaty, were to be defined in a supplemental IMCO
convention.93
After the terms of the compromise had been offered, the following occurred:
Lord Devlin, (a member of the British delegation, but also professionally involved with
the shipping interests, as well as being the person selected by IMCO to head the Brussels
Conference, after checking with the insurance people in London, stated that those limits
could be insured (on the London market) so long as the provisions on direct action
against the person providing financial responsibility contained an exception allowing the
insurer a defense on the ground of willful misconduct of the vessel owner.94
In my interview with a member of the American delegation at the Brussels conference, I
asked whether a treaty could have been concluded without the express agreement of the London
insurers. The delegate replied that in the absence of concurrence by the insurers, a treaty would
not have been possible. He added that the P&I Clubs would not have agreed to a draft treaty that
they considered incompatible with their economic interests.95 I then asked whether this method
of drafting a treaty represented a dilution of a basic principle of tort law. Should compensation
not be based on the victim’s loss rather than on the tortfeasor’s ability to pay?
The diplomat replied that ideally the needs of the victim should be given a priority over
the polluter’s financial condition. However, the realities of the situation dictated that the insurers
had to remain economically viable in order to continue their insurance activities, and one could
not expect them to bear too heavy of a burden of the losses resulting from oil spills.
The diplomat then added that since its creation, IMCO had maintained a close
relationship with groups such as the P&I Clubs and the CMI. He indicated that the Secretariat of
IMCO included several officials who had formerly served in their national maritime industry and
were sympathetic to the positions of the shipowners and insurers.96
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When asked whether or not IMCO would act upon an environmental program that would
run counter to the direct interests of the CMI and the P&I Clubs, the diplomat responded,
“Probably not.”97
In my research, I also interviewed maritime counsel of an international petroleum
company, an American marine insurer, and a staff member of the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the United States Senate. All agreed with the diplomat’s assessment of the CMI
relationship with IMCO.98
This finding that the process of regime formation at Brussels was finalized when the
London insurance confirmed that the conference’s negotiated and agreed upon monetary amount
was acceptable to them raises significant issues about the regime formation process. At the
outset, it is important to reiterate the obvious. The entire regime formation process commencing
in April 1967, was based on the fact that the shipowners’ insurance companies would
compensate third-parties for damages sustained by them. The salient question was what level of
losses could be insured by the insurance companies? No one had realistic expectations that
insurance companies would insure unrealistic levels of loss.
On the other hand, from a regime formation perspective, it is startling that this crucial
decision was, in effect, made by Non-State Actors rather than by the States themselves. This
raises significant issues regarding the general role of Non-State Actors in international regimes,
whether the realist and cognitivist schools of thought provide an accurate description of what
occurred at Brussels, the nature of regime complexes that incorporate both State and Non-State
Actors, and whether the American interest group analogy provides an adequate description of
decision-making at Brussels.
Further, the establishment of TOVALOP and CRISTAL adds another dimension to the
role of Non-State Actors being involved in the decision-making process at Brussels. TOVALOP
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and CRISTAL can be analyzed by means of the concept of non-decision. As stated previously in
Chapter III, a non-decision:
…is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and
privileges in the community can be killed before they gain access to the relevant
decision-making arena.99
Somewhat similarly, TOVALOP and CRISTAL were indicative of the role played by
Non-State Actors in the international environmental movement, which was described by Kyla
Tienhaara, Amandine Orsini, and Robert Falkner as follows:
A final role that global corporations have recently assumed is that of regulator. Instead of
simply passively accepting or trying to influence regulations by governments, global
corporations are actively developing standards for themselves or cooperating with other
private actors (e.g., NGOs) to do so...These private initiatives are not only relevant of
how they affect corporate behavior with respect to the environment, but in terms of how
they influence the way in which environmental issues are dealt with in more traditional
state-led forms.100
Needless to say, a Non-State Actor acting as a regulator is not one and the same as an
entity which assesses damages, and then, through a self-insurance scheme, pays damages to
certain impacted parties.
In the cases of TOVALOP and CRISTAL, the Non-State Actors (in this instance, the
shipowners and oil companies) attempted to deflect a demand for the creation of international
machinery to deal with the oil spill problem. Specifically, these two interests hoped that their
compensation schemes would deter and/or delay IMCO or any State from drafting or enacting a
treaty and/or a statute regulating the liability of one responsible for an accidental oil spill.
In addition, the shipowners and oil companies reasoned that even if TOVALOP and
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CRISTAL did not forestall international action on an oil spill program, these two plans might
form the framework upon which any alternative state-sponsored draft treaty would be based.101
TOVALOP and CRISTAL were ultimately based upon the principle of self-regulation, a
perspective that is predicated upon an assumption that business should be free of governmental
restraint and police its own actions.102 Accordingly, in the case of CRISTAL, a victim of oil
pollution damage would seek to recover compensation by applying to an entity that provided
payment for damage based on rules formulated, adjudicated, and enforced by the very industry
causing the problem in the first place, rather than by a regime established by governments. A
similar situation would prevail when a government would attempt to recover its cleanup costs
from TOVALOP. In either case, recovery would depend upon the shipper’s or petroleum
company’s interpretation of its own contract. Clearly, in so far as the oil companies and tanker
owners were concerned, a self-regulation scheme was far more satisfactory than one imposed by
governments acting alone or in concert.
Accordingly, while the Conclusions chapter will address the issues raised herein, it seems
clear that any analysis of regime formation must incorporate the possibility of the existence of
regime complexes that include Non-State Actors who have a close relationship with States and
Public International Organizations based on clientism, including regulatory capture and their
roles as a veto group. Further, the bargaining among State and Non-State Actors provides
evidence of the validity of the neoliberal approach, which emphasizes the element of bargaining
among the constituent members of an international regime. Conversely, there is absolutely no
evidence that a single State acted as a hegemon exerting undue influence over the outcome of the
Brussels Conference. Moreover, what is perhaps even more striking is that there is no evidence
that the cognitive school of thought guided decision-making at Brussels, but to the contrary, it
was largely irrelevant in explaining what occurred at Brussels. Even more striking, despite the
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growth of a body of international environmental law that incorporated the “polluter pays”
principle, there is no real evidence that this principle was a relevant factor in the drafting of the
private law treaty. To the contrary, there is no mention of it in the records of the proceedings, nor
did it ever come up in the interviews that I conducted with the participants in the Brussels
process.
Specifically, while the conference ostensibly dealt with environmentalism, the essence of
the deliberations was to arrive at the lowest possible figure of compensation to injured parties.
Finally, in the broadest sense, the observation of Raustiala and Victor about regime
complexes describes what occurred at Brussels: “In regime complexes by contrast, the array [of]
rules already in force channel and constrain the content of the new elemental regimes…The
institutional slate is not clean. Ideas, interests, and expectations frequently are already aligned
around some set of existing rules and concepts…”103 In the case of the Brussels Conference, the
existing rules and concepts reflected the power of insurance, shipping, and oil interests, as well
as those States where the insurance and shipping interests were dominant.
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Chapter 5: The Private Law Treaty – The Expansion of the International Regime
and the Impact of Exogenous Events on its Resilience (1971 to 2011)

After the Brussels Conference concluded on November 29, 1969, each participating
State, with the exception of Canada, began the ratification process based on its own
constitutional procedure. Canada, which as noted in Chapter IV, had voiced opposition to certain
portions of the treaties and was the only State present at Brussels that voted against the private
law treaty.

I.

The Canadian Refusal to Participate in the Brussels Regime

In April 1970, four months after the Brussels Conference, the Canadian government
introduced bills in the House of Commons that sharply deviated from the principles that were
incorporated into the civil law treaty.1 Briefly, the bills established pollution-free zones in Arctic
waters from every point of coastal outreach one hundred miles from the Canadian coast above
the sixtieth parallel. Within this zone, Canada asserted the right to control pollution, to regulate
ship construction, to regulate navigation, to prohibit passage of shipping, and to impose financial
penalties for failure to comply. Additionally, the law also established exclusive Canadian fishing
rights beyond a twelve-mile limit in specific areas like the Bay of Fundy, and also designated a
twelve-mile territorial sea. The United States State Department issued a sharply worded
statement contending that, “International law provides no basis for these proposed unilateral
extensions of jurisdiction on the high seas [by Canada], and the United States can neither accept
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nor acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction.”2 Many observers commended the Canadian
legislation and deplored the American response. To them, Canada was acting affirmatively to
protect the Arctic from maritime pollution, while America was attempting to impede this effort
because of “legal technicalities.”3
The Canadian move was motivated by criteria that went beyond a mere concern for
preservation of the Arctic environment. Canada was reacting to the fact that the law of the sea
has generally been formulated to favor shipping interests, not coastal interests. As Columbia
University School of Law Professor Louis Henkin noted:
The law of freedom of the seas has been a law of laissez faire favoring the shippers of the
world. Shipping states are potential perpetrators of serious pollution threatening coastal
states, but they have the votes to resist comprehensive regulation. Recent flurries of
activity have produced neither cure nor effective control, and Canada, in particular, has
been outvoted at several anti-pollution conferences.4
In a sense, the Canadian move can be interpreted as a rebuff to the IMCO conference in
which many of the key decision were shaped by the CMI, the P&I Clubs, other maritime
(noncoastal) interests, and the shipping states to the detriment of the needs of coastal states who
wanted to incorporate into the draft treaty provisions establishing absolute liability. In terms of
the impact on the international law process by the Canadian action, Professor Henkin stated that,
“surely today, the answer to inadequate law or inadequate process is not unilateral assertions
enhancing national authority and national judging for oneself and others. Canada has struck a
blow against pollution and for today’s crusade for the environment, but it is a blow also at
international law and its law of lawmaking.”5
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II.

The American Refusal to Participate in the Brussels Regime

The American reaction was somewhat more muted than that of Canada, but it too reflects
dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Brussels Conference. On April 3, 1970, the United States
Congress, after a three-year effort, adopted the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970
(WQIA).6 The legislation embodied features that either paralleled or surpassed some of the
features of the private law treaty. Particularly significant was the law's section providing that in
the event of an oil spill (unless a shipowner could successfully claim that the discharge occurred
solely because of an act of God, an act of war, negligence on the part of the American
government, or an act of omission of a third party), the owner's liability for the cost of the
removal of the oil of the government would be the lesser of either one hundred dollars per gross
ton or the sum of fourteen million dollars.7 While ostensibly this provision deviates only slightly
from the private law treaty's provision on the amount of liability (one hundred thirty-four dollars
per gross ton or fourteen million dollars), the WQIA's limits applied only to governmental
cleanup costs, while the private law treaty's limits encompassed both governmental costs and
private claims. Under WQIA, private entities, individuals, and individual American states were
free to pursue their own damage claims.
In contrast to the provisions of the WQIA, the private law treaty did not grant any priority
to the government-incurred cleanup costs over those of private interests. Therefore, in any single
instance where the amount available under the cleanup costs would be less than the total damage,
a pro rata distribution would be necessary. Accordingly, in the event of a massive oil spill from a
vessel of more than forty thousand gross registered tons, the amount of money that the United
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States government could recover would be far greater under the WQIA than under the private
law treaty.8
Conversely, since Non-State interests would share with the government in the settlement
based on the private law treaty’s provisions, these interests would forfeit any further claims (if
the damage exceeded the amount allocated to them) based on existing common, statutory, or
admiralty law. Robert Neuman, the American negotiator, when queried on this point, replied,
“That is the price they have to pay for receiving a remedy.”9
Another difference between the private law treaty and WQIA deals with the issue of
jurisdictional coverage. The WQIA provides for liability for damages sustained within the
American contiguous zone, as well as the territory of a particular State or on the territorial sea
adjacent to a State, while the private law treaty omitted the contiguous zone. Instead it refers
only to damages occurring on the territory of a particular State, thereby making the private law
treaty less comprehensive in coverage than the WQIA.
In only one situation, however, would the provisions of the private law treaty be stricter
than those of the WQIA. In the event that an oil spill occurred solely because of the actions of a
third party (a small fishing boat collides with a tanker in a fog, and the fault lies solely with the
smaller vessel), the tanker would not be liable under the WQIA, but would be liable under the
private law treaty.10
Hearings were held before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate's
Public Works Committee in July of 1970, and before the Subcommittee on Oceans and
Environment of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee in May of 1971, to examine the
treaty's provisions and their relationship to the WQIA. With the Supremacy Clause of the United
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States Constitution as the operative principle,11 the Senators were reminded by the Deputy
Attorney General that the private law treaty, “would therefore supersede all state and all
preexisting federal laws which are inconsistent with it.”12
The hearings disclosed that American oil and maritime interests preferred the terms of the
private law treaty over the terms of the WQIA. Among those who testified in favor of the private
law treaty's ratification were James J. Reynolds, President of the American Institute of Merchant
Shipping, and Herbert A. Steyn, Jr. of the American Petroleum Institute.13 Each was
accompanied to the hearings by a representative of a major international petroleum producer.
Their arguments did not center on the private law treaty's generally less onerous liability
provisions. Instead, emphasis was placed on the uniformity of procedure that would arise upon
the private law treaty's ratification. This was deemed far more acceptable than each individual
State adopting unilateral measures to deal with the problem.
The strategy of these interests was, in the words of Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg,
and Victor Thompson to:
...accept regulation, even though somewhat adverse to its short run interests as a means of
anticipating and heading off potential political forces that would otherwise impose more
severe and less palatable regulations upon the group.14
In sharp contrast, the representatives of environmental organizations, such as the National
Audubon Society and the Sierra Club, advocated rejection of the private law treaty. Noting some
of the inadequate aspects of the treaty such as the cap on liability, the priority of payment of
claims, the scope of liability provisions, and the fact that both federal and state laws were more
comprehensive, the spokesman for the latter group urged rejection of the treaty unless it were to
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be linked with a supplementary fund treaty.15
The most vehement arguments against the treaty were presented by Allan I. Mendelsohn,
a former State Department negotiator in the area of marine and air law.16 Noting all the
previously described weaknesses of the treaty, and contrasting these inadequacies with both
international treaties on aviation (which are based on strict liability provisions) and the WQIA,
he insisted that the treaty be ratified only upon negotiation of the thirty million dollar
supplementary treaty.17 He maintained that if the Senate were to reject the liability treaty, “it
would give us the bargaining power to go into that conference and to use the strength of our
government to effect a treaty with a limit that adequately protects the American public.”18
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee accepted the arguments of the
environmentalists and Mendelsohn. On August 5, 1971, the committee reported the Liability
Convention to the Senate floor and recommended that advice and consent to ratification be given
only after the Senate could act on the supplementary fund treaty.19

III.

The Establishment of the IMCO International Compensation Fund in 1971

As part of the regime strengthening process, the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (IMO Fund)
was established in 1971. As noted in Chapter IV, the establishment of a fund to provide for
additional compensation above the limits agreed to at Brussels was a prerequisite by certain
States to approve the private law treaty. Further, it has even been suggested that in the absence of
a commitment to establish an additional source of compensation to parties injured by oil spills,
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the private law treaty would not have been approved at Brussels.20
Accordingly, IMCO held a conference in Brussels in 1971 to establish a source of
compensation for oil spill damages above and beyond that provided by the private law treaty.
Canada again acted as the self-appointed guardian of environmental interests and demanded
unlimited liability for pollution damage caused by oil spills. The other States involved at
Brussels 1971 essentially split on which domestic interests were paramount – their shipping
industries or the role of petroleum in the domestic society.21
Therefore Japan, Greece, Denmark, Liberia, and Norway, together with the USSR and
France, sought to protect their domestic shipping companies from liability. Conversely those
States heavily dependent on foreign oil with a relatively weak shipping component, like
Germany and the Netherlands, sought to shield the oil industry from any extreme compensation
positions.22
Ultimately agreement was reached on the terms of a compensation fund which provided
that a sum of up to thirty-five million dollars would be made available from oil companies for
payment of damages for an incident resulting in oil pollution damage. Nonetheless, the thirtyfive-million-dollar figure would be reduced by any amounts paid under the terms of the private
law treaty. Therefore, the compensation scheme agreed to in 1971 provided that the P&I Clubs
and/or other insurers would pay up to fourteen million dollars while any excess (up to an
additional payment of up to twenty-one million dollars) would be paid by the oil companies.
Since the International Compensation Fund would not go into effect until the ratification process
was completed, TOVALOP and CRISTAL would in the interim pay the excess damages based
on the terms incorporated into their agreements.23 The private law treaty entered into force on
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June 19, 1975, with the Supplemental Fund Convention entered into force on October 16, 1978.

IV.

The 1992 Conventions

The ten-year period after the Supplemental Fund Convention went into effect was
relatively quiet in terms of the issue of oil spills on the seas, and the legal regime established at
Brussels (including the Supplemental Fund Convention, TOVALOP and CRISTAL) and the
WQIA, passed by the United States Congress, seemed adequate to handle the problem.
In 1989, however, after the Exxon Valdez catastrophe (see V. below), it became clear that
the limits of liability contained in the private law treaty and the Supplemental Fund Convention
were set at unrealistically low levels.
Accordingly, in 1992, both the private law treaty and the Supplemental Fund Convention
were significantly revised, which resulted in the levels of compensation being increased.
Therefore, the 1969 private law treaty and the fund were renamed as the 1992 Civil Law
Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention, and they entered into force on May 30, 1996 (“the
1992 Conventions”).
The 1992 Conventions (as subsequently amended in 2003) raised the amount of available
compensation to the sum of $292 million, a significant increase from the 1969/1971 levels. For
large oil tankers (one hundred forty thousand units of tonnage), it was provided that their liability
would be $127.3 million with the balance paid by the fund based on contributions from the large
oil companies.
While the total available amount for compensation represented a significant increase
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from the 1969 private law treaty (although when inflation is factored in the calculation, it is far
less expansive than it initially appears), the 1992 conventions also narrowed the definition of
pollution damage from the 1969 civil law treaty.
Specifically, the 1992 convention limits the operative definition of “pollution damage” by
adding the following provision, which did not appear in the 1969 private law treaty, “…provided
that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken
or to be undertaken.”24
Clearly, the addition of this provision was a concession to the Non-State Actors
(shipping, oil, and insurance) to limit their exposure in the event of a supersized disaster.
The 1992 Conventions rendered TOVALOP and CRISTAL redundant because it was
perceived there was no need for two sources of compensation from the same entities.
Consequently, both entities disbanded in 1997.25
Finally, in 2005, an additional level of compensation was established by means of a
Supplementary Fund. This raised the total available amount for an oil spill disaster to $1.064
billion dollars. This amount includes available compensation under the 1992 Conventions as
amended, and the additional liability under the 2005 convention is paid by the international oil
companies.
Ratification of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention have
been widespread. As of March 20, 2018:
a.

137 States are parties to both Conventions;

b.

31 States are parties to the Supplemental Fund Protocol;
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c.

31 States are parties to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, but not to the 1992
Fund Convention.26

V.

The Exxon Valdez Disaster – 1989

Through the post-1969 period, the United States, through its constitutional processes that
required ratification by a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate, ratified neither the Brussels
private law treaty nor the Supplemental Fund Convention. The American position was that
despite the seemingly impressive numbers that were attached to the treaty and fund, the amount
of compensation available would be totally inadequate in the event of a Torrey Canyon-type
disaster.
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez, whose voyage had begun in California and whose
destination was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline terminal at Valdez, Alaska, ran aground on Bligh Reef
in Valdez. While the subsequent oil spill was relatively small (it did not even make the list of the
thirty-five largest oil spills in history), the Exxon Valdez incident in many ways paralleled the
impact of the Torrey Canyon over twenty years previously. The damage, cleanup costs, and
media attention were massive, and the existing international regimes would have been totally
incapable of properly compensating all impacted parties.
The optics of the disaster were staggering. Television crews swarmed to the site, and
Americans witnessed the damage caused by approximately eleven million gallons of spilled oil.
As thick black sludge washed onto the formerly pristine coast, wildlife activists scurried around
heaping piles of animal carcasses in an effort to rescue marine mammals and sea birds. Even
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those individuals who previously had not considered themselves part of the now well-organized
environmental movement were outraged by the daily images.27
The cleanup costs were stupendous. Bearing in mind that the original limits at Brussels in
1969 were fourteen million dollars, and that the TOVALOP-CRISTAL combination provided for
a total of thirty million dollars, the total cleanup cost for the Exxon Valdez was estimated to be
between $5.3 and $6 billion dollars!28 Further, it was estimated the total economic cost of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill was $16.5 billion dollars!29 None of the existing regimes could even come
close to providing proper clean up and fair compensation to victims.
Accordingly, in 1990, Congress acted unilaterally and passed the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA),30 which was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush.

A.

Damage as Defined Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990

OPA has an incredibly broad, all-encompassing definition of the terms of removal costs
and liability. Specifically, the statute provided that the “responsible party” would be responsible
for “all removal costs.”31 It is noteworthy that, unlike the Brussels regime, liability for removal
was unlimited without any caps whatsoever. This broad liability provision reflected the strength
of the environmental movement in the United States combined with the perception in the United
States that the oil companies were greedy, super wealthy entities who could and should pay for
the damages that they had caused.
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B.

Liability as Defined Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990

Further, the specific damages for which compensation was due from the party found
liable includes:
a.

Damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or use of loss of natural resources.”32

b.

Damages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal
property, which shall be recovered by a claimant who owns or leases that property.”33

c.

Damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, which shall be recoverable by
any claimant who so uses natural resources that have been injured, destroyed, or lost.”34

d.

Damages equal to the net losses of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, or natural resources.”35

e.

Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury,
destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources.” 36

f.

Damages for net costs of providing increased or additional public services during or after
removal activities, including protection from fire safety or health hazards caused by a
discharge of oil.”37
The scope of liability for damage under OPA is breathtaking. Besides the use of the strict

liability standard (which also is incorporated in Brussels and its progeny), OPA, with very few
exceptions, contains no damage caps and, further, does not preempt any American state from
undertaking independent action against the ship or the cargo owner. As will be seen below,
however, one of the very few exceptions for damage caps was granted to offshore drilling
platforms, which proved to be critical in the 2010 Deepwater Horizon catastrophe.
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Further, the categories of damages that can be recovered are beyond anything
contemplated by the Brussels regime and its progeny. By way of example, the government can
recover taxes that are not paid because of the destruction of facilities that provided all types of
governmental revenue, and the subsequent loss of the revenue stream. Further, lost profits are
recoverable, as are increased expenses for public services, such as hazmat crews and other
emergency services.
In short, OPA is everything that Brussels and its progeny are not – a system of
compensation in which the defendant faces open-ended liability for its errors or omissions. There
are no escape clauses, and enforcement, in contradistinction to the international regime, is
backed up by the full power of the United States Department of Justice and the individual state
equivalents.

C.

Sources of Revenue for Compensation of Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act

The most important innovation of OPA was the abandonment of the formula for
compensation that had been the guiding principle of the private law treaty and the 1971
compensation fund and would continue to be used in the 1992 treaty and its compensation fund.
Specifically, the regime established at Brussels incorporated a compensation scheme
whose first tier was payment of damage by marine insurers (P&I Clubs and marine insurance
companies), and whose second tier was payment of damages by contributions from international
oil companies. This was the essence of the compromise reached at Brussels. In sharp contrast,
neither private insurers, nor any compensation fund that was controlled by Non-State Actors
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(i.e., the large international petroleum companies) played any roles in the OPA compensation
scheme. Instead, the United States government used its massive taxing power to establish a onebillion-dollar Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (“the Trust Fund”), which was funded by a five cents
per barrel tax collected from the oil industry on all oil produced or imported into the United
States,38 as well as from transfer from existing trust funds, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
Liability Fund, interest on the principal of the Trust Fund derived from United States Treasury
instruments, and recovery from those held responsible for oil spills.39 Accordingly, it was clear
that the cargo owners (the oil companies) would be the parties ultimately responsible under OPA
to pay damage claims arising from massive oil spills. The net result of Exxon Valdez and OPA
was that the United States abandoned the multilateral treaty approach in favor of the unilateral
OPA.
As a side note, although the litigation by the United States government against Exxon for
damage caused by the Exxon Valdez was settled in 1991, the settlement permitted the federal
government to reopen litigation in the event of “unknown damages.” This is precisely what
occurred and the administration of George W. Bush pursued these claims. It was only in 2015
that the final claims were dropped by the federal government, and all litigations were deemed
terminated or settled.
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VI.

The Deepwater Horizon Disaster40

In 2010, twenty-one years after the Exxon Valdez disaster, the Deepwater Horizon
environmental catastrophe occurred. The Deepwater Horizon was a drilling rig was owned by
Transocean, the largest owner of drilling equipment in the world, and was leased to British
Petroleum (BP), which was using it to drill for oil at the Macondo Field in the Gulf of Mexico in
the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the rig caused a
blowout, which resulted in four million barrels of oil leaking into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven
lives were lost. Further, the economic repercussions were enormous – destruction of livelihoods
for fishermen, resort owners, and those in the tourist industry on the Gulf Coast, as well as the
havoc wreaked on the environment.
Drilling rigs were not covered by the Brussels regime, which was limited to ships.
Further, OPA had a seventy-five million-dollar cap on liability for damages caused by oil rigs. It
was clear that damages would total in the billions of dollars, but there was no compensatory
scheme in place besides ordinary lawsuits, which, in turn, would take many years if not decades,
to wend their way through the American judicial system.
The United States government acted with its full power, and compelled BP to waive the
seventy-five million-dollar-cap. Further, as a result of American governmental pressure, BP put
twenty-nine billion dollars in escrow as security for pending liability claims.
Nonetheless, Deepwater Horizon demonstrated the inadequacies of all existing
compensation schemes, whether established by an international regime or by unilateral State
action, and the distance yet to travel to establish an effective regime.
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VII.

Post-Brussels Conference: Stresses on the International Regime Summed Up

The post-Brussels activities by IMCO, including the establishment of the Supplemental
Compensation Fund in 1971, the adoption of the 1992 Convention, and their subsequent
modification, are demonstrative of the interactions inherent in the regime formation process. The
question of compensation was initially resolved by shifting the burden of liability to the
insurance interests – the P&I Clubs and the traditional marine insurers. While the insurers
reluctantly abandoned the traditional maritime standard of negligence in favor of strict liability,
they refused to raise the actual amount of compensation (fourteen million dollars) beyond what
they deemed an insurable risk.
Accordingly, the oil interests became liable for compensation beyond the fourteenmillion-dollar mark. They, however, did not give an open-ended commitment to compensate
injured parties for any and all damages. Instead, initially through TOVALOP (backed up by
CRISTAL), they essentially retained the power to control compensation on their own terms and
conditions. Even with the introduction of the IMCO compensation funds in 1971 and 1992, there
is no evidence that the oil interests gave an unconditional guarantee of compensation. To the
contrary, the 1992 Treaty narrowed the definition of liability, and thereby further limited the oil
exposure of the oil companies.
Further, the United States and Canada, based on a growing environmental awareness,
refused to ratify the 1969 private law treaty. Moreover, in the case of the United States, the
traumatic Exxon Valdez environmental catastrophe, an exogenous event, made it clear that the
existing (or even a somewhat improved upon) international regime – with its financial model
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based upon insurers, and contributions from oil companies – led to a total abandonment of the
idea of participation in an international regime, and thereby cemented this country’s decision to
proceed unilaterally. Under this unilateral approach, liability was unlimited, and taxation of oil
would provide the source of compensation to injured parties rather than insurance and oil
industry contributions.
This American unilateral approach did not significantly weaken the Brussels regime. In
fact, per the chronology of events attached hereto, the 1992 Protocol to Amend the International
Convention of Civil Liability and the 1992 Fund Convention cover approximately 97,698 of the
gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping. Nonetheless, the unilateral American approach
was certainly impacted negatively on the international regime that was established in 1969 in
Brussels.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions

This study opened with a hypothesis on which factors led to the formation of an
international regime to deal with marine oil spills at the 1969 Brussels Conference sponsored by
the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). As emphasized in this
dissertation, the Brussels Conference offers fertile ground for analysis because it went far beyond
the usual agenda of such conferences. Specifically, it did not deal with garden variety research
proposals, technical or safety issues, or recommendations for action. Rather, it set up a fullyfledged international legal regime that established both enforceable standards of liability and
specific mandatory levels of compensation to those injured by marine oil spills.
Four possible explanations for the formation of this regime were offered:

I. The first explanation was the emergence, in the period 1941 to 1966, of norms of Public
International Law based on the “polluter pays principle,” which essentially opened the possibility
under international law of a victim of oil pollution obtaining compensation for injuries from the
ship that caused the injury.
This explanation evidently does not provide an adequate basis for understanding why the
regime was formed. While, as indicated in Chapter III, the Trail Smelter Arbitration and the
Helsinki Rules both established the Public International Law rule of the illegality of the pollution
of transnational resources, as well as the “polluter pays” principle, there was no mention of any
of this in the 1969 private law treaty, the 1971 Fund Convention, or the 1992 Civil Law
Convention. Further, there is no mention of these rules in the IMCO documents that were
produced contemporaneously with the Brussels Conference.
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Moreover, and possibly most significantly, there is no mention of the “polluter pays” rule
in the 1972 Declaration of the United States Conference on the Human Environment, which is
widely seen as the founding document of the international environmental movement.
Specifically, while the document does call for the maintenance of environmental integrity in
Principles 6 and Principle 7, the omission of this “polluter pays” rule raises fundamental issues
of its importance in international environmental law.
Therefore, by tracing the “polluter pays” rule to determine what happened at the Brussels
Conference and in its aftermath, one can conclude based on the existing evidence, that these
rules, which developed during the period 1941 to 1966, were essentially irrelevant to the
outcome of the Brussels Conference.

II. The second explanation is the emergence of environmentalism as an issue on the public
agenda, particularly the issue of oil spills resulting from tanker crashes, which became part of the
public agenda through an inordinate amount of media coverage.
There is little doubt that the Torrey Canyon episode was the first environmental disaster
of the electronic media era. It received front package coverage (both in the electronic and print
media) in the United States, as well as Europe. Adding to the media drama were images of the
ship being bombed with napalm by the Royal Air Force in an attempt to burn off the leaking
petroleum.
Moreover, as has been observed, a shipwreck leaking oil captures the public imagination
far more effectively than an ordinary oil spill emanating from land-based oil tanks, even if the
latter has greater environmental impact than the former (Kiern).
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Further, it was during this period that the environmental movement began to gain traction
in the United States, as well as other areas of the world. Therefore, during the hearings in the
United States Senate on the ratification of the private law treaty, effective presentations against
the treaty were made by traditional conservationist lobbyists, such as the Sierra Club and the
National Audubon Society, as well as individuals such as Allan I. Mendelsohn, the former State
Department negotiator.
Clearly, the Torrey Canyon episode, with its disastrous environmental impact, was a
sufficient reason for the British government to request an urgent meeting of IMCO to address the
major issues raised by the disaster within ten days of the conclusion of the incident. Needless to
say, the long, two and a half year negotiation process, described in Chapter IV, which
fundamentally centered on evasion of responsibility for compensation by the impacted parties,
cannot be explained simply by the rise of a global environmental consciousness. Accordingly,
this explanation is confirmed to the extent that the Torrey Canyon was a necessary part of the
process, but is far from sufficient in explaining what occurred.

III. The third explanation is the inadequate remedies for compensation to victims of oil
pollution damage under existing domestic laws and institutions.
There is no question that the domestic law in many States provided inadequate legal
remedies to pay claims arising from significant oil pollution damage. As was seen in Chapter II,
the owners of the Torrey Canyon filed a Petition in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to determine that the total liability of the owners totaled just fifty
dollars.
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Yet, in a very real sense, the issue of “inadequate compensation” is a very slippery,
nebulous term to quantify. As has been observed, there are those who maintain that since society
as a whole benefits from international transport of oil, the risk should be spread among society at
large. Further, in a variation of this argument, the shipping industry maintained that since the oil
industry was enormously profitable, it should bear the primary financial risks involved in the
transport of oil, while the oil industry countered that it could not be held accountable for the acts
of negligent ship captains and crews (Sperdokli).
Therefore, while both domestic and international law did not provide effective remedies
to those impacted by oil spills, the real question was not only how much compensation would be
available for injured parties, but who would be responsible for payment. Therefore, this
explanation was a necessary part of the process, but is far from sufficient in explaining the
results of the conference. This then brings this analysis to the most likely explanation in
understanding what happened at Brussels.

IV. The fourth explanation is that the interactions among States, IMCO, and Non-State Actors
(insurance, shipping, and petroleum) who, in the case of Non-State Actors, were guided by
market forces that led to the inclusion in the private law treaty of terms based on these market
forces to the exclusion of other possible factors, such as an approach to the issue based on
environmental integrity being the highest good, irrespective of the financial costs involved.
To determine whether this explanation describes the outcome of the Brussels Conference,
it is necessary to review briefly contemporary international relations theory, especially
international regimes and regime complexes, and see how these paradigms explain what
occurred at Brussels.
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A.

International Regimes

Chapter III describes the evolution of international relations theory from realism to a
transnational system approach, and then to the study of international regimes and regime
complexes. Clearly the series of events beginning at Brussels in 1969 and running for decades
afterwards is consistent with the formation of a regime complex to deal with the issue of marine
oil pollution. This regime formation process itself, both at Brussels and afterwards, can be
described in the following terms:
1.

The regime originated on the contraction track. The participants met with the specific
intent of establishing a, “‘constitutional’ contract laying out a regime to govern the
activity in question” (Young).

2.

It was a reactionary (O’Hagan) that arose to deal with the specific problem – in this case
marine oil pollution. Like other reactionary regimes, it does not have the staying power of
an anticipatory regime, which has the flexibility to meet changing conditions.

3.

The formation process in terms of the negotiations at Brussels is consistent with the
neoliberal approach found in the writings of Keohane and Young. Specifically, the
multiple actors (both State and Non-State) in the process are inconsistent with a realist
approach, which would lead one to conclude that a dominant power (hegemon) was
essentially dictating the terms of the treaties at Brussels. The United States opposed the
process (the United States never ratified the private law treaty), and opted instead for
unilateral action with the passage of the Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA) in
1970 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in 1990. The Brussels treaties have been ratified by
States under whose flags sail more than ninety-seven percent of the world’s merchant
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shipping. It is clear that the United States did not and could not act as a hegemon and
thereby derail the Brussels process.
It is manifest that the case at hand is marked by the opposite of the realist approach, and
accordingly, it is posited that the neoliberal approach describes the events at Brussels.
Specifically, the roles of multiple actors, both State and Non-State, such as the CMI, the national
Maritime Law Associations, the petroleum companies, the P&I Clubs and international insurance
companies, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and IMCO to name but some,
reflect a diverse negotiating universe at Brussels, which was an attempt to find an acceptable
outcome that would have satisfied the needs of at least some of the participants.
Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, there was no evidence that the cognitive school of
thought was relevant to the outcome at Brussels. Specifically, given the fact that the Brussels
Conference was ostensibly about forming a legal regime to deal with preservation of the marine
environment, one would have thought that a knowledge-based approach, in which there were
shared values on the preservation of the environment among key decision-makers, would have
shaped the negotiations, as well as their outcome. Instead, the opposite scenario was dominant.
The insurance and shipping interests had three major concerns: that the traditional maritime
standard of fault (as opposed to strict liability) be incorporated into the private law treaty; that
the limits of liability be set as low as possible; and that the cargo owners (i.e. the international
petroleum companies), rather than negligent shipowners, bear most of the financial and legal
responsibility for paying for oil pollution damage.
Conversely, based on a cognitive approach to international regimes, there is no evidence
of a real discussion on what steps the major actors (Non-State and State) could undertake
together to preserve the fragile marine environment. There was a marked absence of substantive

179

efforts to demonstrate in this study the major points of discussion centered on shifting the burden
of liability from shipping interests to insurance interests, and then to petroleum interests.
If this is indeed the case, and if, further, an international regime is defined as “sets of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making around which actors’
expectations converge in a given area of international” (Krasner), it is somewhat challenging to
incorporate the outcome of the Brussels Conference into a framework that implies a
commonality of interest among the participants. While, as was observed in Chapter IV, the
American, Canadian, and Irish delegations did share some of these values, the countervailing
value of market viability held by other States seemed to have carried the day.

B.

Regime Complexes

1.

The Private Law Treaty as the Initial Component of a Regime Complex

Regime theory was expanded to incorporate the concept of regime complexes that result
from “the rising density of international institutions” (Raustiala and Victor). Further, because of
the density of international institutions, “it is increasingly difficult to isolate and ‘decompose’
individual organizations for study” (Raustiala and Victor). The regime complex centering on
compensation for marine oil pollution encompasses the private law treaty negotiated at Brussels
in 1969, the separate 1970 Canadian legislative initiative, the 1970 WQIA and the 1990 OPA.
The narrative of this study stresses the complicated interactions at Brussels among participating
States, IMCO, and an array of Non-State Actors, such as the CMI, the P&I Clubs, insurance
companies, the international petroleum companies, and special purpose entities such as
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TOVALOP and CRISTAL, which formed the first regime in the regime complex. Figure VI-I
illustrates their interactions at Brussels in 1969. As is self-evident, many Actors (State as well as
Non-State) and a Public International Organization were involved in the negotiating process that
produced the treaties at the end of the conference.
Further, because the international regime established at Brussels encountered only one
institution (the private law treaty), forum shopping, which is a component of a regime complex,
did not exist in 1969, and probably does not even exist today because the United States, which
remains the only major non-participant in the Brussels regime, claims exclusive jurisdiction over
a limited geographic area that abuts against the United States and its territories.
Further, the bargaining among the actors that produced the private law treaty at Brussels
demonstrates another characteristic relevant to the study of regime complexes. An international
regime is not a level playing field because, “The institutional slate is not clean. Ideas, interests,
and expectations frequently are already aligned around some existing rules and concepts”
(Raustiala and Victor). Thus, the Non-State Actors at Brussels entered the negotiations with firm
ideas on whether negligence or strict liability would be the criteria that would form the basis of
any future claim for damages.
Moreover, each Non-State Actor came into the conference with a preconceived notion of
the market forces and business realities that shaped their negotiating stances. For the shipping
companies and their alter egos in the insurance industry, their negotiating stance was shaped by
their knowledge of what was, and what was not, insurable. For the petroleum industry, the issue
was their bottom line and how it would be impacted if, pursuant to any treaty, they were being
asked to become partners in liability with the negligent ship crews who were the root cause of
the problem. Therefore, the oil industry initially refused to participate in any regime in which the
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Figure VI - 1
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*

Overlapped with
State Delegates
and with IMCO

shipping and insurance companies were not parties of the first instance against whom a claim
would be filed.
C.

The Role of Non-State Actors in International Regimes and Complexes

A core issue of this study was to identify the role of interest groups at the Brussels
Conference in particular, and in international regimes and complexes in general. Some of the
existing literature stresses the American interest group analogy, which is perceived as centering
on, “campaign contributions and electoral pressure, strategic information transmission of
expertise and grassroots representation and mobilization” (Bloodgood).
There is no evidence that these three mechanisms were actually utilized at Brussels,
although they were used in the context of the American political system at the time that the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 was being debated in Congress.
Instead, this study of the Brussels Conference has revealed, based on the domestic
interest group analogy, that the dominant form of interaction between IMCO, Non-State Actors
and national delegations in shaping the Conference’s outcome was clientism, which describes a
symbiotic relationship between the regulators and the regulated.
1.

Clientism

A prerequisite for the analysis based on clientism is an assumption that Public
International Organizations do have a propensity for seeking support from those outside the
agency – that in fact, Public International Organizations are not neutral, or even “benevolent”
and in fact, these factors may detract from the organization’s stated mission (Strange, Cox and
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Jacobson, and Frey, but see Dahlberg who argues for strengthened international agencies to deal
with various strategic international agencies to confront environmental issues).
Therefore, IMCO, as described in Chapter IV, for many years prior to Brussels had a very
close relationship with the CMI, and in fact, on occasion actually produced the draft treaties that
formed the basis of treaties circulated and then approved at IMCO meetings. Further, in the
period from 1967 to 1969, both the CMI and IMCO worked at parallel but also intersecting
efforts to produce draft treaties on the issue of liability.
Moreover, the leadership of the Brussels Conference, which ostensibly was run by
IMCO, a Public International Organization, but in practical terms, was run by the leaders of the
CMI, who played triple roles as members of their State delegations, leaders of the IMCO
conference, while simultaneously representatives of the shipping/insurance interests. Figure VI-2
and VI-3 illustrate the overlapping roles of Dr. Walter Muller and Albert Lilar at Brussels, two of
the most influential leaders at the Brussels Conference.
Further, in the case of the United States delegation, clientism was manifested by the
strategic placement of leaders of the American maritime industry into the ranks of those who
officially represented the United States at the Brussels Conference. Moreover, an organ of
administrative pluralism, the Shipping Coordinating Committee, was heavily involved in
formulating the American position at Brussels. Conversely, there is no evidence that
environmental groups played any role whatsoever in the United States preparation for the
Brussels Conference, and there certainly were no representatives of any environmental group in
any capacity (e.g. members of the delegation or advisors to the delegation) incorporated into the
American delegation. Figure VI-4 illustrates the politics of access relevant to the American
delegation of Brussels.
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Figure VI - 2

REGULATORY CAPTURE AT
THE IMCO CONFERENCE:
DR. WALTER MULLER
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DR. WALTER MULLER
1. Member of Swiss Delegation (State)
2. President Swiss Maritime Law Association (Non-State Actor)
3. Chairman - IMCO Committee of the Whole II drafted civil liability convention
(International Organization)
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Figure VI - 3

REGULATORY CAPTURE AT
THE IMCO CONFERENCE:
DR. ALBERT LILAR

Non State
Actors

States

International
Organizations

DR. ALBERT LILAR
4. Chairman Belgian Delegation (State)
5. President of Comite Maritime International (Non-State Actor)
6. President at IMCO Brussels conference (International Organization)
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Non State
Actors

2.

Regulatory Capture

The close relationships between IMCO and the CMI, and the overlapping identifications
between IMCO, the CMI, industry representatives, and State delegations, led to the concomitant
question of regulatory capture (i.e. the domination and even capture by interests) of the agency
that ostensibly is tasked with the regulation of these very interests. This phenomenon has been
studied extensively in the context of domestic systems, and there has been a very limited amount
of research on this in international relations. Among the conclusions drawn about international
environmental regimes is that regulatory capture is a possibility, but has been offset by the
existence of countervailing groups (Victor, Rausytala, Skolnikoff). Further, many scholars do not
even mention the possibility of regulatory capture in their work on international environmental
regimes (Hurrell and Kingsbury). The evidence at Brussels clearly indicates that IMCO was
captured by the shipping industry and its alter egos, the P&I Clubs and the international insurers.
IMCO, in fact, identified with the insurance and shipping interests and vice versa to the extent
that the actual dollar amounts of liability in the private law treaty could not have been
incorporated in its terms unless and until the London insurers consented to this proposal.
Accordingly, not only was there regulatory capture of IMCO, but the insurers actually acted as a
veto group that effectively enabled them to set the terms of liability.
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Figure VI - 4

THE AMERICAN
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1. Advisor to American Delegation (State)
2. President, Maritime Law Association (Non-State Actor)
3. Shipping Coordinating Committee (Organ of Administrative Pluralism)
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3.

Self-Regulation as a Manifestation of Non-Decisions

Another angle to analyze the events leading up to Brussels and afterwards is by approaching
TOVALOP and CRISTAL through the paradigm of self-regulation and non-decision, which
refers to the process by which an interest argues that the most efficient way to deal with an issue
is to allow it to establish its own regulatory scheme and to police itself. By taking this approach,
the interest seeks to coopt outside initiatives, and thereby deflect any regulatory regime imposed
by an outside legal authority.
The role played by TOVALOP and CRISTAL, especially in the years from 1969 to 1976,
in providing financial backup to the regime established by the private law treaty (1969) but prior
to the coming into force of the 1971 International Fund Convention in 1976, allowed both of
these entities to have an input into the payment of any compensation to impacted parties above
and beyond the figure established at Brussels that insurers were required to pay. This selfregulation allowed the shipping and oil companies to police themselves during this time period,
and, in a sense, act as a judge and jury in the determination of the amounts of compensation to be
paid to the injured parties. In fact, it was only after the 1992 conventions were agreed to that
TOVALOP and CRISTAL became totally redundant and obsolete, and consequently,
TOVALOP and CRISTAL disbanded in 1997.

D.

Insurance Companies as Non-State Actors

This study emphasizes the role of the P&I Clubs and insurance companies, such as
Lloyd’s of London, in establishing the limits of liability at the Brussels Conference. More
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specifically, the finalization of the terms of the private law treaty required the assent of the
London insurers who, as previously indicated, acted as a veto group with the power to abort the
proposed international regime unless their demands were acceded to by the assembled delegates
at the Conference sponsored by IMCO, a Public International Organization.
It has been observed that despite the immense wealth and economic power in
international insurance companies (the largest insurance companies have assets in excess of fivehundred billion dollars), there has been a reluctance to undertake scholarly research on their roles
in the transnational system (Strange, Haufler). Even some of those who do write about the
significance of the role played by insurance companies fail to follow up in a subsequent work
about international environmental regimes (Haufler).
It is therefore concluded that the only way to understand fully the terms of the private law
treaty is to integrate the role of insurance companies into the analysis.

V.

The Use of a Critical Case Study

The final issue addressed in this chapter is the utility of a critical or crucial case study as
a research model. Distilled to its essence, this study analyzes the results of the Brussels
Conference in terms of regime formation, and with specific emphasis on the roles of Non-State
Actors (shipping, oil, and insurance interests on its outcome). The stakes were immense – who
was going to be financially liable in the event of an oil spill disaster. The outcome was analyzed
by using theories developed in regime formation (as well as regime complexes), and the use of
the domestic interest group analogy.
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At a certain level, it can be argued that the uniqueness of the Brussels Conference lends
itself to a critical case study if for no other reason than that the private law treaty stands separate
and apart from any other environmental conferences prior to or since 1969. Most international
environmental regimes lack any enforcement provisions (Green, Mitchell). The conferences and
programs that are of headline-making quality (Kyoto and Paris) are essentially voluntary efforts
to comply with certain guideline on the emissions of greenhouse gases.
In sharp contrast, Brussels and its progeny addressed the marine oil pollution issue by
imposing liability of up to one billion dollars on offenders. Whether or not these remedies are
adequate to deal with the issue is not the operative question. What is relevant is that no other
treaty approaches (or possibly even exists) that replicates the Brussels model. Therefore, to
compare the results of Brussels with other cases (environmental regimes) that deal primarily with
technical issues and voluntary guidelines (Green) may be a useless exercise.
Moving beyond the factual uniqueness of the Brussels case, the question arises as to the
epistemological value of a detailed study of the factors and actors that led to the drafting of the
private law treaty. Within the paradigms of political science, there is a significant resistance to
the use of a critical case study, and the compelling reasons against their use have been laid out
with clarity in the Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane, and Verba).
Nonetheless, there are those who advocate the use of significant case studies (Campbell,
Ragin, and Flyvberg). Among the reasons given is that, at the end of the day, there is no
predictive theory in social science. Accordingly, in the absence of social science formulating
context-independent theory, what else is left but context dependent knowledge? (Flyvberg).
Therefore, this study of the Brussels Conference and its aftermath incorporates research
findings that either conflict with existing theory or are not accounted for in existing theory.
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Specifically, regime theory beginning with Keohane and Nye in the 1970s through the
more recent studies by Raustiala and Victor, Sell and Parkash, and Keohane and Victor were
predicated on a view that the transnational system and its component regimes and regime
complexes, consisted of distinct and separate entities – States, Public International Organizations
and Non-State Actors – all of whom operated on independent tracks.
This study, however, concludes that in the case of Brussels, the power centers were not
distinct, and, in fact, there was an overlap of key Non-State Actors (e.g. Lord Devlin, Dr. Albert
Lilar, and Dr. Walter Muller among others) who were embedded in State delegations and in
IMCO, and yet in their professional lives represented the insurance and shipping interests, which
were the subject of regulation at Brussels. The existence of this phenomenon calls into question
those studies that fail to note the existence and importance of this overlap, and by this omission
conclude, among other things, that regulatory capture does not exist in international
environmental regimes, and that Public International Organizations are neutral institutions who
focus exclusively on their stated missions without any other considerations.
Further, by emphasizing the tactic of Non-State Actors who were operating at Brussels in
substantially the same way as they act in domestic legislative systems (i.e. clientism and selfregulation non-decisions – TOVALOP and CRISTAL), this study moves the analysis of regime
formation and regime complexes into previously unexplored territory. Specifically, Non-State
Actors attempting to influence the outcome of a conference, such as the one held in Brussels in
1969, do more than merely mobilize opinion, motivate voters and get them to vote, and provide
crucial information to the formal decision-making persons. Instead they attempt to influence
directly the outcome of the regime formation process through the use of conventional interest
group strategies used to lobby members of a domestic legislature. This process has been, for the
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most part, largely ignored by researchers and theorists. Accordingly, if the existence of this
phenomenon can be found in similar studies that might be conducted, this then might cause the
recalibration of theories of regime formation.

VI. What Was Accomplished at Brussels
This dissertation emphasized theoretical and legal issues in the establishment of an
international regime to provide compensation for those impacted by oil spills on the high seas.
Among the issues discussed was regime formation in a transnational international system, the
role of Non-State Actors in the process, and strategies used by Non-State Actors.
The unspoken issue is whether anything practical was accomplished by the complex
process described in this study. The answer is that the regime did and continues to compensate
victims of oil spill damage. Attached in the Appendix as item 3, is Annex I to the financial
statement of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund of 1992 [the revised version of
the 1969 Civil Liability Treaty and the 1971 Supplemental Fund] for the period ending on
December 31, 2016.
A review of the Comments of the Directors indicates that sums in excess of one-hundred
million British pounds have been paid as compensation to victims of oil spill damage since the
inception of the 1992 Oil Pollution Compensation Fund. Additionally, significant compensation
has been paid by the original 1969 treaty and 1971 Supplemental Fund, which are still applicable
to those States that ratified the original 1969 and 1971 agreements but did not ratify the 1992
Compensation Fund.
These accomplishments, while impressive, are diminished, however, by two factors.
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First, given the extent of damage measured in the billions of dollars in incidents like the
Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon (both of which are discussed in Chapter 5), the level
of compensation provided by the Brussels system of compensation is highly inadequate.
Second, the United States, the key player in the world economy, has opted not to join the
Brussels regime and instead, through the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, has elected to
take a unilateral approach to the issue.
While clearly, a half measure is preferable to inaction, the question that arises is whether
an entirely different approach is feasible. This alternative approach is discussed in the next and
final segment of this study.

VII. Looking Beyond

This dissertation stressed the intertwined roles of large international entities, such as
IMCO, the CMI, the international oil companies, the multinational insurance companies, and
States in the formulation of policy on the issue of liability for oil spills on the oceans.
In recent years, an alternate approach to the issue of the management of international
resources to mitigate pollution has been suggested, which represents a radical break from the
legal-institutional paradigm. Specifically, green international political economy (“green theory”
or “the green approach”) essentially turns the legal-institutional model on its head, and then
proceeds to move into uncharted territory. Green theory’s point of departure is the realization
that despite all of the domestic and international activity in the realm of what might loosely be
termed “pollution control” over the past half-century (i.e. the studies, research, legislation,
treaties et. al.), there has been a “visible absence of substantive policy responses to handle these
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issues, both in the United States and the rest of the world.”1 Accordingly, it has been suggested
that a new approach is required to deal with ecological issues:
A Green or ecological approach understands the international political economy as an
open subsystem of the largely closed planetary ecosystem, with which human society is
deeply intertwined and fundamentally dependent. Because of this view, the relative size
of any political-economic subsystem within a larger ecosystem becomes a central
analytic device for Green IPE, as do exchanges between various subsystems. It is an
inherently social (or human ecological process).2
Green theory’s intellectual progenitors include Leopold Kohr, an Austrian born
economist whose 1957 book, The Breakdown of Nations, was a cri de coeur over the
consequences of large States and mass industrialization.3
In 1973, E.F. Schumacher made the following observation about organizations:
The higher level must not absorb the functions of the lower one, on the assumption that
being higher, it will automatically be wiser and fulfill them more efficiently. Loyalty can
grow only from the smaller units to the larger (and higher) ones, not the other way around
– any loyalty is an essential element in the health of any organization. The Principal of
Subsidiary Function implies that the burden of proof always lies on those who want to
deprive a lower level of its function, and thereby of its freedom and responsibility in that
respect; they have to prove that the lower level is incapable of fulfilling this function
satisfactorily and that the higher level can do much better.4
In a similar vein, Eric Helleiner, who has written extensively on international finance, is
generally credited as being the first major scholar to identify a theory of Green International
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Economy.5 He observed that the slogan that best describes green thinking is “think globally, act
locally.”6 Here, act locally, “is meant to convey the idea that people should focus their energies
primarily on improving the quality of life and solving problems within communities where they
live,” and in general refers to a, “deep commitment to the decentralization of political-economic
life and the strength and value of local communities.”7
“Think globally” is somewhat more difficult to define, but refers to several phenomena
such as a belief that global institutions, such as the G-7 and the European community, become
more democratic and more responsive to the people of the world; the creation of “global civil
society” groups that would promote the world economy to push for green goals; the creation of a
world economy in which, “relatively autonomous local economies would exist within national
economic spaces, which in turn would function fairly independently within broader regional and
global economic structures;” and the elimination of “Koyaanisqaatsi,” a Hopi Indian word
describing a life out of balance.8
In terms of the practical application of Green theory to the issue of the pollution of
transnational resources, it is clear that in recent years, the beginnings of the “think globally, act
locally” approach have begun to emerge, which have been described as follows:
Consider the United Nations climate change negotiations in Paris {2015}. As Oxford
professor and activist Thomas Hale has explained, the Paris Agreement of last December
represents a paradigm shift in international agreements, from a ‘regulatory’ model of
enforceable legal obligations to a ‘catalytic and facilitative’ model that both spurs and has
a wide range of actors meeting rolling schedules of increasing commitments. That model,
in turn, can work only if state parties to an agreement formally include non-state and
substate actors – or as they insisted on being called in Paris “non-Party stakeholders’.
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According to a study released during the Paris negotiations, more than 7,000 cities from
more than 99 countries and some 5,000 companies from 88 countries made climate
commitments. The cities represent 11 percent of the world’s population and about 32
percent of the global gross domestic product, and the companies represented over $38
trillion in revenue.9
The reference to Non-Party Stakeholders reflects the increasing role given to these entities in the
ongoing efforts to include non-conventional Non-State Actors in the international policymaking
process in the area of environmental protection.
A Non-Party Stakeholder is defined in the United Nations Framework Convention on the
Climate Change as:
Entities that are not Parties (national governments). Non-Party Stakeholders therefore
include civil society, the private sector, financial institutions, cities and other sub-national
authorities, local communities, and indigenous people.10
The increased participation by Non-Party Stakeholders in the various United Nations Specialized
Agencies and other international entities is reflected, by way of example only, in the recent
publication by the United Nations Framework Convention or Climate Change, which published a
forty-seven page document that consisted of a list of the submissions Non-State Party
Stakeholders in the area of the climate change. Each of these diverse entities (e.g. the Mountain
Institute, Alliance for Global Water Adoption, and Gesellschaft für international
Zusammenarbeit, to name but three of these Non-Party Stakeholders) had submitted a position
paper reflecting its concerns to the United Nations.11
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The Non-Party Stakeholders submissions are diverse and essentially reflect the interests
of the submitting entity within the context of the recipient international organization’s mandate.
By way of example, the Purdue University Department of Political Science in its submission to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change made the following suggestion
for a course of action that would:
support knowledge-related capacity building within the UNFCCC process especially with
regard to providing science-based learning opportunities for Parties in the form of
materials/documents, in-session presentations or other, more creative formats and
exercises (e.g. serious games).12
Accordingly, it is undeniable, that in the twenty-first century, the existence and role of
Non-State Actors in the policymaking process in international environment matters is
ascendant.13 What is not clear at this time, of course, is the actual ability of these Non-State
Actors, be they Non-Party Stakeholders or other, to be relevant to the policymaking process.
Nonetheless, it is possible that these new approaches represent a path forward in the regulation of
ocean pollution and other transnational environmental issues.
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Appendix 1:
1969 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO INTERVENTION ON THE
HIGH SEAS IN CASES OF OIL POLLUTION CASUALTIES
Adopted in Brussels, Belgium on 29 Nov 1969
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Conscious of the need to protect the interests of their peoples against the grave consequences of a
maritime casualty resulting in danger of oil pollution of sea and coastlines,
Convinced that under these circumstances measures of an exceptional character to protect
such interests might be necessary on the high seas and that these measures do not affect the
principle of freedom of the high seas,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
1. Parties to the present Convention may take such measures on the high seas as may be
necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or
related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea by oil; following upon a
maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to
result in major harmful consequences.
2. However, no measures shall be taken under the present Convention against any warship
or other ship owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government
non-commercial services.

ARTICLE II
For the purposes of the present Convention:
1. "maritime casualty" means a collision of ships, stranding or other incident of navigation,
or other occurrence on board a ship or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent
threat of material damage to a ship or cargo;
2.

"ship" means:

(a)

any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever, and

(b)

any floating craft, with the exception of an installation or device engaged in the
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exploration and exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the
subsoil thereof,

3.

"oil" means crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil and lubricating oil;

4. "related interests" means the interests of a coastal State directly affected or threatened
by the maritime casualty, such as:
(a) maritime coastal, port or estuarine activities, including fisheries activities,
constituting an essential means of livelihood of the persons concerned;
(b)

tourist attractions of the area concerned;

(c) the health of the coastal population and the well-being of the area concerned,
including conservation of living marine resources and of wildlife ;
5.

"Organization" means the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

ARTICLE Ill
When a coastal State is exercising the right to take measures in accordance with Article I, the
following provisions shall apply:
(a) before taking any measures, a coastal State shall proceed to consultations with other
States affected by the maritime casualty, particularly with the flag State or States;
(b) the coastal State shall notify without delay the proposed measures to any persons
physical or corporate known to the coastal State, or made known to it during the
consultations, to have interests which can reasonably be expected to be affected by those
measures. The coastal State shall take into account any views they may submit;
(c) before any measure is taken, the coastal State may proceed to a consultation with
independent experts, whose names shall be chosen from a list maintained by the Organizations;
(d) in cases of extreme urgency requiring measures to be taken immediately, the coastal
State may take measures rendered necessary by the urgency of the situation, without prior
notification or consultation or without continuing consultations already begun;
(e) a coastal State shall, before taking such measures and during their course, use its best
endeavours to avoid any risk to human life, and to afford persons in distress any assistance
of which they may stand in need, and in appropriate cases to facilitate the repatriation of
ships' crews, and to raise no obstacle thereto;
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(f) measures which have been taken in application of Article I shall be notified without
delay to the States and to the known physical or corporate persons concerned, as well as to the
Secretary- General of the Organization.
ARTICLE IV
1.
Under the supervision of the Organization, there shall be set up and maintained the list of
experts contemplated by Article III of the present Convention, and the Organization shall make
necessary and appropriate regulations in connexion therewith, including the determination of
the required qualifications.
2.
Nominations to the list may be made by Member States of the Organization and by
Parties to this Convention. The experts shall be paid on the basis of services rendered by the
States utilizing those services.
ARTICLE V
1. Measures taken by the coastal State in accordance with Article I shall be proportionate to
the damage actual or threatened to it.
2. Such measures shall not go beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the end
mentioned in Article I and shall cease as soon as that end has been achieved; they shall not
unnecessarily interfere with the rights and interests of the flag State, third States and of any
persons, physical or corporate, concerned.
3. In considering whether the measures are proportionate to the damage, account shall be
taken of:
(a)

the extent and probability of imminent damage if those measures are not taken; and

(b)

the likelihood of those measures being effective; and

(c)

the extent of the damage which may be caused by such measures.

ARTICLE VI
Any Party which has taken measures in convention of the provisions of the present
Convention causing damage to others, shall be obliged to pay compensation to the extent of
the damage caused by measures which exceed those reasonably necessary to achieve the end
mentioned in Article I.
ARTICLE VII
Except as specifically provided, nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice any
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otherwise applicable right, duty, privilege or immunity or deprive any of the Parties or any
interested physical or corporate person of any remedy otherwise applicable.
ARTICLE VIII
1. Any controversy between the parties as to whether measures taken under Article I were
in contravention of the present Convention, to whether compensation is obliged to be paid
under Article VI, and to the amount of such compensation shall, if settlement by negotiation
between the Parties involved or between the Party which took the measures and the
physical or corporate claimants has not been possible, and if the Parties do not otherwise
agree, be submitted upon request of any of the parties concerned to conciliation or, if
conciliation does not succeed, to arbitration, as set out in the Annex to the present
Convention.
2.
The Party which took the measures shall not be entitled to refuse a request for
conciliation or arbitration under provisions of the preceding paragraph solely on the grounds
that any remedies under municipal law in its own courts have not been exhausted.
ARTICLE IX
1.
The present Convention shall remain open for signature until 31 December 1970 and
shall thereafter remain open for accession.
2.
States Members of the United Nations or any of the Specialized Agencies or of the
International Atomic Energy Agencies or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice may become Parties to this Convention by:

(a)

signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval;

(b)
signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval followed by ratification,
acceptance or approval; or
(c)

accession.

ARTICLE X
1.
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of a
formal instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General of the Organization.
2.
Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the entry
into force of an amendment to the present Convention with respect to all existing Parties or
after the completion of all measures required for the entry into force of the amendment with
respect to those Parties shall be deemed to apply to the Convention as modified by the
amendment.
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ARTICLE XI
1.
The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on
which Governments of fifteen States have either signed it without reservation as to ratification,
acceptance or approval or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession with the Secretary-General of the Organization.
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it the
present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State
of the appropriate instrument.
ARTICLE XII
1.
The present Convention may be denounced by any Party at any time after the date on
which the Convention comes into force for that State.
2.
Denunciation shall be affected by the deposit of an instrument with the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization.
3.
A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be specified in
the instrument of denunciation, after its deposit with the Secretary-General of the
Organization.
ARTICLE XIII
1.
The United Nations where it is the administering authority for a territory, or any State
Party to the present Convention responsible for the international relations of a territory, shall as
soon as possible consult with the appropriate authorities of such territories or take such other
measures as may be appropriate, in order to extend the present Convention to that territory and
may at any time by notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization declare
that the present Convention shall extend to such territory.
2.
The present Convention shall, from the date of receipt of the notification or from such
other date as may be specified in the notification, extend to the territory named therein.
3.
The United Nations, or any Party which has made a declaration under paragraph 1 of
this Article may at any time after the date on which the Convention has been so extended to
any territory declare by notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization
that the present Convention shall cease to extend to any such territory named in the
notification.
4. The present Convention shall cease to extend to any territory mentioned in such
notification one year, or such longer period as may be specified therein, after the date of
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receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General of the Organization.
ARTICLE XIV
1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Convention
may be convened by the Organization.
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of the States Parties to the present
Convention for revising or amending the present Convention at the request of not less than
one-third of the Parties.
ARTICLE XV
1.

The present Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization.

2.

The Secretary-General of the Organization shall:

(a)

inform all States which have signed or acceded to the Convention of:

(i)

each new signature or deposit of instrument together with the date thereof;

(ii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Convention together with the date of
the deposit;
(iii) the extension of the present Convention to any territory under paragraph 1 of Article
XIII and of the termination of any such extension under the provisions of paragraph 4 of that
Article stating in each case the date on which the present Convention has been or will cease
to be so extended;
(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Convention to all Signatory States and to
all States which accede to the present Convention.

ARTICLE XVI
As soon as the present Convention comes into force, the text shall be transmitted by the
Secretary-General of the Organization to the Secretariat of the United Nations for
registration and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
ARTICLE XVII
The present Convention is established in a single copy in the English and French languages, both
texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the Russian and Spanish languages shall be
prepared and deposited with the signed original.
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In witness whereof the undersigned* being duly authorized by their respective Governments
for that purpose have signed the present Convention.
Done at Brussels this twenty-ninth day of November 1969.
ANNEX
CHAPTER I. CONCILIATION
Article 1
Provided the Parties concerned do not decide otherwise, the procedure for conciliation shall be in
accordance with the rules set out in this Chapter.
Article 2
1. A Conciliation Commission shall be established upon the request of one Party
addressed to another in application of Article VIII of the Convention.
2.
The request for conciliation submitted by a Party shall consist of a statement of
the case together with any supporting documents.
3.
If a procedure has been initiated between two Parties, any other Party the nationals or
property of which have been affected by the same measures, or which is a coastal State
having taken similar measures, may join in the conciliation procedure by giving written
notice to the Parties which have originally initiated the procedure unless either of the latter
Parties object to such joinder.
Article 3
1. The Conciliation Commission shall be composed of three members: one nominated
by the coastal State which took the measures, one nominated by the State the nationals or
property of which have been affected by those measures and a third, who shall preside over
the Commission and shall be nominated by agreement between the two original members.
2. The Conciliators shall be selected from a list previously drawn up in accordance
with the procedure set out in Article 4 below.
3. If within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the request for conciliation,
the Party to which such request is made has not given notice to the other Party to the
controversy of the nomination of the Conciliator for whose selection it is responsible, or
if, within a period of 30 days from the date of nomination of the second of the members
of the Commission to be designated by the Parties, the first two Conciliators have not
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been able to designate by common agreement the Chairmen of the Commission, the
Secretary-General of the Organization shall upon request of either Party and within a
period of 30 days, proceed to the required nomination. The members of the Commission
thus nominated shall be selected from the list prescribed in the preceding paragraph.
4. In no case shall the Chairman of the Commission be or have been a national of
one of the original Parties to the procedure, whatever the method of his nomination.
Article 4
1. The list prescribed in Article 3 above shall consist of qualified persons designated
by the Parties and shall be kept up to date by the Organization. Each Party may designate
for inclusion on the list four persons, who shall not necessarily be its nationals. The
nominations shall be for periods of six years each and shall be renewable.
2. In the case of the decease or resignation of a person whose name appears on the list,
the Party which nominated such person shall be permitted to nominate a replacement for
the remainder of the term of office.
Article 5
1.
Provided the Parties do not agree otherwise, the Conciliation Commission shall establish
its own procedures, which shall in all cases permit a fair hearing. As regards examination, the
Commission, unless it unanimously decides otherwise, shall conform with the provisions of
Chapter III of The Hague Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes of 18
October 1907.
2.
The Parties shall be represented before the Conciliation Commission by agents whose
duty shall be to act as intermediaries between the Parties and the Commission. Each of the
Parties may seek also the assistance of advisers and experts nominated by it for this purpose
and may request the hearing of all persons whose evidence the Party considers useful.
3.
The Commission shall have the right to request explanations from agents, advisers and
experts of the Parties as well as from any persons whom, with the consent of their
Governments, it may deem useful to call.
Article 6
Provided the Parties do not agree otherwise, decisions of the Conciliation Commission shall be
taken by a majority vote and the Commission shall not pronounce on the substance of the
controversy unless all its members are present.
Article 7
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The Parties shall facilitate the work of the Conciliation Commission and in particular, in
accordance with their legislation, and using all means at their disposal:
(a)

provide the Commission with the necessary documents and information;

(b)
enable the Commission to enter their territory, to hear witnesses or experts, and to visit
the scene.
Article 8
The task of the Conciliation Commission will be to clarify the matters under dispute, to
assemble for this purpose all relevant information by means of examination or other means, and
to endeavour to reconcile the Parties. After examining the case, the Commission shall
communicate to the Parties a recommendation which appears to the Commission to be
appropriate to the matter and shall fix a period of not more than 90 days within which the
Parties are called upon to state whether or not they accept the recommendation.
Article 9
The recommendation shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons. If the recommendation
does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the Commission, any Conciliator
shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
Article 10
A conciliation shall be deemed unsuccessful if, 90 days after the Parties have been notified of
the recommendation, either Party shall not have notified the other Party of its acceptance of the
recommendation. Conciliation shall likewise be deemed unsuccessful if the Commission shall
not have been established within the period prescribed in the third paragraph of Article 3
above, or provided the Parties have not agreed otherwise, if the Commission shall not have
issued its
recommendation within one year from the date on which the Chairman of the Commission was
nominated.
Article 11
1. Each member of the Commission shall receive remuneration for his work, such
remuneration to be fixed by agreement between the Parties which shall each contribute an
equal proportion.
2. Contributions for miscellaneous expenditure incurred by the work of the Commission
shall be apportioned in the same manner.
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Article 12
The parties to the controversy may at any time during the conciliation procedure decide in
agreement to have recourse to a different procedure for settlement of disputes.
CHAPTER II. ARBITRATION
Article 13
1. Arbitration procedure, unless the Parties decide otherwise, shall be in accordance with
the rules set out in this Chapter.
2. Where conciliation is unsuccessful, a request for arbitration may only be made within a
period of 180 days following the failure of conciliation.

Article 14
The Arbitration Tribunal shall consist of three members: one Arbitrator nominated by the coastal
State which took the measures, one Arbitrator nominated by the State the nationals or property of
which have been affected by those measures, and another Arbitrator who shall be nominated by
agreement between the two first-named, and shall act as its Chairman.
Article 15
1. If, at the end of a period of 60 days from the nomination of the second Arbitrator, the
Chairman of the Tribunal shall not have been nominated, the Secretary-General of the
Organization upon request of either Party shall within a further period of 60 days proceed to
such nomination, selecting from a list of qualified persons previously drawn up in
accordance with the provisions of Article 4 above. This list shall be separate from the list of
experts prescribed in Article IV of the Convention and from the list of Conciliators prescribed
in Article 4 of the present Annex; the name of the same person may, however, appear both on
the list of Conciliators and on the list of Arbitrators. A person who has acted as Conciliator in
a dispute may not, however, be chosen to act as Arbitrator in the same matter.
2.
If, within a period of 60 days from the date of the receipt of the request, one of the Parties
shall not have nominated the member of the Tribunal for whose designation it is responsible,
the other Party may directly inform the Secretary-General of the Organization who shall
nominate the Chairman of the Tribunal within a period of 60 days, selecting him from the list
prescribed in paragraph 1 of the present Article.
3.
The Chairman of the Tribunal shall, upon nomination, request the Party which has not
provided an Arbitrator, to do so in the same manner and under the same conditions. If the Party
does not make the required nomination, the Chairman of the Tribunal shall request the
Secretary- General of the Organization to make the nomination in the form and conditions
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prescribed in the preceding paragraph.
4.
The Chairman of the Tribunal, if nominated under the provisions of the present Article,
shall not be or have been a national of one of the parties concerned, except with the consent of
the other Party or Parties.
5.
In the case of the decease or default of an Arbitrator for whose nomination one of the
Parties is responsible, the said Party shall nominate a replacement within a period of 60 days
from the date of decease or default. Should the said Party not make the nomination, the
arbitration shall proceed under the remaining Arbitrators. In the case of decease or default of the
Chairman of the Tribunal, a replacement shall be nominated in accordance with the provisions
of Article 14 above, or in the absence of agreement between the members of the Tribunal within
a period of 60 days of the decease or default, according to the provisions of the present Article.
Article 16
If a procedure has been initiated between two Parties, any other Party, the nationals or property
of which have been affected by the same measures or which is a coastal State having taken
similar measures, may join in the arbitration procedure by giving written notice to the Parties
which have originally initiated the procedure unless either of the latter Parties object to such
joinder.
Article 17
Any arbitration Tribunal established under the provisions of the present Annex shall decide
its own rules of procedure.
Article 18
1.
Decisions of the Tribunal both as to its procedure and its place of meeting and as to
any controversy laid before it, shall be taken by majority vote of its members; the absence
or abstention of one of the members of the Tribunal for whose nomination the Parties were
responsible shall not constitute an impediment to the Tribunal reaching a decision. In cases
of equal voting, the Chairman shall cast the deciding vote.
2. The Parties shall facilitate the work of the Tribunal and in particular, in accordance with
their legislation, and using all means at their disposal:
(a)

provide the Tribunal with the necessary documents and information;

(b) enable the Tribunal to enter their territory, to hear witnesses or experts, and to visit the
scene.

3.

Absence or default of one Party shall not constitute an impediment to the
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procedure.
Article 19
1. The award of the Tribunal shall be accompanied by a statement of reasons. It shall be final
and without appeal. The Parties shall immediately comply with the award.
2. Any controversy which may arise between the Parties as regards interpretation and
execution of the award may be submitted by either Party for judgment to the Tribunal which
made the award, or, if it is not available, to mother Tribunal constituted for this purpose in
the same manner as the original Tribunal.
Source: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Pub1ication/UNTS/Volume%20970/volume-970-1-14049English.pdf
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Appendix 2:
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(Brussels, 29 November 1969)

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE PRESENT CONVENTION,
CONSCIOUS of the dangers of pollution posed by the worldwide maritime carriage of oil in
bulk,
CONVINCED of the need to ensure that adequate compensation is available to persons who
suffer damage caused by pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from ships,
DESIRING to adopt uniform international rules and procedures for determining questions of
liability and providing adequate compensation in such cases,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
Article I
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. "Ships" means any sea-going vessel and any seaborn craft of any type whatsoever, actually
carrying oil in bulk as cargo.
2. "Person" means any individual or partnership or any public or private body, whether corporate
or not, including a State or any of its constituent subdivisions.
3. "Owner" means the person or persons registered as the owner of the ship or, in the absence of
registration, the person or persons owning the ship. However in the case of a ship owned by a
State and operated by a company which in that State is registered as the ship's operator, "owner"
shall mean such company.
4. "State of the ship's registry" means in relation to registered ships the State of registration of the
ship, and in relation to unregistered ships the State whose flag the ship is flying.
5. "Oil" means any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and
whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship.
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6. "Pollution damage" means loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape
or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures and further loss or
damage caused by preventive measures.
7. "Preventive measures" means any reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident
has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage.
8. "Incident" means any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same origin, which
causes pollution damage.
9. "Organization" means the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.
Article II
This Convention shall apply exclusively to pollution damage caused on the territory including
the territorial sea of a Contracting State and to preventive measures taken to prevent or minimize
such damage.
Article III
1. Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the owner of a ship at the time of an
incident, or where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at the time of the first such
occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been
discharged from the ship as a result of the incident.
2. No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the damage:
(a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or
(b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third party,
or
(c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other
authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of
that function.
3. If the owner proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partially either from an act or
omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who suffered the damage or from the
negligence of that person, the owner may be exonerated wholly or partially from his liability to
such person.
4. No claim for compensation for pollution damage shall be made against the owner otherwise
than in accordance with this Convention. No claim for pollution damage under this Convention
or otherwise may be made against the servants or agents of the owner.
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5. Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any right of recourse of the owner against third
parties.
Article IV
When oil has escaped or has been discharged from two or more ships, and pollution damage
results therefrom, the owners of all the ships concerned, unless exonerated under Article III, shall
be jointly and severally liable for all such damage which is not reasonably separable.
Article V
1. The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in respect of
any one incident to an aggregate amount of 2,000 francs for each ton of the ship's tonnage.
However, this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed 210 million francs.
2. If the incident occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the owner, he shall not be
entitled to avail himself of the limitation provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation provided for in paragraph 1 of
this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum representing the limit of his
liability with the Court or other competent authority of any one of the Contracting States in
which action is brought under Article IX. The fund can be constituted either by depositing the
sum or by producing a bank guarantee or other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the
Contracting State where the fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court or
another competent authority.
4. The fund shall be distributed among the claimants in proportion to the amounts of their
established claims.
5. If before the fund is distributed the owner or any of his servants or agents or any person
providing him insurance or other financial security has as a result of the incident in question,
paid compensation for pollution damage, such person shall, up to the amount he has paid, acquire
by subrogation the rights which the person so compensated would have enjoyed under this
Convention.
6. The right of subrogation provided for in paragraph 5 of this Article may also be exercised by a
person other than those mentioned therein in respect of any amount of compensation for
pollution damage which he may have paid by only to the extent that such subrogation is
permitted under the applicable national law.
7. Where the owner or any other person establishes that he may be compelled to pay at a later
date in whole or in part any such amount of compensation, with regard to which such person
would have enjoyed a right of subrogation under paragraphs 5 or 6 of this Article, had the
compensation been paid before the fund was distributed, the Court or other competent authority
of the State where the fund has been constituted may order that a sufficient sum shall be
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provisionally set aside to enable such person at such later date to enforce his claim against the
fund.
8. Claims in respect of expenses reasonably incurred or sacrifices reasonably made by the owner
voluntarily to prevent or minimize pollution damage shall rank equally with other claims against
the fund.
9. The franc mentioned in this Article shall be a unit consisting of sixty-five and a half
milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. The amount mentioned in paragraph 1 of
this Article shall be converted into the national currency of the State in which the fund is being
constituted on the basis of the official value of that currency by reference to the unit defined
above on the date of the constitution of the fund.
10. For the purpose of this Article the ship's tonnage shall be the net tonnage of the ship with the
addition of the amount deducted from the gross tonnage on account of engine room space for the
purpose of ascertaining the net tonnage. In the case of a ship which cannot be measured in
accordance with the normal rules of tonnage measurement, the ship's tonnage shall be deemed to
be 40 per cent of the weight in tons (of 2240 lbs) of oil which the ship is capable of carrying.
11. the insurer or other person providing financial security shall be entitled to constitute a fund in
accordance with this Article on the same conditions and having the same effect as if it were
constituted by the owner. Such a fund may be constituted even in the event of the actual fault or
privity of the owner but its constitution shall in that case not prejudice the rights of any claimant
against the owner.
Article VI
1. Where the owner, after an incident, has constituted a fund in accordance with Article V, and is
entitled to limit his liability,
(a) no person having a claim for pollution damage arising out of that incident shall be entitled to
exercise any right against any other assets of the owner in respect of such claim;
(b) the Court or other competent authority of any Contracting State shall order the release of any
ship or other property belonging to the owner which has been arrested in respect of a claim for
pollution damage arising out of that incident, and shall similarly release any bail or other security
furnished to avoid such arrest.
2. The foregoing shall, however, only apply if the claimant has access to the Court administering
the fund and the fund is actually available in respect of his claim.
Article VII
1. The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil
in bulk as cargo shall be required to maintain insurance or other financial security, such as the
guarantee of a bank or a certificate delivered by an international compensation fund, in the sums
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fixed by applying the limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1 to cover his liability
for pollution damage under this Convention.
2. A certificate attesting that insurance or other financial security is in force in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention shall be issued to each ship. It shall be issued or certified by
the appropriate authority of the State of the ship's registry after determining that the requirements
of paragraph 1 of this Article have been complied with. The certificate shall be in the form of the
annexed model and shall contain the following particulars:
(a) name of ship and port of registration;
(b) name and principal place of business of owner;
(c) type of security;
(d) name and principal place of business of insurer or other person giving security and, where
appropriate, place of business where the insurance or security is established;
(e) period of validity of certificate which shall not be longer than the period of validity of the
insurance or other security.
3. The certificate shall be in the official language or languages of the issuing State. If the
language used is neither English nor French, the text shall include a translation into one of these
languages.
4. The certificate shall be carried on board the ship and a copy shall be deposited with the
authorities who keep the record of the ship's registry.
5. An insurance or other financial security shall not satisfy the requirements of this Article if it
can cease, for reasons other than the expiry of the period of validity of the insurance or security
specified in the certificate under paragraph 2 of this Article, before three months have elapsed
from the date on which notice of its termination is given to the authorities referred to in
paragraph 4 of this Article, unless the certificate has been surrendered to these authorities or a
new certificate has been issued within the said period. The foregoing provision shall similarly
apply to any modification which results in the insurance or security no longer satisfying the
requirements of this Article.
6. The State of registry shall, subject to the provisions of this Article, determine the conditions of
issue and validity of the certificate.
7. Certificates issued or certified under the authority of a Contracting State shall be accepted by
other Contracting States for the purposes of this Convention and shall be regarded by other
Contracting States as having the same force as certificates issued or certified by them. A
Contracting State may at any time request consultation with the State of a ship's registry should it
believe that the insurer or guarantor named in the certificate is not financially capable of meeting
the obligations imposed by this Convention.
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8. Any claim for compensation for pollution damage may be brought directly against the insurer
or other person providing financial security for the owner's liability for pollution damage. In such
case the defendant may, irrespective of the actual fault or privity of the owner, avail himself of
the limits of liability prescribed in Article V, paragraph 1. He may further avail himself of the
defences (other than the bankruptcy or winding up of the owner) which the owner himself would
have been entitled to invoke. Furthermore, the defendant may avail himself of the defence that
the pollution damage resulted from the wilful misconduct of the owner himself, but the
defendant shall not avail himself of any other defence which he might have been entitled to
invoke in proceedings brought by the owner against him. The defendant shall in any event have
the right to require the owner to be joined in the proceedings.
9. Any sum provided by insurance or by other financial security maintained in accordance with
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be available exclusively for the satisfaction of claims under this
Convention.
10. A Contracting State shall not permit a ship under its flag to which this Article applies to trade
unless a certificate has been issued under paragraph 2 or 12 of this Article.
11. Subject to the provisions of this Article, each Contracting State shall ensure, under its
national legislation, that insurance or other security to the extent specified in paragraph 1 of this
Article is in force in respect of any ship, wherever registered, entering or leaving a port in its
territory, or arriving at or leaving an off-shore terminal in its territorial sea, if the ship actually
carries more than 2,000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo.
12. If insurance or other financial security is not maintained in respect of a ship owned by a
Contracting State, the provisions of this Article relating thereto shall not be applicable to such
ship, but the ship shall carry a certificate issued by the appropriate authorities of the State of the
ship's registry stating that the ship is owned by that State and that the ship's liability is covered
within the limits prescribed by Article V, paragraph 1. Such a certificate shall follow as closely
as practicable the model prescribed by paragraph 2 of this Article.
Article VIII
Rights of compensation under this Convention shall be extinguished unless an action is brought
thereunder within three years from the date when the damage occurred. However, in no case
shall an action be brought after six years from the date of the incident which caused the damage.
Where this incident consists of a series of occurrences, the six years' period shall run from the
date of the first such occurrence.
Article IX
1. Where an incident has caused pollution damage in the territory including the territorial sea of
one or more Contracting States, or preventive measures have been taken to prevent or minimize
pollution damage in such territory including the territorial sea, actions for compensation may
only be brought in the Courts of any such Contracting State or States. Reasonable notice of any
such action shall be given to the defendant.
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2. Each Contracting State shall ensure that its Court s possess the necessary jurisdiction to
entertain such actions for compensation.
3. After the fund has been constituted in accordance with Article V the Courts of the State in
which the fund is constituted shall be exclusively competent to determine all matters relating to
the apportionment and distribution of the fund.
Article X
1. Any judgment given by a Court with jurisdiction in accordance with Article IX which is
enforceable in the State of origin where it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review, shall
be recognized in any Contracting State, except:
(a) where the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
(b) where the defendant was not given reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to present his
case.
2. A judgment recognized under paragraph 1 of this Article shall be enforceable in each
Contracting State as soon as the formalities required in the State have been complied with. The
formalities shall not permit the merits of the case to be re-opened.
Article XI
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to warships or other ships owned or
operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service.
2. With respect to ships owned by a Contracting State and used for commercial purposes, each
State shall be subject to suit in the jurisdictions set forth in Article IX and shall waive all
defences based on its status as a sovereign State.
Article XII
This Convention shall supersede any International Conventions in force or open for signature,
ratification or accession at the date on which the Convention is opened for signature, but only to
the extent that such Conventions would be in conflict with it; however, nothing in this Article
shall affect the obligations of Contracting States to non-Contracting States arising under such
International Conventions.
Article XIII
1. The present Convention shall remain open for signature until 31 December 1970 and shall
thereafter remain open for accession.
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2. States Members of the United Nations or any of the Specialized Agencies or of the
International Atomic Energy Agency or Parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice
may become Parties to this Convention by:
(a) signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval;
(b) signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval followed by ratification, acceptance
or approval; or
(c) accession
Article XIV
1. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be effected by the deposit of a formal
instrument to that effect with the Secretary-General of the Organization.
2. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after the entry into
force of an amendment to the present Convention with respect to all existing Contracting States,
or after the completion of all measures required for the entry into force of the amendment with
respect to those Contracting States shall be deemed to apply to the Convention as modified by
the amendment.
Article XV
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which
Governments of eight States including five States each with not less than 1,000,000 gross tons of
tanker tonnage have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval
or have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance approval or accession with the
Secretary-General of the Organization.
2. For each State which subsequently ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to it the present
Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day after deposit by such State of the
appropriate instrument.
Article XVI
1. The present Convention may be denounced by any Contracting State at any time after the date
on which the Convention comes into force for that State.
2. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument with the Secretary-General of
the Organization.
3. A denunciation shall take effect one year, or such longer period as may be specified in the
instrument of denunciation, after its deposit with the Secretary-General of the Organization.
Article XVII
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1. The United Nations, where it is the administering authority for a territory, or any Contracting
State responsible for the international relations of a territory, shall as soon as possible consult
with the appropriate authorities of such territory or take such other measures as may be
appropriate, in order to extend the present Convention to that territory and may at any time by
notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization declare that the present
Convention shall extend to such territory.
2. The present Convention shall, from the date of receipt of the notification of from such other
date as may be specified in the notification, extend to the territory named therein.
3. The United Nations, or any Contracting State which has made a declaration under paragraph 1
of this Article may at any time after the date on which the Convention has been so extended to
any territory declare by notification in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization that
the present Convention shall cease to extend to any such territory named in the notification.
4. The present Convention shall cease to extend to any territory mentioned in such notification
one year, or such longer period as may be specified therein, after the date of receipt of the
notification by the Secretary-General of the Organization.
Article XVIII
1. A Conference for the purpose of revising or amending the present Convention may be
convened by the Organization.
2. The Organization shall convene a Conference of the Contracting States for revising or
amending the present Convention at the request of not less than one-third of the Contracting
States.
Article XIX
1. The present Convention shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the Organization.
2. The Secretary-General of the Organization shall:
(a) inform all States which have signed or acceded to the Convention of:
(i) each new signature or deposit of instrument together with the date thereof;
(ii) the deposit of any instrument of denunciation of this Convention together with the date of the
deposit;
(iii) the extension of the present Convention to any territory under paragraph 1 of Article XVII
and of the termination of any such extension under the provisions of paragraph 4 of that Article
stating in each case the date on which the present Convention has been or will cease to be so
extended;
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(b) transmit certified true copies of the present Convention to all Signatory States and to all
States which accede to the present Convention.
Article XX
As soon as the present Convention comes into force, the text shall be transmitted by the
Secretary-General of the Organization to the Secretariat of the United Nations for registration
and publication in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XXI
The present Convention is established in a single copy in the English and French languages, both
texts being equally authentic. Official translations in the Russian and Spanish languages shall be
prepared and deposited with the signed original.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their respective
Governments for that purpose have signed the present Convention.
DONE at Brussels this twenty-ninth day of November 1969.

ANNEX
CERTIFICATE OF INSURANCE OR OTHER FINANCIAL SECURITY IN RESPECT OF
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
Issued in accordance with the provisions of Article VII of the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969.
Name of ship Distinctive number or letters Port of registry Name and address of owner

This is to certify that there is in force in respect of the above-named ship a policy of insurance or
other financial security satisfying the requirements of Article VII of the International convention
on civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969.
Type of Security
Duration of Security
Name and Address of the Insurer(s) and/or Guarantor(s)
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Name
Address
This certificate is valid until
Issued or certified by the Government of
(Full designation of the State)
At On
(Place) (Date)
Signature and Title of issuing or certifying official.
Explanatory Notes:
1. If desired, the designation of the State may include a reference to the competent public
authority of the country where the certificate is issued.
2. If the total amount of security has been furnished by more than one source, the amount of each
of them should be indicated.
3. If security is furnished in several forms, these should be enumerated.
4. The entry "Duration of Security" must stipulate the date on which such security takes effect.
[Explanatory Notes appeared in original text.]

Source: The Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide at:
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/civilpol1969.html

223

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Abecassis, David William. The Law and Practice Relating to Oil Pollution from Ships. London:
Butterworths, 2008.
Adams, Gordon. The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle. New Brunswick:
Transaction Books, 1982.
Alker Hayward B. Jr. World Politics in the General Assembly. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1965.
Aron, Raymond. Peace and War. Garden City: Doubleday, 1966.
Aron, Raymond. The Century of Total War. New York: Doubleday, 1954.
Aron, Raymond. The Imperial Republic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1978.
Bachrach Peter and Morton Baratz. Power and Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press,
1970.
Berger, Suzanne. How We Compete: What Companies Around the World are Doing to Compete
in Today’s Global Economy. New York: Doubleday, 2005.
Beckmann, Matthew N. and Richard Hall. “Elite Interviewing in Washington, D.C.” In Interview
Research in Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 196-208. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2013.
Bernstein, Marver. Regulating American Business by Independent Commission. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1955.
Biermann, Frank and Philipp Pattberg, eds. Global Environmental Governance Reconsidered.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2012.
Bodansky, Daniel. The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2010.
Bratspies, Rebecca and Russell A. Miller, eds. Transnational Harm in International Law:
Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Brown, Lester R. World Without Borders. New York: Random House 1972.
239

Bruno, Kenny and Joshua Karliner. earthsummit.biz: The Corporate Takeover of Sustainable
Development. Oakland: First Food Books, 2002.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. New York:
Basis Books, 2012.
Carpenter, Daniel B. “Detecting and Measuring Capture.” In Preventing Regulatory Capture:
Special Interest Influence and How to Prevent It. Edited by Daniel Carpenter and David
Moss, 57-68. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961.
Cashore, Benjamin. Governing Through Markets: Forest Certification and the Emergence of
Non-State Authority. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.
Cline, William R. The Economics of Global Warming. Washington D.C.: The Petersen Institute
for International Economics, 1992.
Cohen Daniel. The Wealth of the World and the Poverty of Nations. Cambridge: MIT Press,
1998.
Coll, Steven. Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power. New York: Penguin Books,
2012.
Conca, Ken. Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institutional
Building. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005.
Cox, Robert W. and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in
International Organizations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.
Cutler, A. Claire, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter. Private Authority and International Affairs.
Albany: SUNY Press, 1999.
Dahlberg, Kenneth. Beyond the Green Revolution: The Ecology and Politics of Global
Agricultural Development. New York: Plenum Press, 1979.
Dauvergne, Peter. Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia.
Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1997.
De La Rue, Colin and Charles Anderson. Shipping and the Environment. London: Llp Ltd. 1997.
De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno. The Predictioneer’s Handbook. New York: Random House, 2009.

240

Drumbl, Mark A. “A Trail Smelter and the International Law Commission’s Work on State
Responsibility for Internationally Wrong Acts and State Liability.” In Transnational
Harm in international Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, edited by
Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller, 85-98. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2006.
Ehrmann, Henry W. “Comparative Study of Interest Groups.” In Interest Groups on Four
Continents, edited by Henry W. Ehrmann. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1958.
Elliott, Lorraine and Shaun Breslin, eds. Comparative Environmental Regionalism. New York:
Routledge: 2011.
Engel, Robert, The Politics of Oil. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961.
Eulau, Heinz ed., Behavioralism in Political Science. Chicago: Aldline, 1969.
Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds. Double - Edged Diplomacy:
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993.
Ferguson, Niall. Kissinger 1923-1968: The Idealist. New York: Penguin Press, 2015.
Frey, Bruno S. International Political Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., 1984.
Friedmann Wolfgang, Oliver Lissitzyn, and Richard Crawford Pugh. Cases and Materials on
International Law. St Paul: West Publishing Company, 1969.
Friedmann, Wolfgang. Transnational Law in a Changing Society. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972.
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005
Gill, Crispin, Tony Soper, and Frank Booker. The Wreck of the Torrey Canyon. Newtown
Abbott: David & Charles, 1967.
Gordon, Sanford and Catherine Hafer. “Conditional Forbearance as an Alternative to Capture”
Evidence From Coal Mine Safety Regulation.” In Preventing Regulatory Capture Special
Interest Influence and How to Limit It, edited by Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Gottlieb, Robert. “Where We Live, Work, and Play.” In Environment and Society, edited by
Christopher Schlottmann, Dale Jamieson and Anne Rademacher. New York: New York
University Press, 2017.
241

Green, Jessica F. Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global
Environmental Governance. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
Grotius, Hugo. The Freedom of the Seas (Latin and English version, Magoffin trans, 1608)
available from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/552 (A Project of Liberty Fund, Inc).
Haas, Peter M. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental
Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger. Theories of International Regimes.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Haufler, Virginia. A Public Role for the Private Sector. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace 2001.
Haufler, Virginia. Dangerous Commerce: Insurance and Management of International Risk.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Hoffman, Daniel, ed. Terrorism and International Relations. Washington D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 2006.
Hoffman, Stanley. The State of War. New York: Praeger,1966.
Hoffman, Stanley. Primacy of World Order. New York: McGraw Hill, 1978.
Holyoke, Thomas. Interest Groups and Lobbying. Boulder: Westview Press, 2014.
Hovet Jr., Thomas. Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1960.
Humphreys, David. Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance. Abington
Oxon: Earthscan 2006.
Hurrell, Andrew and Benedict Kingsbury, eds. The International Politics of the Environment,
Actors, Interests and Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Jackson, John H. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997.
Jessup, Philip. Transnational Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956.

242

Jinnah, Sinkina. Post Treaty Politics: Secretarial Influence in Global Environmental
Governance. Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2014.
Kauffmann, Robert and Cutler J. Cleveland. Environmental Science. New York: McGraw Hill,
2008.
Karns, Margaret, Karen Mingst and Kenneth W. Stiles. International Organizations: The Politics
& Processes of Global Governance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2015.
Kay, David A. The New Nations in the United Nations 1960-1967. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1970.
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Keeton, George W. and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds. Yearbook of World Affairs, 1968. New
York: Praeger, 1968.
Key, V.O., A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co.,
1966
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An
Introduction.” In Transnational Relations and World Politics, edited by Robert O.
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972.
Khee-Jin Tan, Alan. Vessel Source Marine Pollution: The Law and Politics of International
Regulation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Kindleberger, Charles P. Power and Money. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
King, Gary, Robert D. Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Kissinger, Henry. World Order. New York: Penguin Books, 1965.
Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961.
Kissinger, Henry. The Troubled Partnership; a Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. New York:
McGraw Hill, 1965.
Kissinger, Henry. The Necessity of Choice: Prospects for American Policy. New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1961.
Krasner, Stephen D., ed. International Regimes. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983.
243

Knox, John H., “The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong Law.” In
Transnational Harm in International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration,
edited by Rebecca M. Bratspies and Russell A. Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2006.
Lador-Lederer, J.J. International Non-Governmental Organizations and Economic Entities.
Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1963.
Lane, Robert. Political Ideology: Why the Common Man Believes What He Does. New York:
The Free Press, 1962.
Lasswell, Harold D. Politics - Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw Hill Book
Company, 1936.
Lewis, Joanna I. Green Innovation in China. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
Lipschutz, Ronnie D., Global Civil Society and Global Governance: The Politics of Nature from
Place to Planet. Albany: SUNY Press, 2005.
List, Marter and Volker Ritteberger. “The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in the
Formation and Evolution of International Environmental Regimes.” In The Politics of
International Environmental Management, edited by Arild Underdal. The Netherlands
(no city): Springer, 1998.
Low, Nicholas and Brendan Gleeson. Justice Society and Nature: An Exploration of Political
Ecology. New York: Routledge, 1998.
Matthews, Donald R. U.S. Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,
1960.
Meadows, Donella H., Dennis J. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W, Beherns III, The
Limits of Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of
Mankind.
New York: Universe Books, 1972.
McCaffrey, Steven C. “Of Paradoxes and Precedents and Progeny: the Trail Smelter Arbitration
65 Years Later.” In Transnational Harm in International Law, edited by Rebecca M.
Bratspies and Russell A. Miller. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
M’Gonigle, Michael and Mark W. Zacher. Pollution, Politics and International Law-Tankers at
Sea. Berkley: University of California Press, 1979.

244

Miller, Marian. The Third World in Global Environmental Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1995.
Mitchell, Ronald B. International Oil Pollution at Sea. Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1994.
Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York:
McGraw Hill, 1948.
Mutenga, Stanley and Christopher Parsons, “Marine Insurance.” In The Blackwell Companion to
Maritime Economics, edited by Wayne K. Talley. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2011.
Naim, Moises. The End of Power. New York: Basic Books, 2013.
Nixon, Rob. Slow Violence and Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2013.
Odell, Peter R. Oil and World Power. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970.
Ong, David M. “International Law or Environmental Protection.” In International Law for
International Relations, edited by Basak Cali. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2010
Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons, the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Park, Susan. World Bank Group Interactions with Environmentalists: Changing International
Organization Identities. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011.
Petrow, Richard. In the Wake of the Torrey Canyon. New York: David McKay Co., 1968.
Princen, Thomas, Michael Maniates and Ken Conca, eds. Confronting Consumption. Cambridge:
the MIT Press, 2005.
Princen, Thomas, The Logic of Sufficiency. Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2005.
Princen, Thomas and Jack P. Manno. The Problem: Ending the Fossil Fuel Era. Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 2015.
Prosser, William L. The Law of Torts (Second Edition). St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1955.
Ragin, Charles C. And Howard S. Becker, eds. What is a Case: Exploring the Foundations of
Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Reiff, Henry. The United States and the Treaty Law of the Sea. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1959.
245

Rolfe, Sidney E. “The Multinational Corporation.” New York: Foreign Policy Association
Headline Series 199 (February 1970).
Rosenau, James R. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1990
Sampson, Anthony. The Seven Sisters, the Great Oil Companies & the World They Shaped. New
York: the Viking Press, 1975
Sayre, Wallace and Herbert Kaufman. Governing New York City. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1960.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
Schreiber, J.J. Servan. The American Challenge. New York: Atheneum, 1968.
Schumacher, E.F. Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered. New York: Harper &
Row Inc, 1973.
Schwartz, Victor E. and Kathryn Kelly and David E. Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz’s
Torts: Cases and Materials, 12th ed. St. Paul: Foundation Press, 1982.
Sebenius, James. Negotiating the Law of the Sea: Lessons in the Art and Science of Reaching
Agreement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Simon, Herbert A., Donald Smithsburg, and Victor P. Thompson. Public Administration. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Sowers, Jeannie L. Environmental Politics in Egypt: Activists, Experts, and the State. London:
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
Spanier, John. American Policy Since World War II. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston 1983
Stoessinger, John, The United Nation and the Superpowers: China, Russia, and America. New
York: Random House, 1965
Strange, Susan. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Strange, Susan. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Men the
State and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
Strange, Susan. States and Markets. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1998.
246

Kyla Tienhaara, Amandine Orsini and Robert Falkner. “Global Corporations.” In Global
Environmental Governance Reconsidered, edited by Frank Biermann and Philipp
Pattberg, 45-63. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2012.
Victor, David G., Kal Raustiala and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds. The Implementation and
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice.
Cambridge: the MIT Press, 1998.
Wapner, Paul. Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996.
Ward, Barbara and René Dubos. Only One Earth. New York: W.W. Norton, 1972.
Webster, D.G. Adaptive Governance: The Dynamics of Atlantic Fisheries Management.
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009.
Wellings, Ben. “Into the Archives.” In Political Science Research Methods in Action, edited by
Michael Bruter and Martin Lodge. New York: St. Martin’s Press LLC - Palgave
Macmillan, 2013.
White, Lyman. The Role of International NGOs in World Affairs. New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1951.
Wight, Martin, ed. Systems of States. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977.
Wootton, Graham. Interest Groups. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1970.
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Method. Newbury Park California: Sage
Publishing, 1989.
Young, Oran R. and Gail Osherenko, eds. Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental
Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Young, Oran R., ed. The International Economy and International Institutions, vol I.
Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, USA: An Elgar Reference Collection, 1996.
Zeigler, Harmon. Interest Groups in American Society. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964.

247

COURT CASES AND DECISIONS

Barracuda Tanker Corp, 281 F. Supp 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
Jaramillio v. Weyerhauser Company, 209 N.Y. Slip Opinion 02444, 209, WL 812965 (2009)
Palsgraf v. The Long Island Railroad 248 NY 339 (128).
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) UKHL 1 (1868) LR3 HL330
Yenem Corp. V. 291 Holdings LLC (New York Appeals, 2012)

248

JOURNALS
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (February 1998): 3-32.
Alnaim, Fahad. “The Case Study Method: Critical Reflection.” Global Journal of Human Social
Science & Arts & Humanities 15, no. 7 (2015): 29-32.
Baker, Roozbeh (Rudy). “Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and
New Debates.” European Journal of International Law 21, no. 1 (2010): 173-204.
Barrett, David A. and Christine M. Warren. “History of Florida Oil Spill Litigation.” Florida
State University Law Review 5, no. 3 (Summer, 1977): 310-359.
Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. “Power in International Politics.” International
Organization 59, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 39-75.
Becker, Gordon L. “A Short Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and CRISTAL.” Journal of
Maritime Law and Commerce 5, no. 4 (July, 1974): 609-632.
Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. "Case Study Methods in the International Relations
Subfield." Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 2 (2007): 170-95.
Billah, Muhammad Masaum. “The Role of Insurance in Providing Adequate Compensation and
in Reducing Pollution Incidents: The Case of the International Oil Liability Regime.”
Pace Environmental Law Review 29, no.1 (Fall 2011): 4-27.
Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. “Revolving Door Lobbyists.”
American Economic Review 102, no. 7 (December 2012): 3731-3748.
Bloodgood, Elizabeth A. “The interest group analogy: international non-governmental advocacy
organisations in international politics.” Review of International Studies 37 (2011): 93120.
Bloodworth, Susan. “Death on the High Seas: The Demise of TOVALOP and CRISTAL.”
Florida State University Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law 13, no 2 (Spring
1998): 443-458.
Bonica, Adam. “Ideology and Interests in the Public Marketplace.” American Journal of
Political Science 57, no. 2 (2013): 294-311.
Brian, Christine. “Trends in Marine Pollution Legislation.” Risk Management, (January 1994):
59.
249

Brooks, Stephen, G. “Dueling Realisms.” International Organization 51, no.3 (Summer 1997):
445-477.
Clapp, Jennifer and Eric Helleiner. “International Political Economy and the Environment: Back
to Basics?” International Affairs 88, no. 3 (2012): 45-50.
Cohen, Lawrence. “Revisions of TOVALOP and CRISTAL: Strong Ships for Stormy Seas.”
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 18, no. 4 (October 1988): 525-539.
Eshanov, Din. “The Role of Multinational Corporations from the Neoinstitutionalist and
International Law Perspectives: The Concept of the Three Level Game.” NYU
Environmental Law Journal 16, no. 1 (2008): 110-169.
Faure, Michel and Wang Hui. “The International Regimes for Compensation of Oil Pollution
Damage: Are They Effective?” Review of European Comparative International and
Environmental Law 12, no. 3 (2003): 242-253.
Frey, Bruno S. “The Public Choice of International Political Economy.” International
Organization 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 199-223.
Feraru, Anne Thomson. “Transnational Political Interest and the Global Environment.”
International Organization 28, no. 1 (Winter 1974): 31-60.
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 12,
no. 2 (April 2006): 219-245.
Friedheim, R.L. and J.B. Kadane. “Quantitative Content Analysis of the United Nations Seabed
Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study.” International Organization
24, no. 3 (Summer 1970): 479-502.
Gais, Thomas L., Mark A. Petersen, and Jack L. Walker. “Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and
Representative Institutions in American National Government.” British Journal of
Political Science 14, no 2 (1984): 161-185.
Galloway, Jonathan F. “Worldwide Corporations and International Integration: The Case of
INTELSAT.” International Organization 24, no. 3 (1970): 503-519.
Gomez Mera, Laura. “Regime Complexity and Global Governance: The Case of Trafficking in
Persons.” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 3, (2015): 566-595.
Grieves, Forest. “Classical Writers of International Law and the Environment.” Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review 4, no 2 (1975): 309-322.

250

Handl, Gunther. “Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution.” American
Journal of International Law 69, no. 1 (January, 1975): 50-76.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittensberger. “Integrating Theories of
International Regimes.” Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (January, 2000): 3-33.
Healy, Nicholas J. “The CMI and IMCO Draft Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution.”
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 1, no. 1 (October, 1969): 93-105.
Healy, Nicholas J. “The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
1969.” Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 1, no. 2 (January, 1970): 317-323.
Henkin, Louis. “Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make – Or Break – International Law?”
American Journal of International Law 65, no. 1 (January, 1971): 131-136.
Houdlett, Ronald R. “Direct Action Statutes and Marine Insurance P & I Insurance.” Journal of
Maritime Law & Commerce 3, no. 1 (April, 1972): 559-573.
Huntington, Samuel P. “The Marasmus of the I.C.C.” Yale Law Journal 61, no. 4 (April 1952)
467-509.
Johnson, Tana and Johannes Urpelainen, “A Strategic Theory of Regime Integration and
Separation.” International Organization 66, no. 4 (October, 2012): 645-677.
Keeton, G.W. “The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon.” Current Legal Problems 21, no. 1 (January
1968): 94-112.
Kennan, George F. “To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal.” Foreign Affairs 48, no. 3
(April, 1970): 401-413.
Kiern, Lawrence I. “Liability, Compensation and Financial Responsibility Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade.” Tulane Maritime Law Journal
36, no. 2 (Winter, 2011): 2-64.
Krasner, Steven. “International Law and International Relations, Together, Apart, Together?”
Chicago Journal of International Law 1, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 93-99.
Lerner, Daniel and Marguerite Kramer. “French Elite Perspectives on the United Nations.”
International Organization 17, no. 1 (Winter 1963); 54-75.
Lovins, Amory. “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken.” Foreign Affairs 55, no. 1 (October
1976): 65-96.
Mahoney, James. "Process Tracing and Historical Explanation." Security Studies 24, no. 2
(2015): 200-18.
251

McKay, Amy. “Buying Policy? The Effects of Lobbyist’s Resources on their Policy Success.”
Political Science Quarterly 65, no. 4 (December 2012): 908-923.
Mendelsohn, Allan I. “Marine Liability for Oil Pollution: Domestic and International Law.”
George Washington Law Review 38, no. 1 (October 1969): 1-32.
Mendelsohn, Allan I. “The Public Interest and Private International Maritime Law.” William and
Mary Law Review 2, no. 4 (Summer 1969): 783-819.
Modelski, George. “The Promise of Geocentric Politics.” World Politics 22, no. 4 (July, 1970):
617-635.
Morgan, Jeffrey D. “The Oil Pollution Act of 1990.” Fordham Environmental Law Review 6, no.
1 (1994): 1-27.
Morris, Brandon, T. “Oil, Money and the Environment: Punitive Damages Under Due Process,
Preemption, and Maritime Law in the Wake of the EXXON VALDEZ Litigation.”
Tulane Maritime Law Journal 33, no.1 (Winter 2008): 165-202.
Neuman, Robert H. “Oil on Troubled Waters: The International Control of Marine Pollution.”
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 2, no. 1 (January 1971): 349-361.
O’Connell, Dennis M. “Reflections on Brussels: IMCO and the 1969 Pollution Conventions.”
Cornell International Law Journal 3, no. 2 (Spring 1970): 166-188.
“Oil Pollution of the Sea.” Harvard International Law Journal 10, no.2 (Spring 1969): 316-359.
Raynolds, Laura T. “The Globalization of Organic Agro-Food Networks.” World Development
32, no. 5 (2004): 725-743.
Risse-Kappen. “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and
the End of the Cold War.” International Organization 48, no.2 (Spring 1994): 185-214.
Roosevelt, Curtis. “The Politics of Development: A Role for Interest and Pressure Groups.”
International Associations 5 (1970): 283-289.
Savage, Tyler J. “North American Oil Pollution: Who is Liable for a Canadian/American
Catastrophe?” Roger Williams University Law Review 4, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 335-386.
Schachter, Oscar and Daniel Serwer. “Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies.” American
Journal of International Law 65, no. 1 (January 1971): 84-111.
Schweller, Randall. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Theory of Understanding.”
International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 159-201.
252

Sell, Susan and Aseem Prakash. “Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business and
NGO Networks in International Property Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 48, no.
1 (March 2004): 93-120.
Sperdokli, Elli. “Marine Insurance for Oil Pollution.” Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Law
Journal 49, no. 2 (2014): 611-43.
Stein, Arthur A. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World.”
International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 299-324.
Utton, Albert. “Protective Measures and the Torrey Canyon.” Boston College Industrial and
Commercial Law Review 9, no. 3 (1968): 613-631.
Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24, no. 1
(Summer 1999): 5-41.
Wood, Steve, Neil Wrigley and Neil M. Coe. “Capital Discipline and Financial Market Relations
in Retail Globalization: Insights from the Case of Tesco plc.”Journal of Economic
Geography 17, no. 1 (January 2017): 31-57.
Xu, Jingjing. “The Law and Economics of Pollution Damage Arising from Carriage of Oil by
Sea.” Marine Pollution Management 36, no. 4 (August 2009): 309-323.
Young, Oran. “International Regimes.” World Politics 32, no. 3 (April 1980): 331-356.

253

MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES
Bachman, W.A., “Oil Spills Where are we heading?” Oil & Gas Journal, June 1, 1970.
Bill C - 202, 2nd Sess., 28th Parliament, 18-19 Elizabeth II c. 47 (1969-1970). reproduced in 9
International Legal Materials, 543 (1970).
Bongaerts, Jan C. And Aline F. M. DeBievre, “Insurance for Civil Liability for Marine Oil
Pollution Damages,” The Geneva Papers on Risk and on Insurance, 12 , no. 43, April
1997 pages 145-157.
“British-American Diplomacy, The Caroline Case.” New Haven: Yale Law School, Lilian
Goldman Law Library.
Civil Law Convention (International Maritime Organization), 1992, and 1992 Fund Convention
(text on International Maritime Organization website).
Code of Hammurabi, Number 53.
Comité Maritme International, Constitution, www.comitemaritime.org/part1-genera.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, March 19, 1971.
Constitution of India 48A.
Contract Regarding An Interim Supplement To Tankker Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CRISTAL), International Legal Materials,10, no.1 (January 1971): 137-144.
“Corporations more powerful than nations,” www.makeworldwealthhistory.org, 2014.
Cruise Ship Registry, Flag of Convenience, Flag Ship Control, www.cruisemapper.com
Ford, Don, Private International Law, Washington D.C.: American Society of International Law,
2013.
Galloway, Jonathan F., “Multinational Enterprises as worldwide interest Groups,” paper
delivered at the sixty-sixth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Los of Angeles, 1970.
George, J. David “Can the Seas Survive?” The Ecologist, March, 1971.
Gopalan, Sasidharan, Jeremy Liu, and Teminite Tefera, Green International Political Economy:
Issues and Concerns, in Public Policy, Volume V, Winter 2010-2011, George Mason
University School of Public Policy.
254

“Evaluation of the Environmental Impact of Agriculture at the Farm Level: A Comparative
Analysis of 12 Indicator Based Methods” in Agriculture, Ecosystems. & Environment,
Volumes 1-3, December 2002.
International Convention for the Prevention of pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954).
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (reproduced in Appendix).
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties (reproduced in Appendix).
International Environmental Agreements Database Project.
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971 (text on International
Maritime Organization website)
International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Rivers, 1966.
Kamieniecki, Sheldon and Michael E. Kraft, The Evolution of Research on U.S. Environmental
Policy, oxfordhandbooks.com.
“Key Men: They Switch Between Industry and Federal Posts,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, March 19, 1971.
Knott, David, “Hole Appears in Tanker Spill Cover,” Oil and Gas Journal, March 17, 1997, 30.
McCarty, Niall, “The World’s Biggest Employers,” Forbes Magazine June 23, 2015, www.
Forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/201506/23-worldsbiggest employers.
Mendelsohn, Allan I., Submission made on April 24, 2015, in response to the Request of the
United States Government for Public Comment on the Issue of Foreign Government
Subsidies to Foreign Subsidies to Foreign Air Carriers.
Moss, Lara “The 13 largest oil spills in history,” www.mnn.com/earth matters/wilderness/stories.
National Center for Policy Analysis “How U.S. Agricultural Subsidies Harm the Environment,
Taxpayers and the Poor,” August 7, 2013.
New York Times, March 25, 28 and 29, 1967.
Nobuoka, Yoko, Jane Ellis, and Sarah Pyndt Andersen, Encouraging Increased Climate Action
by Non-Party Stakeholders, Climate Change Expert Group, Paper No. 2015 (5), October
2015. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 8.
255

Nordic Environmental Protection Convention (1974).
Noumea Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South
Pacific Region (1985).
O’Hagan, John, The Dynamics of Bilateral Regime Formation in Northern American Great
Lakes Basin. Ph.D. dissertation the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, (Tufts
University) 2009, in ProQuest Dissertation Publishing 2009, 3359806.
“Oil Dumping Poses Growing Problem,” Chemical and Engineering News, November 30, 1970.
“The Oil Spills at Brussels” (editorial), Journal of Commerce, November 17, 1969.
Osuga, Hideo, “International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage,” discussion at the Petroleum Association of Japan symposium held at Tokyo on
March 4, 1996.
Outer Space Treaty Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, January 27, 1967, TIAS No. 6347.
Report of the 28th Annual Meeting of the Subscribers to the American Hull Insurance Syndicate,
March 18, 1971.
Schulman, Leon, “Lloyd’s—After 284 Years, Young, Vibrant,” Insurance Advocate, May 27,
1972.
Slaughter, Ann-Marie, “The Only Way Forward: Can the new world order be saved by
humanism?” Foreign Policy: The Leading Global Thinkers of 2016,
Foreignpolicy.com/2016/essay.
Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP),
International Legal Materials, 8, no. 9 (May 1969): 497-501.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957).
Wellington Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities.
World GDP (nominal ranking 2014) www.statisticstimes.com/economy/world-gdp-ranking.php
www.ila.hq.org.
www.internationalcomite.org

256

UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, “Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the
Service of the United Nations,” International Court of Justice, I.C.J. Reports, 1949.
The Corfu Channel Case Merits) International Court April 9th 1949. Leyden: A.W. Sitjhoff’s
Publishing Company.
Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrong Acts in Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third Sessions, UN GAOR 56th
Sess, Sup, UN Doc A/56/10 (2001).
International Civil Aviation Organization, International Conference on Private Air Law, The
Hague, September, 1955 (Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization) (Doc.
7686 n LC/140).
Report on the World Commission on Environment, United Nations General Assembly A/43/427,
1987.
“Liability and Compensation for Ship-Source Oil Pollution: an Overview of the Legal
Framework for Oil Pollution Damage from Takers”, United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 2012.
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Document A/CONF - 151-26
(Vol I) August 25th, 1992.
The Trail Smelter Arbitration, United Nations Treaty Series.
UN Global Compact (1998).
United Nations Declaration on Environment and Development (1972).
United Nations Maritime Conference, Geneva, 19 February to 6 March, 1948, Final Act and
Related Documents, U.N. Publications.
United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 450 P.11, Convention on the High Seas (1958).

257

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
An Act to Authorize the Office of Management and Budget to Establish a System Governing the
Creation of Advisory Committees Throughout the Federal Government Which Are
Created to Advise Officers and Agencies of the Federal Government, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
Hearings Held Before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Movements of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ninety First Congress, First Session, May 8, 13, 14
and 15 1969 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1969).
Neuman, Robert E., Rear Admiral William L. Morrison, U.S.C.G., Charles I. Bevans, Louis P.
Georgantas, Report of the United States Delegation to the International Legal Conference
on Marine Pollution Damage, Submitted to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1969.
Ocean Dumping: A National Policy: A Report to the President Prepared by the Council on
Environmental Quality, October, 1970.
Report on the International Control of Pollution, United States House of Representatives, 90th
Congress, first session, Report 628, September 11, 1967.
United States Senate Committee on Public Works, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution
(IMCO Civil Liabilities Convention), Ninety First Congress, 2nd Session, July 21 and 22,
1970.
United States Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Oceans and Environmental Affairs of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, The International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Damage, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session,
April 17 and 18, 1973.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 484.
United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Report on
Implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (2004).
United States Office of Science and Technology, The Oil Spill Problem (1971).
“U.S. Regrets Canada’s Extension of High Seas Jurisdiction,” Department of State Bulletin, 64.,
no.1649, (February 1, 1971): 139.

258

